A strategy for NASA's utilization of space assets in the former Soviet Union by Rymarcsuk, Jim A
A Strategy for NASA's Utilization
of Space Assets in the Former Soviet Union
by
Jim Arthur Rymarcsuk
B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Stanford University (1986)
M.S., Astronautical Engineering, Stanford University (1987)
M.B.A., Management, Golden Gate University (1989)
Submitted to the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1993
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1993
All rights reserved
Signature of Author
De artment of AeronaIics and Astronautics
April 21, 1993
Certified by
CiibPro fe-ard f Crawley
f kThesis Advisor
Certified by
Professor Leon Trilling
Thesis Advisor
Accepted by
Professor Richard de Neufville
/ Chairman, Technology aId Policy Program
Accepted by Acc - Pr4ssor Harold Y. Wachman
Chairman; Department Graduate Committee
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TFCHNOLOGY
[JUN 08 1993 Aero
UBRARIES

A STRATEGY FOR NASA'S UTILIZATION
OF SPACE ASSETS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
by
Jim Arthur Rymarcsuk
Submitted to the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
on April 21, 1993 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science in Technology and Policy
ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War has opened up unprecedented opportunities for
the U.S. to benefit from the vast resources of the former Soviet space program.
Unfortunately, due to a lack of clear and consistent policies, the U.S. space
community and NASA in particular has been slow to exploit these opportunities.
In this paper an improved strategy for NASA's pursuit of Russian cooperation is
developed that specifies the recommended areas in which to cooperate and the
suggested means for implementation. Detailed information on the capabilities
and operation of former Soviet space enterprises is also presented as background.
The strategy was developed using lessons learned from past and on-going joint
aerospace projects with Russian as well as other international partners. Evidence
to support the recommendations was gathered through dozens of interviews
with space officials both in the U.S. and former Soviet Union.
The analysis identifies newly emerging objectives for international space
ventures in support of foreign policy and industrial competitiveness goals.
NASA's present approach to cooperating with Russia is built upon short-term
government-led projects that neglect these broader objectives. Recommendations
for making space policy structures at NASA and at the national level more
responsive to U.S. long-term strategic interests are presented to overcome this
shortcoming. To effectively meet the needs of U.S. and Russian partners alike, it
is recommended that NASA make greater use of private companies with their
efficient commercial practices as the interface to Russian industrial enterprises.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Soviet Union, with its enormous military strength and hostile political
ideology towards Western democracies, represented the single greatest threat to
U.S. national security for over thirty years. In support of its Cold War
competition with the U.S., the Soviet Union created the world's largest aerospace
industry to produce military hardware and technological achievements to wage
its propaganda campaigns. But with the ascension of Mikail Gorbachev in 1985,
a thaw in the Cold War began as a dramatic era of restructuring (perestroika)
took hold of Russian society. Eventually the forces that Gorbachev put in motion
went beyond his control leading ultimately to the collapse of the Soviet Union in
December 1991. With the central government that created it no longer existing,
the former Soviet space program was plunged into turmoil. The aerospace
industry had enjoyed extensive government support throughout the Cold War
years, providing it the resources to become one of the few Soviet industries with
products and technologies of international caliber. Yet to the surprise and
dismay of Soviet industrial leaders, their initial efforts to earn hard currency by
selling space hardware and services abroad met with little success. Fear of
political instabilities, effects on domestic industry, and national security concerns
along with simple ignorance of what the Russians had to offer often resulted in
lukewarm Western responses. This coolness toward Russian overtures has now
changed led by the Europeans and their direct financial support of the Russian
space program beginning in 1991. In the U.S., due mainly to foreign policy
concerns that without assistance Soviet industry would be unable to transition to
a market economy or control the proliferation of weapon technologies, the
government has also begun to support increased space contacts with the
Russians. A new agreement that substantially expands the potential areas for
U.S.-Russian cooperation in space was signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in
June, 1992 and it has resulted in a near explosion of joint space ventures between
the two former adversaries.
The new cooperative environment between the U.S. and Russia opened up
many promising opportunities for American organizations to benefit from the
accomplishments of the Soviet space program. The former Soviet Union has ten
operational launch vehicles including the enormous Energia booster which can
place more than five times as much mass into orbit as any U.S. vehicle. Even
under the present chaotic conditions the Russians continue to launch over 50
flights a year, more than the rest of the world combined. Russian cosmonauts
have spent over a year in space and continuously man the Mir station which has
orbited the Earth since 1986, a far cry from the few weeks a year that Americans
spend in space. And many Russian space technologies in such areas as materials
processing, propulsion, and power systems are significantly more advanced than
in the U.S.. Without a doubt, there is technically much that the Russians could
offer the U.S. space program. In addition, the former Soviet Union's emphasis on
mass producing simple space hardware could provide the U.S. a low cost option
for meeting some of its space hardware needs.
But beyond the opportunities to enhance the U.S. space program by
utilizing Russian capabilities, cooperating with the Russians also supports many
foreign policy goals. The former Soviet states have undertaken an enormously
difficult task in attempting to transition from an authoritarian form of
government with a centrally planned economy to a democracy built upon free
market capitalism. A successful completion of this transition is clearly in the best
interest of the United States, so prudent policy dictates that the U.S. do whatever
it can to support Russian efforts to change. Yet years of neglect and improper
use have made many sectors of the Russian economy hopelessly inefficient and
possibly unsalvageable. The aerospace industry is one of the few exceptions to
this rule, having prospered throughout the Cold War years and developed
technologies that could make it internationally competitive. International
cooperation with the former Soviet space program could give the aerospace
industry the opening it needs to enter the world economy and potentially lead
other Russian industries out of the stagnation imposed on them by communist
rule. A prosperous free market economy in Russia would provide a foundation
for enhanced democracy and greater friendship with Western nations.
Without Western support, the former Soviet space industry will continue to
deteriorate and its personnel will become more desperate as sources of funding
disappear. Eventually individual experts or whole enterprises may be forced by
economic necessity to abandon their advanced technologies or sell them to
nations potentially hostile to the U.S.. The loss of technologies whose
development required years of effort and the expenditure of untold resources
would be a terrible waste. Likewise, proliferation of technologies with military
applications from Russia to such belligerent nations as Iraq or Iran would do
great damage to U.S. national security. U.S. policy must provide alternatives,
besides technology abandonment or proliferation, to Russian space enterprises
trying to preserve their existence. Offering the Russians a role in international
cooperative space activities would provide them a viable alternative and allow
for improved relations between the U.S. and former Soviet states.
The opportunities for cooperating with the Russians in space are indeed
promising while the consequences of ignoring these opportunities could be
disastrous. Therefore the U.S. government has begun to put great effort into
enhancing space contacts with the former Soviet republics. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has taken the lead in utilizing
Russian capabilities, although other government agencies, most notably the
Department of Defense (DoD), and private corporations are also significantly
involved. The U.S. State Department has taken the lead in promoting Russian
cooperation and in its coordination among the various government agencies.
Unfortunately, it has not been very successful in reducing interagency conflict or
in developing a coherent and consistent U.S. policy on the use of former Soviet
space capabilities. To date, decisions on the use of Russian space assets have
been made on a case-by-case basis, sometimes representing one agency's view
and sometimes representing another's. And even within agencies such as NASA,
there is little unanimity on the best approach for pursuing cooperation and
consequently little uniformity of policy. The result is that the U.S. government in
general, and NASA in particular, has pursued inconsistent and inefficient
approaches to cooperation that have limited progress and sent mixed signals to
potential partners in Russia.
The analysis presented in the following chapters will address the
shortcomings in NASA's approach, and the government's approach in general,
for pursuing cooperation with the former Soviet space program. Although this
assessment focuses on NASA's particular needs, due to the space agency's broad
involvement in space activities, many of the recommendations will be widely
applicable to other government agencies or to industry. The purpose of this
study is to answer two main questions : 1) Under what circumstances should
NASA seek cooperation with the Russians? and 2) In such cases, how should
cooperation be pursued? Through answering these questions a general strategy
for guiding NASA policy makers and project managers will be developed. A key
consideration in deriving NASA's strategy will be its affect on other U.S. agencies
and interest groups. To avoid the parochial bias that has to date plagued the
debate on the use of Russian space assets, a strategic U.S.-level perspective will
be maintained whenever possible. Two main sources of information will be used
for determining the recommended strategies for cooperation: technical and
organization knowledge of the Russian space program and evidence from past
and on-going joint U.S.-Russian space projects. European experience in
cooperating with the Russians as well as lessons learned from U.S. space
cooperation with other nations will also be used to enlighten the
recommendations. Finally, the needs and modes of operation of the U.S. space
program will play a large role in determining which strategies are workable. All
of this information will be integrated in an analytical framework based on the
costs and benefits of international space cooperation as discussed in the next
section. By weighing the benefits against the costs, appropriate areas for
cooperation will be identified and through knowledge of U.S. and Russian needs
and prior experience in cooperation, effective approaches for proceeding in these
areas will be determined.
A major objective of this analysis is to bring together information from
diverse sources to synthesize a better and more consistent strategy for
cooperating in space. Too little exchange of lessons learned from different
sectors of the space industry, or from related industries, has occurred resulting in
many of the same mistakes being repeated. By addressing multiple sectors at
once and considering the interests of more than just a single agency, this analysis
will avoid the myopic outlook that is crippling present space policy toward the
Russians. The entry of the Russians into the international space arena opens up
many exciting opportunities for accelerating such fields as manned space
exploration and the commercialization of space. By not focusing on narrow
organizational interests and the risks involved, but instead creatively exploiting
the unprecedented opportunities, NASA along with the rest of the U.S. space
community could make use of Russian space assets to stimulate a new era of
progress in the exploration and utilization of outer space.
Before proceeding on to the detailed discussions of Russian capabilities and
strategies for their use, this introductory chapter provides some necessary
background on the costs and benefits involved in international cooperation and
the present status of joint activities with the Russians. This is followed in
Chapter 2 with a thorough overview of the organization of the former Soviet
space program and the space systems that support it. Significant historical
information on Russian space organizations is also provided in that chapter to
help create a better picture of Russian business practices and how they have
developed. Chapter 3 addresses the question of in what areas should NASA seek
U.S.-Russian cooperation in space. Chapter 4 discusses how cooperation should
be pursued in these promising areas. The discussions in both of these chapters
will draw heavily upon the cost/benefit framework presented in the next section
as well as the knowledge of Russian space activities and past cooperative
experiences that will be described in later chapters. Chapter 5 concludes the
study with a summary of the findings from the earlier chapters and
recommendations for improving NASA's approach to cooperating with the
Russians. To help simplify nomenclature in the following discussion, the term
"Russian" will be used loosely to mean all people of the former Soviet Union
unless clear distinction between inhabitants of the different republics is required.
In such cases names for individual nationalities such as Ukrainian, Azerbaijani,
etc. will be used and the phrase "former Soviet" will be used when describing all
residents of the former U.S.S.R..
1.1 Benefits and Costs of International Cooperation
The inherently supra-national nature of outer space makes it a natural place
to pursue international cooperation. Although the Cold War stifled East-West
space cooperation for decades, within each political bloc international joint
ventures became the rule in space activities. From its earliest days of operation,
the U.S. space program has solicited participation in its projects from nations all
over the world. Even the dramatic competition that developed between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. in space was not necessarily inevitable. In an address at the United
Nations on September 20, 1963, President John F. Kennedy said: "Why must the
first flight of a man to the Moon be the subject of a competition between
individual countries? Without a doubt, we need to figure out why the scientists
and astronauts of our two countries - in essence, of all mankind -- cannot
consolidate their efforts in the exploration of space"1 . Following this speak and
only eleven days before he was killed, President Kennedy wrote Memorandum
on Actions in National Security No. 271, only recently declassified, in which he
proposed initiating space cooperation with the U.S.S.R., including the
exploration of the Moon. From this newly revealed evidence it is apparent that
even President Kennedy, who instigated the great race to the Moon, felt that
cooperation in space was preferable to rivalry. Cooperation in space exploration
and utilization enjoys much popular appeal since by international law space is
considered "the province of all mankind" 2. However, just because cooperating
in space is widely appealing does not mean that the costs and risks involved in
conducting multinational projects can be ignored.
Before analyzing the most promising areas for cooperation with the Russian
space program and how they should be pursued, it is important to first have a
clear understanding of the benefits and costs that can reasonably be expected
from international cooperation. Many government agencies and private
companies have jumped on the band wagon and espoused all of the wonderful
things which international cooperation in space will bring without much
thoughtful reflection. Such justifications for international projects as increased
cultural understanding, improved friendships among nations and a greater
world vision may sound great, but will multinational space projects alone really
lead to a more harmonious world? It is doubtful. The added expense of
internationalizing a space project must be justified by concrete benefits that result
from the participation of many nations. These benefits may be political as well as
technical or economic but they must be identifiable and preferably quantifiable,
not some vague notion like increased international understanding. The following
discussion begins with a general outline of the benefits and costs that can be
expected from an international space project. This is followed in the next section
1 J. Logsdon & G. Khozin, "Space Program: The Path to Space, Together or Separately?
Lessons and Perspectives of the Cooperation Among the Scientists of Two Superpowers",
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 14, 1992, p. 6.
2 "Article I", Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, United Nations Treaty,
entered into force October 10, 1967.
by specific benefits and costs arising from the use of Russian space assets. The
framework presented in the pages to follow will be used in later chapters to
determine those areas where Russian cooperation is viable and those areas were
the costs exceed the benefits and therefore cooperation should not be pursued.
1.1.1 General Benefits and Costs of Cooperating in Space
The three main reasons why nations pursue international cooperation in
space activities are to: 1) improve the effectiveness of their space program,
2) further foreign policy objectives, and 3) support the competitiveness of their
domestic industries. The most obvious benefits from cooperating in space are
those garnered by a nation's space program. International cooperation usually
entails cost sharing among nations which allows large space projects to be
undertaken that would be too expensive for any individual nation to pursue.
The trend in space activities is toward ever larger and more complex projects and
consequently one would expect this motivation for international cooperation to
become increasingly important. In addition to sharing costs, international
cooperation allows the sharing of expertise, technology and hardware so that
each nation can benefit from the strengths of its partners. In an analogous
manner to a market economy, by allowing each partner to contribute to joint
projects in those areas where they has a comparative advantage, the projects' net
efficiency can be increased. These improved efficiencies can result in lower
project costs, enhanced technical capabilities, and accelerated schedules.
Through international cooperation a nation's space program can leverage on its
strengths to become more effective and contribute to grand international
endeavors that it could not dream of doing alone.
Yet international cooperation in space is not pursued simply for the
technical and costs advantages it provides to national space programs. Political
or foreign policy motivations have always played a large role in promoting
international projects. Space cooperation is used to provide technical and
financial support to allies and its accomplishments are used as propaganda
weapons against adversaries. Few would deny that a major purpose of U.S.
international space projects during the Cold War was to buttress America's
position in East-West competition. The secondary effects from combining efforts
in space can also be important for international relations. By working together
on joint projects, the goals and perspectives of different nations are brought
together providing common ground on which to build improved future
relationships. And the channels of communications that are developed through
joint space activities will unavoidably increase mutual knowledge and empathy
among participants form different nations. Finally, through international
participation a space project gains political clout which it would not otherwise
have. Policy makers are much less likely to modify or cancel a project that has
contributions from international partners. Therefore, international cooperation
may be used as a domestic political weapon to give projects greater resiliency to
the never-ending reviews from funding sources.
The ever more integrated global economy has increased recognition of the
role that international cooperation and joint ventures play in improving the
competitiveness of domestic industries. The space industry, like other high
technology sectors, is beginning to take advantage of international opportunities
to enhance domestic competitiveness. The international environment has shifted
from East-West military confrontation to West-West economic competition and
the goals of our international activities in space should reflect this shift3 . In
addition to pursuing international cooperation to further program effectiveness
and foreign policy objectives, governments are now beginning to use joint space
activities to help their domestic industries become more competitive. Through
joint ventures in space, companies can learn from their foreign partners better
procedures, technologies and management practices that can help to improve
their overall efficiency. No nation has a monopoly on good ideas making
openness to foreign practices and technologies essential to remaining
competitive. International competition and cooperation are not mutually
exclusive but can be used to compliment each other. Well conceived cooperative
projects can improve U.S. industry's performance in areas of strategic importance
to future competition. Such improved performance will provide industry the
comparative advantage needed to successfully compete in the emerging global
marketplace for space goods and services.
There are of course considerable costs and risks that international
cooperation adds to a space project. First of all, it is simply more complicated to
manage a project that has elements contributed from several different nations.
There are language barriers, cultural differences, varying technical standards,
3 K. Pedersen, "Some Thoughts on International Space Cooperation and Interests in the Post
Cold War World", Space Policy. August 1992, pp. 230-232.
and diverse management and legal practices that must be overcome.
Identification of interfaces specifications becomes an issue for complex
international negotiations instead of being determined by the simple exchange of
requirements documents. And even telephoning your partners or traveling to
their facilities can add substantial expense, not to mention the costs for making
foreign systems technically compatible with each other. Because of these
reasons, internationalizing a space project nearly always results in increased
operating costs, more convoluted management structures and slower progress.
Related to the costs for increased management complexity are the risk to
program success that international cooperation brings. The U.S. has always
considered leadership in space exploration an important element of its space
program. In the past leadership meant out performing the Soviets and allowing
U.S. allies only to contribute nonessential elements to joint space projects.
However, now that competition with the Russians has waned and greater parity
in space capabilities exists worldwide, the U.S. is no longer able to demand
control of the critical path in all of its collaborative efforts without isolating itself.
America needs to modify its definition of leadership to include leading more
equal cooperative efforts that are chosen through a policy of selective
interdependence 4. Future participation in international projects will
undoubtedly expose the U.S. to the prospect that its partners will not come
through, possibly resulting in the project's failure. Such heightened risks are
inherent in any truly cooperative activity. But by developing long-term
relationships with other nations built on trust and respect, these risks can be
minimized and America can remain a world leader in space. Continued U.S.
leadership will also be important for justifying the space program at home now
that the geopolitical imperative to compete with the Russians no longer exists.
The final costs of international space activities that should be mentioned are
those related with the control of technology transfer. A major reason why
nations get involved in joint space activities is because of the technological and
managerial knowledge that can be gained by working with foreign enterprises.
But for competitive as well as national security reasons, nations wish to control
the amount of technology they transfer to a partner in a cooperative project.
4 J. Logsdon & J. Fabian, International Cooeration in Space: New Opportunities. New
Approaches Association of Space Explorers and the Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University, April 1992, p. 8.
Establishing technology safeguards can be costly and can limit interaction among
participants from different nations in a joint venture. And if the safeguards fail,
the costs due to reduced industrial competitiveness or compromised national
security can be enormous. For these reasons, sophisticated and expensive
procedures for controlling technology transfer are nearly always present in
projects involving international cooperation.
1.1.2 Specific Reasons for Utilizing Russian Space Assets
The major benefits from utilizing Russian space capabilities fall into the
same three categories as the benefits from international cooperation in general:
increased space program effectiveness, support of foreign policy goals, and
enhanced competitiveness of the domestic industry. Both the U.S. civil and
military space programs could significantly benefit from access to the space
technologies, experience, and flight systems developed as a result of the former
Soviet Union's huge investment in space. These benefits could include reduced
costs for development, procurement and operations, improved performance of
space systems, and shorter development times. The "bargain basement" prices at
which the Russians are now offering their space systems and technologies are far
below what it would cost to obtain similar capabilities domestically.
Additionally, there are benefits from simply coordinating the space activities of
the world's two leading space powers, independent of any procurement of
assets. By sharing scientific data and flight opportunities, making navigation,
communications and manned systems compatible, and coordinating tracking
and control operations, both the U.S. and Russian space programs could be
improved even without the exchange of assets.
However, by directly utilizing Russian space assets, several important
foreign policy goals could simultaneously be achieved. U.S. purchase of Russian
aerospace products would provide desperately needed capital to an industry that
is attempting to transition from military to commercial products and from a
communist to a capitalist structure. Both of these trends are in America's best
interest. Even former President Reagan, who considered the Soviet Union an
"Evil Empire", has called for the U.S. to begin making large scale purchases of
Russian space hardware to help "recapitalize" the economy5 . Through joint
5 R. Reagan, "A Good Deal: Buy Russia's Space Program", Wall Street Tournal,
March 25, 1992, p. 1.
business ventures with Western firms, Russian enterprises can gain not only
much needed funding but also exposure to Western business practices which can
teach them a great deal about how capitalism works. Supporting the aerospace
industry in these difficult times, one of the few Russian industries with the
potential to be internationally competitive, could allow the U.S. to create a
successful model of Western-style capitalism in Russia for the rest of the
economy to emulate. In addition, financial support to the aerospace enterprises
would help keep their employees reasonably well paid, thus reducing the
temptation to sell their services abroad and possibly proliferate weapons
technologies to potential U.S. adversaries. Finally, increasing governmental and
business contacts with the former Soviet Union is important for opening up
channels of communications that have long been closed due to political tensions.
Maintaining free and open communications will be essential if future political
confrontation is to be avoided.
Allowing U.S. businesses access to Russian space assets can provide benefits
by improving their competitiveness in both domestic and international markets.
Through joint ventures to share technologies or cooperate in product
development, production or marketing, U.S. firms can lower the costs and
improve the customer appeal of their existing products. They can also gain
access to completely new products or services that create heretofore unavailable
business opportunities. U.S. firms can be assured that their foreign competitors
are not ignoring what the Russians have to offer and that their future
competitiveness may well depend on wise use of Russian capabilities. On the
other hand, the most often cited reason for restricting cooperation with the
Russians in space is the threat it poses to U.S. industry. Allowing low priced
Russian space hardware, particularly launch vehicles, to compete in the
international market could drastically reduce the market share of U.S. firms.
Loss of market share would be particularly devastating in the contracting
aerospace and defense industry whose companies are already experiencing mass
lay-offs6. Although satellite manufacturers and other purchasers of launch
services would benefit from access to low cost Russian boosters, the U.S. launch
industry would certainly suffer, at least in the short-term.
6 "General Dynamics Laying-Off 10-15% of Staff", Space News. September 28,1992, p. 2 .
"Martin Marietta to Lay-Off 1,750 People This Year", S~ace News. October 5, 1992, p. 1.
Other costs or risks that accompany the use of Russian space assets are the
potential for reduced national security, increased management complexity, and
negative foreign policy impacts. The main national security concerns involve
technology transfer, as discussed in the previous section, and support of an
industry in Russia that may present a future military threat. Some in the U.S.
defense establishment believe that it is unwise to aid the Russian aerospace
industry because it helps Russia to sustain the ability to militarily threaten the
West. The general contention that international cooperation inflates costs and
risks due to increased management complexity is exacerbated in the former
U.S.S.R. by their political and economic instabilities and their Byzantine
management structures. By all accounts, understanding Russian business
relationships is difficult and having any confidence that once you have learned
them they will remain unchanged, is impossible 7. The large initial investment
required to overcome the systemic barriers between U.S. and Russian business
practices is often the cause of failure for aspiring international joint ventures.
Increased interaction with the Russian space program also has foreign policy
costs as well as foreign policy benefits. As the U.S. pursues more joint activities
with Russia, it runs the risk of neglecting its more traditional partners in the
space field. There are only a limited number of space projects to go around and
by improving our relationships with former Soviet states through enhanced
cooperation, we may worsen our friendship with other nations by allowing their
role in joint space projects to decline. And of course the most obvious cost in
utilizing Russian space assets is the direct financial burden of paying for the
Russian equipment. Some in U.S. industry argue that the government's priority
should be to invest funds in the ailing U.S. economy where jobs need to be
created, not to distribute taxpayer dollars to prop up foreign economies.
The difficulty with many of the benefits and costs discussed above is that
they accrue to different organizations and interest groups throughout society and
thus it is hard to balance them off against each other. The State Department may
see all kinds of good foreign policy reasons to increase space cooperation with
the Russians, but the domestic launch industry and its representatives in the U.S.
government see only the costs that such a policy would impose on them.
Similarly, some U.S. firms may be able to realize substantial benefits through
7 E. Crawley & J. Rymarcsuk, "U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space: Benefits, Obstacles and
Opportunities", Space Policy, February 1992, p. 36.
joint research projects with Russian enterprises but the Defense Department may
object to such projects because of their potential dissemination of sensitive
defense technologies. To determine the most fertile areas for pursuing joint
space activities with Russia, it is important not only to weigh off the costs and
benefits to one's own organization, but also to consider the affects on external
organizations. Unfortunately, this approach has often not been followed leading
to extensive interagency conflict in the government along with a host of industry
and government disputes concerning the use of Russian space hardware.
1.2 Present Status of Joint Activities with Russia
The economic imperative to cut costs and become more efficient is driving
many nations to investigate the use of Russian assets to improve their space
programs. As cost control becomes more important, economics as well as foreign
policy and scientific motives is playing a larger role in determining a nation's
international space strategy. This has not always been the case. Prior to the
1970's, the U.S. and Soviet space programs eclipsed all others and openly used
space as an arena for political competition in the Cold War. Other countries
desiring access to space had to rely on U.S. or Russian launch capabilities to get
them there. However this began to change in the 1970's as other nations, most
notably the Europeans, developed their own satellites and space boosters. The
1980's saw the conversion of international space activities from a bipolar
environment completely dominated by the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to one with
multiple poles supported by independent launch capabilities in Europe, China,
India, and Japan among others. As the number of nations utilizing space grew
along with the commercial applications for space systems, economic competition
became a driving force in the space industry. No longer were space activities
conducted strictly for political and scientific motives as in the past, but for
economic profit. Nonetheless until the 1990's, the U.S. maintained a clear
superiority in space technology with its only viable competitor in terms of
strength and breadth of program being the Soviet Union whose capabilities were
largely inaccessible to the rest of the world. This all changed with the collapse of
communism and the Soviet state, opening up the vast resources of the Russian
space program for utilization by other nations. Russian space assets now
represent a potential wild card that could dramatically alter the U.S.'s
competitive position relative to other nations in the ever more commercial world
market for space products and servicess .
Since the onset of "perestroika" the Russians have realized the importance
of international space cooperation to their economy. Although scientific and
political justifications for the space program still exist, the deteriorating economic
conditions in the former Soviet Union have made the clear emphasis of the
program economic gain. The domestic space program is promoted
predominantly on its economic returns to society and international activities are
widely supported because they offer opportunities for bringing hard currency
into the Russian economy. The ruble's devaluation makes even minor
international sales an important source of revenue for many organizations. For
example, the huge Energia enterprise covers much of its operating budget on the
income from a few small contracts with France, Germany and the United States9.
Without such support Energia would be facing the loss of many of its best and
brightest engineers as so many other enterprises in the former Soviet Union have
experienced. The turmoil and challenges facing the Russian space program and
its constituent industrial enterprises will be discussed at some length in Chapter
2, but for now suffice it to say that short-term economic survival is the industry's
greatest concern. With drastic outright cuts in defense spending and effective
cuts in civilian space funding caused by run away inflation, most space
enterprises are in a real financial crunch. Without new sources of revenue they
will not be able to pay their employees or maintain their facilities and much of
the industry is in danger of simply disappearing.
To most Russians, international sales or joint ventures are seen as the
natural solution to their declining domestic demand 10 . They are willing to sell
their best space systems and technologies to just about any country or company
who can come up with the hard currency to pay for the goods. Yet the control of
potentially lucrative contacts with foreign partners remains a strong point of
contention. The government formed the Russian Space Agency last year to give
it control of and a cut of the profits from international space activities. But
8 C. Covault, "International Space Programs Face Strategic Realignment", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, July 27, 1992, pp. 20-21.
9 P. de Selding, "Western Contracts May Keep NPO Energia Engineers Busy", Space News.
January 4-11, 1993, p. 9 .
10 M. Sinelshikov, Department Chief, Russian Space Agency, interviewed in his Moscow
office, October 19, 1992.
several of the larger Russian space enterprises such as NPO Energia would like
to pursue Western partnerships without government interference and they
continue to fight for their independence". At present the management of
international joint ventures in Russia remains somewhat of a hodge podge with
several larger enterprises contracting directly with foreign customers with little
government oversight while the government directly administers most other
cooperative projects.
1.2.1 U.S. and Russian Space Cooperation
The U.S. and Russian space programs have a long history of limited
cooperation dating back to the early 1960's. Most of these early efforts at
cooperation were in strictly scientific fields such as space biology, meteorology
and geodesy. The beginning of the 1970's saw some expansion of cooperative
activities with the exchange of lunar soil samples and the development of
compatible rendezvous and docking systems. The joint rendezvous and docking
work culminated in 1975 with the joining of Apollo and Soyuz capsules in Earth
orbit and the intermingling of their crews. The Apollo-Soyuz mission has been
the only joint U.S.-Russian manned space project to date. The U.S. and Soviet
Union's first bilateral agreement to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation in
space was signed in 1972. Since then this agreement has been renewed and
expanded every five years except for in 1982 when the agreement was allowed to
lapse due to a downturn in East-West relations. Under the agreements, five joint
working groups in the areas of space biology, solar system exploration,
astronomy & astrophysics, solar-terrestrial physics and Earth sciences were
established. These working groups met approximately once each year to
exchange data and plan future joint activities. Until the signing of the 1992
agreement Which substantially increased the areas for cooperation, only
relatively small joint projects had been conducted. These projects included the
flight of U.S. experiments on Soviet Bion satellites for investigating space life
sciences, the flight of a Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) on a Soviet
Meteor-3 spacecraft, tracking of the Phobos spacecraft using the U.S. Deep Space
Network and a few small commercial projects. All of these projects occurred
after 1986 as cooperative activities with the Russians became more politically
11 P. de Selding, "Semenov Warns Western Groups to Bypass RSA", Space News.
December 14-20, 1992, pp. 1 & 28.
acceptable. Prior to this time, bilateral relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
were too strained to allow any substantial cooperative ventures to proceed.
The beginning of the 1990's witnessed a near explosion of cooperative space
activity between the U.S. and former Soviet Union. In June 1992 Presidents Bush
and Yeltsin signed the new space agreement providing a broad framework for
greatly enhanced future cooperation. Among the projects stipulated by the new
agreement are joint manned activities to include the flight of a cosmonaut on the
Space Shuttle in 1993, the flight of an astronaut to Mir for a three month stay in
1995 and the docking of the Shuttle to Mir in 1995. The agreement also provides
for enhanced high level government contact and assistance to better coordinate
the space activities of the U.S. and Russia and for increased space science and
technology cooperation. In addition, the U.S. and Russian governments
announced last year that NASA would award direct funding to NPO Energia to
study the use of Russian hardware for U.S. missions and that a Proton launch
vehicle would be allowed to launch one of the new Inmarsat-3 satellites. Both of
these announcements were completely unprecedented. Never before has NASA
provided direct funding to a foreign contractor, let alone a Russian contractor.
Since the announcement of this award, NASA's contracts with Russian
organizations have expanded and now include payments to several Academy of
Science institutes, the Babakin Research Center and several other organizations.
Using taxpayer dollars to fund a foreign enterprises is an entirely new approach
to international cooperation for NASA. Allowing the Russians to bid on a launch
for an international customer such as Inmarsat was also previously forbidden.
The U.S. launch industry considers the entry of Russians launch providers into
the international market a threat to their very existence and lobbied heavily
against its approval12. Yet foreign policy concerns eventually won out and the
Russians were allowed into the launch services market on a limited basis.
The DoD, or more specifically the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO),
along with other government agencies have been very active in expanding
Russian contacts. These organizations have emphasized acquiring advanced
Russian technologies such as the space nuclear power technology contained in
the Topaz-2 reactor, two of which were recently purchased by SDIO. Likewise,
U.S. industry has not missed out on the emerging opportunities in Russia. Loral
Space Systems has a joint venture with Fakel enterprise to produce its electric
12 "Space Bargains From Russia", editorial in The New York Times March 9, 1992, p. A16.
satellite thrusters in the U.S., Pratt & Whitney has an agreement to utilize
NPO Energomash's liquid rocket engine technology in its U.S. engines and
Lockheed and Khrunichev enterprise just announced a joint venture to market
Proton boosters in the West. And it is not only the large aerospace firms that are
taking advantage of the emerging opportunities in Russia. Small U.S. firms such
as Payload Systems Incorporated are making use of the new openness to, among
other things, fly microgravity experiments on Russian rockets. Each of these
cooperative business activities will be discussed in more detail in later chapters,
but for now it is enough to recognize that there are many U.S. firms actively
pursuing joint ventures with Russian enterprises. On the negative side, in May
1992, the U.S. government placed sanctions on the Russian agency Glavkosmos
barring it from importing to or exporting from the U.S. for two years due to its
sale of propulsion hardware to India which allegedly violated missile technology
non-proliferation agreements. These sanctions were intended to send a clear
signal to the Russians that although the U.S. desired enhanced space cooperation,
it would not tolerate defense technology proliferation to developing nations.
The speed with which Russian cooperation has taken hold of the U.S. space
community has resulted in joint projects being undertaken faster than
government policy makers can coordinate them. Although cooperative projects
with Russian organizations tend to offer many benefits to the space user
community and to help further foreign policy objectives, they often can
exacerbate concerns for national security or protection of the domestic space
industry. Thus NASA, the major user of space technologies in the U.S., tends to
support Russian cooperation since it helps improve its programs. But NASA is
also sensitive to the needs of the U.S. aerospace industry which provides most of
its hardware and this somewhat tempers its enthusiasm for utilizing Russian
systems. The State Department on the other hand, at least under the Bush
administration, was mainly concerned with supporting Russian conversion to a
market economy and therefore supported almost all U.S.-Russian joint ventures.
To date, the State Department has been the greatest proponent of Russian space
cooperation in the administration. The DoD wants to obtain as much advanced
technology through Russian contacts as is possible but also is fearful of
supporting a potential adversary by keeping its defense-related industries in tact.
The Department of Transportation represents the launch industry interests and is
therefore completely against allowing Russian vehicles to launch U.S. satellites.
The Commerce Department represents both the launch vehicle manufacturers
who want low cost Russian launchers kept out of the market and the satellite
manufacturers who would like access to these lower cost vehicles. Consequently,
the Commerce Department has divided loyalties but tends to be more
protectionist. With all of these organizations promoting their different agendas it
is not surprising that the U.S. position on cooperation with Russia has often been
inconsistent. The National Space Council is supposed to coordinate government
space policy, but in the past year the interagency feud has often proved too big
for this organization to handle and has had to be resolved at the executive level.
The State Department administers the interagency approval process for
international transactions (known as the Circular 175 process) and therefore
tends to have more influence than the other agencies. The State Department's
influence was further enhanced by the Bush administration's emphasis on
international affairs leading on occasion to nearly unilateral decisions by State in
support of expanded Russian cooperation 13. Whether the State Department will
maintain such wide-ranging authority under the Clinton administration remains
to be seen, but the interagency feud and the mixed signals from the U.S.
government are almost certain to continue absent a major change in the policy
making process.
1.2.2 Russian Space Cooperation with Other Nations
While U.S. space cooperation with the Russians has developed slowly and
has only recently become significant, several other nations have been working
with Russia for decades. Since the 1960's the French have cooperated with both
the Russians and Americans in their space activities, never fully committing to
either the Eastern or Western camp during the Cold War. The long Franco-
Russian relationship in space has included scientific exchanges, the flight of
French instruments on Russian spacecraft and, to date, three visits by French
cosmonauts to Soviet space stations. Cosmonaut Jean-Loup Chretian worked on
both the Salyut 7 and Mir stations and most recently in July 1992, Michel Tognini
was the first Frenchman to use Mir on a commercial basis. The French paid the
Russians approximately $12 million for Tognini's visit. France plans to continue
sending cosmonauts to Mir every two years at a cost of $12 million per flight
until at least the turn of the century, with the next flight coming in July 1993.
13 A. Lawler, "Foreign Policy Reigns in Space", Space News. January 18-25, 1993, pp. 4 & 21.
Besides the joint manned flight activities, the French are pursuing increased
cooperation so that they may use Russian space assets to explore natural
resources, the environment, nuclear power systems, pharmacology and
improved telecommunications 14. The last in a series of space cooperation
agreements between France and Russia was signed in Paris in February 1991.
This agreement was expanded by a Memorandum of Understanding in July 1992
that provided for French technical assistance and financial support for several
key Russian space projects s5 . Among these projects are the Mars '94 and '96
missions that include a French-built balloon and scientific instruments. Both the
French and the Germans are now providing funding directly to the Russians to
keep these Mars missions on schedule.
The German government has been aggressively supporting greater use of
Russian capabilities by the European Space Agency and has itself undertaken
more than 50 separate space projects with Russia. Many of these projects were
inherited from former East Germany, but quite a few have been recently
initiated. In March 1992 a German cosmonaut spent a week on Mir for an
estimated cost of $14 million, paid in cash to the Russians. Germany is also
providing two cameras and twelve other instruments, along with financial
support, to the Mars '94 & '96 missions. Perhaps most impressive, German
companies are leading the world in private use of Russian space assets. Kayser-
Threde has been flying materials processing payloads on Photon and Resurs-F
spacecraft and the Mir space station since 198916. It now has a joint venture with
NPO Energia to sell Russian remote sensing data in the West and at the end of
1992 it bought two Tsyklon launches to place small German-built
communications satellites in orbit. Deutsche Aerospace has a joint venture to
build the Romantis telecommunications system to link Russia with Western
Europe. Romantis will be launched by Russian boosters and the system may
include some Russian satellites or component hardware. Bosch Telecom,
Germany's largest telephone company, also has a joint project with NPO Energia
to determine how Russian satellites could be used in its system. Other
14 I. Parker, "France and Cooperation", SAce, Vol. 8, No. 5, October-November 1992, p. 16.
15 J. Lenorovitz, "French Technical Aid to Russians to Bolster Long-Term Space Plan",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 17, 1992, p. 28.
16 "Commercial Agreement for Orbital Materials Processing Signed with German Firm",
Vechernyaya Moskva, Moscow, December 29, 1987, p. 1.
Europeans besides the French and Germans are expanding space cooperation
with the former Soviets. A British cosmonaut, Helen Sharman, visited Mir in
early 1991 as did an Austrian cosmonaut, Clemens Lothaller, in late 1991. Both of
these were paid visits to the Russian space station. An Italian company, CTI,
with partial ownership by Swedish and Russian partners, is now marketing
Russian space technologies in Europe for applications outside of the space
industry. And the lead European propulsion company, Societe Europeenne de
Propulsion (SEP) signed an agreement with NPO Energomash in December 1992
to transfer Russian advanced liquid rocket engine technology to Europe. The
Europeans are clearly wasting little time in exploiting opportunities that have
emerged from the opening up of the former Soviet space industry.
The European Space Agency (ESA) is responsible for continent-wide
projects to utilize Russian capabilities, predominantly for reducing the costs of
the European space program. Like the Americans, the Europeans were at first
hesitant to use tax-payer funds to directly support the Russian space industry but
they have recently overcome this inhibition. ESA now has plans to spend nearly
$150 million dollars for Russian space hardware and services over the next four
years. About a third of this money will be used to pay for the flight of several
European cosmonauts to Mir beginning in 1994. The money will also be used to
fund Russian analyzes of the European space plane design (Hermes), proposals
for a joint European-Russian space station and Russian assistance with the
development of advanced rocket propulsion technology. At present, ESA has
over 30 contracts with Russian research institutes and industrial enterprises with
a total value of around $8 million 17. This value is expected to increase markedly
over the next year. The Europeans are also investigating the possibility of
developing a joint space shuttle with Russia or contributing European hardware
to the Mir-2 space station. ESA signed a broad space cooperation agreement with
the former U.S.S.R. in 1990 that provided the foundation for Russian cooperation
and led to the development of the recent contractual relationships. Russian
capabilities are more enticing to the Europeans than to the Americans since
Europe trails Russia in many more areas of space technology. ESA hopes to use
Russian capabilities to leap frog over many expensive technology development
programs and produce its own independent manned space program at minimal
17 "Russia Gets ESA Contracts", Space Flight. June 1992, p. 182.
cost 18. In the long-term the Russians may even join ESA and become just another
member of the European space community. Although the Russians have applied
for membership, it will be several years before the details of a European space
merger can be worked out19.
Europeans and Americans are not the only ones who recognize the
opportunities from the internationalization of the Russian space program. For
years the Indians have utilized Russian boosters to put their satellites into orbit
and this relationship was recently expanded to include technology transfer
projects. India's agreement to pay KB Salyut and KB Isayev some $200 million
dollars for liquid Oxygen/Hydrogen rocket engine technology is well known in
the West for the sanctions which it provoked from the U.S. government. Russia
also has substantial cooperative space activities with other Asian nations
including China and Japan. Russo-Japanese cooperation has included the paid
flight of television journalist Toyohiro Akiyama to Mir in 1990 and was recently
expanded by a July 1992 space agreement which allows for the launch of
Japanese satellites on Russian rockets, use of Japanese electronics in Russian
spacecraft and the utilization of the Mir space station by Japan. The Japanese
have been criticized for their attempts to hire away "human capital" from the
ailing Russian aerospace industry to improve their aspiring space program20. It
is uncertain how successful these efforts have been, but the combination of
Russian technology and Japanese business expertise undoubtedly represent a
substantial threat to the market dominance of the U.S. space industry.
International firms are also exploiting the opportunities to utilize Russian space
assets. For example, Rimsat Limited intends to use Russian satellites to provide
space-based communication services to the nations of the Pacific Rim. Russian
space capabilities have attracted interest beyond the European and Asian
theaters as well with negotiations underway to launch satellites for South Africa
and the possibility of flying an Israeli cosmonaut to Mir next year. It is clear that
joint space projects with the U.S. are only one of many opportunities available to
the Russian industry for developing increased international cooperation.
18 Y. Kovalenko, "Financial Problems Are Forcing Europe to Turn to Russia for Help in
Exploring Space", Izvestiyao Morning Edition, Moscow, September 15, 1992, p. 4 .
19 "European Space Agency Considers Russian Request for Membership", Satellite Week.
April 13, 1992, p. 6.
20 "Headhunting in the CIS", Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 20,1992, p. 13.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Post-Soviet Space Activities
The Soviet Union no longer exists but it has left as a legacy to its successor
states the world's largest space program. With the majority of space assets
located on its soil, the Russian republic is the heir apparent for carrying on Soviet
space work. Although substantial turmoil and shortages of funding now plague
the former Soviet space industry, contrary to some "dooms day" reports in the
West, it remains alive and functioning. Poor wages have caused significant loss
of personnel in many space enterprises, but space workers have not yet
completely abandoned ship. Some one thousand space-related enterprises and
government facilities still employ nearly a million workers. Although launches
were down from 59 to 54 between 1991 and 1992, the CIS continues to launch
more space boosters than the rest of the world combined21 . These launches each
year place nearly 500 tons into orbit to maintain 30 different satellite systems
consisting of 160 total spacecraft 22. Now that we are no longer enemies with the
states of the former Soviet Union, what are the opportunities for the U.S. to
benefit from their vast space capabilities? And once these opportunities are
identified, how can they best be pursued? To answer these difficult questions it
is necessary to first take a step back and obtain an understanding of what the
former Soviet space program consists of and how it has developed. To this end,
21 V. Kiernan, "Analysts: Better Russian Satellites Ease Launch Pace", Space News,
January 11-17, 1993, p. 11.
22 A. Tarasov, "Club 206: Into the International Space Year on the Fragments of the Space
Program", Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 4, January 22, 1992, p. 12.
we discuss in Section 2.1 the political and administrative structures that have
controlled and continue to manage the space program. This is followed in
Section 2.2 by an overview of the major flight hardware that the space industry
produces. Since the structure of the organizations that implement the space
program in the former Soviet Union was shrouded in secrecy until very recently,
Section 2.3 provides considerable new information on Russia's previously hidden
space enterprises. Finally, Section 2.4 summarizes the different management
practices of Russian and American space organizations and discusses what effect
these may have on the potential for successful international cooperation.
2.1 Overall Organization
The fracturing of the Soviet Union into a loose Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) has resulted in drastic changes in the organization of
space activities in the former Soviet republics. The previous hierarchical,
centrally-based control over the space program has been dispersed from the
central government to the republics and from the bureaucrats to the enterprise
managers. There is no longer a unified Soviet space program but a collection of
space programs in eleven different republics. Of course one republic, the
Russian republic, dominants all others performing more than 80% of all space
projects and therefore is the true heir of the Soviet space program. However
important space activities also occur in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other republics.
The following overview of the organization of post-Soviet space activities will
begin with a discussion of the importance of space assets outside of the Russian
republic and how they are related to the dominant Russian program. This will
be followed by a synopsis of the present organization of Russian space activities
and a brief history of the development of this organization. Lastly the important
role played by the new Russian Space Agency within the Russian republic will be
presented. The organization of space activities in the former Soviet Union
continues to be in a high state of flux so that the information provided in this
section provides only a snapshot as of the beginning of 1993. Without a doubt
the next few years (or even months) will see many more changes which should
be considered when making use of the outline in this section.
2.1.1 Inter-Republic Relationships
Although most space enterprises, research centers and infrastructure
elements such as launch sites, control centers and training facilities are located in
Russia, other republics do contain some critical elements. The two most
important non-Russian republics to the space program are Ukraine and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine possesses one of the three largest missile and spacecraft
production centers in the former Soviet Union, Yuzhnoye Scientific and
Production Association (NPO) in Dnepropetrovsk. In addition, it contains other
smaller but still important space hardware manufacturing enterprises such as
NPO Elektropribor in Kharkov and NPO Muson in Sevastopol. Also located in
Ukraine are several major infrastructure facilities including the deep space
control and tracking center in Yevpatoria on the Crimean peninsula. When taken
together, these Ukrainian assets are significant enough so that their loss
markedly diminishes the space capabilities of the former Soviet Union, but they
are not enough to allow Ukraine to support an independent space program.
Ukraine lacks any launch facilities and has only small pieces of a spacecraft
control system making it necessarily dependent on others for these services23.
The Baikonur launch facility or cosmodrome, responsible for all manned
flights and capable of launching almost all former Soviet launch vehicles, is
located in Kazakhstan. Containing the largest investment of any single facility
dedicated to space activities in the former U.S.S.R., Baikonur is a nearly
irreplaceable asset that is essential to the space program's operation. In addition
to Baikonur, several important nuclear rocket research and test facilities are
located in Kazakhstan around the city of Semipalatinsk. The vast open spaces of
Kazakhstan make it an ideal place for testing hazardous devices but its
remoteness from Moscow or other major cities makes it a poor choice for most
high-technology production enterprises. Thus Kazakhstan's main contribution to
the space program is in hardware testing and launch and not in the design and
production areas. Other republics such as Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, and
Azerbaijan also contain some important enterprises involved with the space
program that must coordinate their activities with the rest of the industry in
Russia to be effective.
23 L. Stukalina, "Timely Topic: Does a Country That Doesn't Have Enough Sugar Need
Rockets?", Veherniy Kiyev, August 6, 1992, p. 2.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union during the final months of 1991, the
preservation and coordination of space activities in the newly independent
republics became considerably more complex. After several months of
sometimes bitter negotiations, nine of the eleven former Soviet republics
(excluding the three Baltic states) signed a space cooperation pact on
December 30, 1991 in Minsk, Belarus. The two abstaining republics were
Ukraine, which finally signed in the summer of 1992, and Moldova, which has
yet to sign the agreement 24. The Minsk agreement stipulated the creation of an
ESA-like structure for coordinating space activities between independent space
agencies in each of the republics. Funding for the CIS-level space activities are to
be provided by each republic in proportion to their participation in the program
similar to the ESA arrangement. An Interstate Space Council was formed to
coordinate joint civilian space activities while all military operations remained
under the control of the joint strategic forces. On March 20, 1992 the CIS
republics agreed to provide funding to support common defense needs and
maintain the joint strategic forces at their meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Although the Minsk agreement provided a theoretical structure for coordinating
space activities in the post-Soviet states, there remained great turmoil in the
space industry through much of 1992 since few republic-level space agencies
existed for implementing the agreement. To help alleviate this problem, the
republics began to form their own space agencies at around the time of the Minsk
agreement. In September 1991 the Kazakhstan Space Research Agency was
formed by decree of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. In February 1992 the
Russian Space Agency (RSA) and the Azerbaijani National Space Agency25 were
formed and finally in March 1992 the National Space Agency of Ukraine was
established by directive of President Leonid Kravchuk.
Once each republic had its own space agency to represent it, many difficult
issues had to be addressed in dividing up the costs and benefits of the former
Soviet space program. The most difficult issue continues to be who will pay for
on-going space activities. The intent of the Minsk agreement is that each republic
should pay according to its use of space systems, but determining level of use
24 M. Smith, Russia/US Space Interaction: A Trip Report With Observations and Options,
Congressional Research Service Report Number 92-774, October 27, 1992, p. 2.
25 S. Sememova, "Azerbaijan has its Own Space Program", Rossiyskayva Gazeta, Moscow,
September 16, 1992, p. 6.
and allocating costs for development of future capabilities is very difficult in the
chaotic political and economic environment in the former U.S.S.R.. To date the
financing of most activities has fallen to the Russian republic leaving many space
enterprises in the smaller republics who do not receive Russian funding in
particularly desperate straits. For example, although Ukraine has over 50,000
people involved in its space industry, the Ukrainian government refused until
recently to provide any state funding to these enterprises resulting in their
substantial decay. Due to the unacceptable levels of unemployment caused by
this policy, the Ukrainian government recently reversed itself and began to help
fund space production enterprises within its borders 26. Besides the financial
difficulties in managing a multinational space program, many issues of
sovereignty and local control have been raised by the partition of the former
Soviet space program. The most striking of these was the battle between Russia
and Kazakhstan for control of the Baikonur cosmodrome. After months of
debate which included riots at Baikonur and delays of some launches, the
Russian and Kazakhstan governments finally signed an agreement on
May 25, 1992 for the cosmodrome's joint use The agreement assigned ownership
of the cosmodrome to Kazakhstan but gave rights of use to Russia and the CIS
strategic forces under certain stipulations of cost and profit sharing27.
Kazakhstan was also given approval authority over environmental protection
measures and selection of staff at the cosmodrome, both long-time issues of
contention with the local government.
2.1.2 Organization of Space Activities in the Russian Republic
The bulk of former Soviet space activities (around 85%) are now
administered by the Russian republic. It is the only former Soviet republic with a
sufficient breadth of assets to be able to conduct independent space operations.
The present organization of space activities in Russia will be presented in this
section with the following section containing a history of how this organizational
structure developed. To many acquainted with the Soviet space program of only
a year or two ago the present structure will appear wholly unfamiliar and the
26 L. Dayen, "Sensations Without Secrets: Ukraine is a Space Power", Demokrawchna
Ukrayina, April 11, 1991, pp. 1-2.
27 "Agreement Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Procedure
for Use of the Baikonur Cosmodrome", Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, May 29, 1992, pp. 1-3.
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changes drastic. In fact, although substantial cosmetic changes have occurred to
administrative structures in the former U.S.S.R., many of the same people and
modes of operation remain basically the same as they were in the Soviet era,
particularly at the lower organizational levels.
Starting from the very top of the policy making structure, gone are the old
organizations which formed the core of the Soviet system, the Politburo, Central
Committee of the Communist Party, Council of Ministers and their
implementing arms the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) and the State
Planning Committee (Gosplan). In their place a powerful elected President in
each republic has emerged (Boris Yeltsin in Russia) and a legislature consisting of
a directly elected Congress of Peoples Deputies (over a thousand members in
Russia) and their pared down operating wing the Supreme Soviet or Parliament
(around 400 members). A Council of Heads of Government unites all the
republics into a loose confederation know as the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). The old Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM), which
contained all space production enterprises, was dissolved following the
August 1991 coup attempt that was supported by its lead minister, Oleg Shiskin.
Russian space enterprises are now part of the Department of Cosmonautics
within the Ministry of Industry of the Russian Federation, however their
connection with the ministry is much looser than it was under the Soviet system.
Enterprises are free to develop new products and customers and to pursue
foreign contacts without specific ministry approval, none the less, they remain
government owned institutions although they will be privatized in the future.
An overview of the organizational relationships within the Russian space
program is presented in Figure 2.1. As previously mentioned the Russian
President and legislature make the highest level policy decisions for space as
they do for all branches of the government. Several committees and
commissions in the Supreme Soviet deal directly with space policy issues, the
most important of these is the Commission on Transport, Communications,
Informatics and Space chaired by Deputy Alexei Adrov. On Deputy Androv's
urging, for the first time in 1993 civilian space expenditures will be a line item in
the state budget requiring specific legislative approval. In the future, oversight
of space expenditures by the Supreme Soviet is expected to increase as the
Russian Deputies become more adept at wielding legislative power. Presidential
and legislative direction guides the government's ministry structure in allocating
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Organization of the Russian Space Program
Funding & Policy Agencies
Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of
Finance Science Industry
Space Science & Technology Council)
--- 
-- - - -----
Launch Sites
Cosmonaut Training
Control Centers
Search & Rescue
Contracts
Civilian Users
Russian Academy
of Sciences
Intercosmos Council
Vemadsky
Keldysh
Russian
Ministry of
Communications
NPO Planeta
L SoyuzkartaKosmokarta
MY IT It MM -A ITT 1 7 It-
funds for space. The main ministries involved in the space program are the
Ministry of Economy and Finance which processes budget requests, the Ministry
of Science, Higher Education and Technology Policy which reviews all budget
requests dealing with science and technology, and the Ministry of Industry
which oversees the industrial enterprises. Space activities represent only a small
fraction of the responsibilities of each of these ministries. To better coordinate
space activities among the vast government ministry structure, an interagency
Space Science and Technology Council under the Chairmanship of Yuri Osipov
(President of the Russian Academy of Sciences) was recently created. This
council, which is administered by the Ministry of Science, is responsible for
coordinating all civilian space activities within the Russian republic. It will
review funding proposals from the Russian Space Agency (RSA) and from other
government agencies to assure that their budgets and plans are compatible with
high level policy directives. There is some talk particularly in the RSA that a
Space Council directly under the president, similar to the one that used to exist in
the U.S., will soon be formed 28. However, when and if space policy will be
elevated to such a level remains uncertain at present.
Three main types of organizations are funded by the ministerial financial
and policy agencies: military users, civilian users and the RSA. All military
space operations are administered at the CIS-level and approved by the CIS's
Council of Heads of Government. The military Space Command is under the
direction of Colonel General Vladimir Ivanov and its structure has changed little
from the Soviet era. The military still controls most space infrastructure
operating all launch sites as well as most control and tracking centers and
conducts the training of cosmonauts and their recovery upon landing. The RSA
coordinates its operations with the military so that it is able to use its immense
space infrastructure. The CIS Space Command has an R&D and acquisition
system independent of the RSA and it contracts directly with space enterprises to
obtain space hardware. All other users are supposed to rely on the expertise of
the RSA and obtain space services through this agency. However, since the RSA
is a relatively new organization that has yet to solidify its power, some civilian
users continue to bypass the RSA and contract directly with industrial
enterprises (shown as dotted line in Figure 2.1). The major civilian users are the
28 M. Smith, Russia/US Space Interaction: A Trip Report With Observations and Options,
Congressional Research Service Report Number 92-774, October 27, 1992, pp. 3-4.
Russian Academy of Sciences which is responsible for all space science missions,
the Russian Ministry of Communications, Information and Space which
maintains the civilian satellite telecommunications system and NPO Planeta
which manages the Earth observation and resources program. In addition to
these, there are dozens of other government agencies which use space assets to a
lesser extent. All of these civilian users receive funding from the state budget
which they either use internally or provide to industry through the RSA to meet
their program objectives. Intersputnik, the Soviet equivalent to Intelsat, is
another important user of Russian space assets that provides international
telecommunication services. Unlike the agencies previously mentioned,
Intersputnik receives much of its funding from non-governmental sources29.
Most civilian users have little internal space expertise and simply funnel their
resources allocated for space to the RSA. The Academy of Science is the major
exception to this rule. Several institutes within the academy system employ
thousands of people who are exclusively dedicated to space research. Within
these institutes, substantial research and instrument fabrication for space
missions is performed separate from the space industry.
The new focal point for civilian space activities is the Russian Space Agency
(RSA). Ironically, although Soviet ideology supported the central planning of
nearly all aspects of society, for over thirty years the Soviet space program
operated without the benefit of a central space agency. Modeled on NASA in the
United States, the RSA was established in February 1992 to overcome this
shortcoming and to provide central coordination of all civilian space activities. It
receives funding directly from the state budget to develop advanced space
systems and technologies and then channels these funds to industrial enterprises
who perform most of the work. It also receives funding from other government
agencies who would like to utilize space systems and acts as their contracting
agency with the industrial enterprises. The operation of the RSA and its major
programs will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.4. The final element of
the Russian space program is the space industry or industrial enterprises
themselves. The majority of the people involved in the space program are
employed by the industrial enterprises. The industry possesses most of the
know-how and assets and it is the place where most value-added operations
29 R. Riccitiello, "Intersputnik Links East to West", Space News. October 5-11, 1991, pp. 1& 21.
occur. The principal enterprises within the space industry of the former Soviet
Union are discussed at length in Section 2.3.
2.1.3 Historical Development of the Space Program Structure
The system for administering the Soviet space program was set up in the
late 1940's as a copy of the political establishment that then ruled the country. It
was a rigidly authoritarian pyramid with the Politburo and Communist Party
Central Committee at the top and the design bureaus and factories at the bottom
simply performing the tasks assigned to them. The communist party chieftains,
and Khrushchev in particular, saw excellence in space exploration as an
important means of proving the effectiveness of communism. From his position
as General Secretary of the Communist party in the late 1950's and early 1960's,
Khrushchev demanded ever more impressive space "breakthroughs" with which
to impress the world and the design bureaus of Korolov, Yangel and Chelomei
struggled to keep the space spectaculars coming30 . Khrushchev, with little
formal education and simple peasant ways had a poor understanding of space
technology but this did not stop him from directly managing its development.
To him space exploration was no more than a Cold War propaganda weapon to
be wielded against the Americans. To assure firm control of this weapon, nearly
all decisions of any consequence involving the space program bypassed the
government's Council of Ministers and were acted upon directly by the
Communist Party Central Committee. Several powerful commissions and
committees, such as the Military and Industrial Commission (VPK), were
charged with assuring that the dictates of the Central Committee were carried
out31. The role of the design bureaus was to inform the top political leadership of
the technical possibilities and then to unquestioningly carry out their orders.
As time passed and the bureaucracies which implemented the space
program grew, they began to assert their authority. After the departure of
Khrushchev, the top Soviet leadership was less enthusiastic about space. The
ministries and large design bureaus were given more freedom and they used this
freedom to substitute their departmental interests for state interests in the space
30 W. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, Basic
Books, New York, 1985, p. 249.
31 A. Dupas, "The Political Organization of the Soviet Space Economy", The Cambridge
Encyclopedia of Space, Cambridge, England, 1990, p. 331.
program. The unwieldy network of commissions that had developed over the
years and the weak central government structure that had been chronically
circumvented by the Central Committee, were incapable of resisting the special
interests once the top leadership ceased to directly manage space activities. The
powerful Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) became the major
customer as well as the sole producer of space hardware32 . Power to approve
projects was transferred from the center to the bureaucracy since the MOM
possessed all the technical expertise and external evaluations of its projects were
next to impossible. The major way of justifying a new program under the MOM
management system was whether the United States had a similar program, not
whether it contributed to any long-term objective33 . This approach led to the
development of such systems as the Buran space shuttle to match American
capabilities even though the Russian space program had no identified need for a
spaceplane. Bureaucratic politics took over as the MOM gained in influence and
many technical and managerial approaches, although obsolete, continued to be
used. With the erosion of the pyramid of control, the Central Committee and
VPK roles degenerated to "rubber stamping" proposed projects which the MOM
had already decided it would pursue. The political leadership maintained
ideological control but ceded all programmatic control to the bureaucracy which
in the absence of independent reviews or public scrutiny, often relied on personal
preferences and other extraneous criteria in making its decisions. Which Chief
Designers supported a particular project was very important in determining the
project's future. The MOM and its affiliated design bureaus became completely
self-contained acting as the program planner, inspector, client and vendor all at
the same time. This situation led to a heavy reliance on large resource-intensive
projects which mainly benefited the huge design bureaus that led them and little
consideration of the needs of other potential space service users outside of the
MOM sphere of influence. In particular, commercial applications of space
systems were almost completely neglected.
In the 1970's and 1980's the declining efficiency of the space industry led to
the amalgamation of research institutes, design bureaus and factories together
32 T. Cremins & E. Newton, "Changing Structure of the Soviet Space Program", Space Policy.
May 1991, pp. 135-136.
33 "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Economy: Russia and Space", Russian
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into what were called Scientific-Production Associations (NPOs). The idea was
that by combining research and design organizations with manufacturing plants,
the ensuing synergy would increase the transfer of technology into final products
and consequently improve industry effectiveness. The result was even more
concentration of power in the hands of the space hardware producers with little
diminishment of their tendency to use old reliable technologies. The NPOs
continued to grow in power throughout the 1980's further eroding the original
pyramid of control so that when the Soviet system finally collapsed in 1991, these
enterprises were well poised to assert their independence.
By the beginning of the 1990's the Communist Party had formally
relinquished its monopoly power over society and an elected President and
parliament were beginning to establish control. The MOM had created within
itself a branch, Glavkosmos, to market Soviet space wares abroad in an attempt
to shore-up the industry's weakening position and make space operations more
profitable. But this was not to be as Glavkosmos was largely unsuccessful in
making foreign sales and political upheavals were soon to intercede. Following
the August 1991 coup attempt, the MOM along with many other ministries were
disbanded and the Russian space industry was thrown into turmoil. Most of the
industry quickly rallied around the Minster of General Machine Building, Oleg
Shiskin, by joining the Russian General Machine Building Company
(Rosobshchemash) which he led34. Rosobshchemash was also known by other
names including NPO Cosmos and Korat until its final designation was decided
upon3 5 . However the largest space enterprise, NPO Energia, led by Yuri
Semenov saw the turmoil as a perfect opportunity to assert complete enterprise
independence and refused to join Rosobshchemash. Semenov's action was the
natural progression of a process which has been building in the Soviet Union for
over thirty years whereby control of the space program was dispersed to
increasingly lower levels. Semenov saw the Rosobshchemash organization as
just the MOM under a different name and he felt that NPO Energia had the clout
to obtain international and domestic funding without higher level interference.
To some extent he was proven right as NPO Energia wrested complete control of
34 E. Crawley, "Trip Report on the Current Status of the Soviet Space Organization", MIT
internal memorandum, November 25, 1991.
35 V. Khrustov, "Ministry of General Machine Building to Undergo Radical Transformation",
Tass television news program, Moscow, 0956 GMT, September 20, 1991.
the Mir space station away from the central government and earned considerable
hard currency by selling flights to the station to foreign cosmonauts.
The creation of the Russian Space Agency in February 1992 basically
brought an end to the need for Rosobshchemash and presented a new challenge
to NPO Energiya's independent authority. Yuri Koptev, the First Deputy of both
the MOM and the Rosobshchemash organizations was appointed director of the
RSA. He quickly seized control of most international dealings from Glavkosmos
and began to consolidate his power base in the old MOM building in central
Moscow. However, although there are some apparent similarities between the
former MOM and the RSA organizations, there are some important differences.
The RSA is intended to truly consolidate the management of all civilian space
activities, something which the MOM with all its affiliated commissions and
ministries was never able to do. But more importantly, the RSA will be only a
client of space projects distinct from the enterprises which actually produce the
hardware. This arrangement is fundamentally different from the ministry
structure where the central authority continuously interfered and micro
managed the production enterprises. Even with the RSA's charter to not
interfere in enterprise operations, Yuri Semenov and other large NPO managers
still fear the centralizing power of the RSA. Since its founding, a battle has raged
between the two personalities of Koptev and Semenov, advocating centralization
and dispersion respectively, for control of the Russian space program36 .
Semenov has historical trends and some early victories to bolster his
independence movement, while Koptev has the success of centralized space
agencies in almost all other developed countries to support his approach.
Whether the RSA will ever fully consolidate its authority and become the
"Russian NASA" still remains to be seen.
2.1.4 Role of the Russian Space Agency
The Russian Space Agency was established to address several widely
recognized shortcomings in the Russian space program. The most important of
these was the lack of a central authority to coordinate space activities and the
need to make greater use of market incentives to improve program efficiencies.
With the decline of military and space funding, these shortcomings were
36 L. David, "Russian Space Program Caught in Power Struggle", Space News.
October 12-18, 1992, p. 25.
exacerbated leading to widespread conversion of space production assets to
consumer products manufacturing. Significant amounts of Russian space
manufacturing capability has and continues to disappear and is being replaced
by facilities to make products ranging from refrigerators to children's toys37. A
major objective of the RSA is to assure that conversion efforts proceed in a logical
manner so that irreplaceable space capabilities are not lost. Another oft-sited
shortfall of the Russian space industry is its slowness to insert new technology
into its operating systems. This slowness has led to Russian satellites that are
much heavier and short-lived than their foreign counterparts and to many basic
space system designs that have not changed in almost 30 years38. Making
Russian engineering design more progressive and responsive to customer needs
is another major objective of the RSA. To meet these objectives, the RSA intends
to radically reorganize the space industry using the "principles of rationalism,
democratization, and commercialization" 39. It will be responsible for creating a
national long-term space development plan with specific projects to be
implemented along the way. The agency will write specifications for each of
these projects and conduct open competitions between independent design
bureaus to determine the best approach for proceeding. According to the RSA,
the design bureaus are strictly subordinate to the government customer although
the agency does not intend to interfere with how the enterprises manage their
internal matters40. The RSA consists of only a small staff (approximately 200
people) and does not have the manpower to micro manage as the MOM did. The
relationship between the RSA and the production enterprises will be for the most
part that of a customer to a seller with all the attendant market benefits which
this type of relationship brings. However, the RSA does have some coordination
and approval roles, especially in dealing with foreign nations, which make it
more than simply a purchasing agent for space products.
The program of the Russian Space Agency is broken into six categories:
scientific missions, manned flight, Earth observation, communications &
37 V. Litovkin, "How to Earn Money for Conversion", Izvestiyva July 9, 1991, p. 2 .
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39 B. Konovalov, "Russian Space Agency Set Up", Izvestiyao February 28, 1992, p. 5.
40 B. Ostroumov, Deputy General Director of the Russian Space Agency, interviewed in his
Moscow office, October 18, 1992.
navigation, microgravity use, and advanced technology development. The RSA
is the central coordinating and contracting organization in the Russian
government for all of these diverse space activities. Unlike in the United States,
great emphasis is put on economic returns when justifying new space projects in
the former Soviet Union. An entire research institute under the RSA, the
Economics & Production Planning Institute (AGAT), employs over a thousand
people in calculating the expected benefits from space activities. These
calculations are often highly involved and the results somewhat dubious. Table
2.1 shows some published results from AGAT on the savings that several major
categories of space systems are supposed to provide to the Russian economy. A
simplified version of a typical calculation to determine these numbers might go
as follows. Space systems are used to forecast 100 tornadoes so that
countermeasures can be taken. Without this forewarning, each tornado would
have caused approximately one million rubles of damage. Thus, the presence of
the satellites returns R100 million to the Russian economy 41 . Although these
type of arguments may be somewhat suitable for meteorological and
communication satellites which have direct economic applications, the Russians
don't stop there and even attempt to use such calculations to justify their manned
flight and scientific programs. This over-reliance on economic measures is a
indicator of the poor understanding of economic and strategic business issues
that continue to plague decision making within the Russian space program.
Table 2.1 - Estimated Economic Return from Russian Space Applications 42
(Billions of Rubles During Each 5-Year Plan Period)
Application Program 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000
Meteorology 3.9 5.8 9.6
Earth Resources 2.2 4.8 5.8
Communications 2.6 4.1 5.6
Navigation .2 .8 3.8
To implement its program the RSA gets about 40% of the space budget with
the rest going to the military. In 1989 the total budget for space activities in the
41 V. Avduyevsky & G. Uspensky, "Systems Designing of Economy-Oriented Space
Complexes", Scientific and Economy-Oriented Space Systems. Mir Publishers, Moscow,
1988, pp. 75-77.
42 "CIS/USSR Space Program", Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Jane's Information Group,
1992, p. 12.
former Soviet Union was R6.9 billion (or 1.5% of the state total) of which about
R3 billion went to civilian projects. The development programs for the Energia
booster and Buran space shuttle consumed nearly half of the civilian space funds
with a remarkably small amount (only R220 million) allocated to on-going
manned activities. In comparison, the Academy of Science space institutes
received about R300 million for their activities in 1989. In 1990 and 1991 the total
space budget shrank to R6.3 billion and R5.8 billion respectively and although
the budget for civilian programs alone was R8.7 billion in 1992, it effectively
shrank to even a greater extent than in the past due to run-away inflation4 3 . In
comparable prices, the military space budget for 1992 was cut in half while the
civilian budget was reduced by 25%. To offset declining funding, around $30
million was earned from flying foreign cosmonauts and equipment in space.
Using a conservative exchange rate of R200 to the dollar, this means R6 billion, or
almost one half of all civilian space dollars in 1992 came from foreign sources.
From this simple calculation it is clear why the RSA is so interested in expanding
its international affiliations and earning hard currency from abroad.
2.2 Existing Space Systems
The purpose of this section is to summarize the existing space systems of the
former Soviet Union and to discuss the benefits that each of these systems could
offer a U.S. partner. In examining the space capabilities of the CIS, emphasis will
be placed on non-military systems since they are the ones most likely to be
involved in any cooperative venture. But to completely neglect military space
capabilities would require ignoring over half of Russia's space activities giving
an unrealistic picture of the true breadth of their program. Almost all non-
scientific space assets are "dual-use" in that they can be equally well used for
both military and civilian applications. However, there are some strictly military
space systems in the former Soviet Union, most of which have designations in
the Cosmos series, that have no civilian application. Before proceeding onto the
core discussion of "dual-use" and civilian space systems, a brief overview of the
major military systems will be given.
43 V. Golovachev, "What's the Purpose of the Shuttle Going Up to Mir?", Trud. Moscow,
September 15, 1992, p. 2.
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The former Soviet Union maintains an active reconnaissance (spy) satellite
network for observing militarily important developments worldwide. Short
duration photographic reconnaissance satellites make up the core of the Russian
system, providing rapid response high resolution imagery but requiring literally
dozens of launches each year. Unlike Western spy satellites, the Russians use
photographic film to obtain images which must be recovered and developed
before it is useful. This approach demands short missions so that military
planners do not have to wait too long for information. Russian photographic
reconnaissance satellites are derived from the same design as the manned Vostok
capsule and the civilian use Resurs-F Earth resources satellites44. Recent
upgrades to the technology provide for multiple re-entry pods to return a
satellite's film in several installments allowing longer life missions and
consequently fewer launches. The Russians also possess a particularly well
developed ocean surveillance capability. The main spacecraft supporting this
system are the nuclear-powered Rorsat radar satellites and the Eorsat electronic
intelligence satellites (Elints). Working together these two systems provide a
complete picture of the activities of Western fleets at sea under all weather
conditions. Several Eorsats are launched each year to maintain the full
operational constellation of six satellites to monitor electronic transmissions from
foreign navies. Besides the Eorsats, the CIS also maintains a substantial
terrestrial Elint capability. The Rorsat program has been declining in recent
years, following the 1978 dumping of radioactive debris from a Rorsat nuclear
core on Canada. This event and other near accidents with nuclear systems have
increased international criticism of the program and resulted in no Rorsat
launches since 1988.
In addition to its reconnaissance systems, the former Soviet Union also
possesses an operational Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability along with several
other military satellite systems. Its ASAT system consists of co-orbital
conventional warheads launched by SL_11 boosters as well as ground based laser
and microwave beam weapons to destroy an enemy's critical communications
and surveillance capabilities during wartime. The U.S. Defense Department
estimates that Russian ASATs provides a 70-75% kill probability for satellites
orbiting within their 5,000 kilometer range45. The former U.S.S.R. has tested its
44 N. L. Johnson, The Soviet Year In Space 1989, Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1990, p. 37.
45 G. Piotrowski, Soviet Military Power 1985, US Government Printing Office, 1986.
ASAT interceptors over a dozen times since development began in the late 1960's
using Cosmos satellites as the target. For military communication needs, the
Russians rely on "dual-use" systems in geosynchronous and high inclination
(Molniya) orbits as well as several dedicated low altitude systems. The low
altitude military communication systems provide direct links for tactical
operations and a store and dump capability for long-range communications.
Approximately five launches of SL-8 boosters from Plesetsk each year are used to
maintain the low altitude communication capabilities. Lastly, the former Soviet
military maintains several other miscellaneous satellite systems for defense
purposes including the "dual-use" GLONASS navigational system and a nine
satellite constellation to provide early warning of ballistic missile launches. This
long list of threatening capabilities make Russian space activities a major concern
to the Western defense community.
2.2.1 Launch Systems
The former Soviet space program utilizes 10 different launch vehicles from a
half dozen classes to boost its payloads into space. They range in lift capability
from one to one hundred metric tons to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and all rely
exclusively on liquid propulsion systems. Soviet launch vehicles are designated
in three different ways, by their: (1) Russian name, (2) DoD designation and
(3) Sheldon class and number. The ten operational vehicles along with some
performance characteristics are shown in Table 2.2.
The A-class boosters are the oldest yet still the most actively used launch
vehicles in the Russian inventory. Over half of all launches in 1991 were by
A-class vehicles which have accumulated almost 1,400 successful flights. Of the
seven variants of the family that have been developed over the last 35 years, only
three are presently produced. The A-3 Vostok is a two and a half stage launch
vehicle used to put sun-synchronous remote sensing satellites into orbit. Its
payload capability for such missions is just under two metric tons. Only one A-3
flew in 1991 since the newer and more capable Zenit vehicle has now replaced it
for many sun-synchronous missions. The A-4 Soyuz (also two and a half stages)
is the most frequently used launch vehicle in the world and has been responsible
for launching all Russian manned missions since 1964. It is best known for
boosting manned Soyuz-TM and unmanned Progress-M capsules to the Mir
space station for resupply. However the majority of its 24 missions in 1991 were
to launch military photo reconnaissance satellites and some civilian Resurs,
Photon and Cosmos scientific spacecraft. All man-related launches are from
Baikonur while either major cosmodrome can support reconnaissance missions.
Flights of both A-3 and A-4 boosters from Plesetsk none the less, are very rare.
Table 2.2 - Launch Vehicles of the Former Soviet Union46
Russian DoD Sheldon Year of Launch Orbital Missions Payload to
Name Number Number Debut Sites as of 1991 LEO (tons)
Vostok SL-3 A-3 1959 BA & PL 149 4.7
Soyuz SL-4 A4 1963 BA & PL 967 7.2
Molniya SL-6 A-6 1961 BA & PL 264 1.8 (SEO)
Cosmos SL-8 C-1 1964 PL & KY 371 1.5
SL-11 F-1 1966 BA 115 3.0
Tsyklon SL-14 F-2 1977 PL 94 4.0
Proton SL-12 D-le 1967 BA 154 2.5 (GSO)
Proton SL-13 D-1 1968 BA 22 20.6
Zenit SL-16 J-1 1985 BA 12 13.7
Energia SL-17 K-1 1987 BA 1 105.0
The A-6 Molniya (a three and a half stage vehicle) is the final operational
variant now used for high altitude semi-synchronous missions such as Molniya
communication, Prognoz and early warning satellites. In the 1960's, the A-6 was
used to launch planetary spacecraft and lunar probes until it was replaced in
these missions by the more powerful Proton launcher. The A-6 is formed by
placing a third core stage on top of the A-4 booster which allows the vehicle to
perform higher energy missions. The vehicle was flown 8 times in 1991 and its
projected replacement by a new three stage Zenit vehicle is unlikely to occur for
at least several more years. A-class boosters were derived from the SS-6
Sapwood Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)47 and therefore have many
46 Launch site abbreviations are BA for Baikonur, PL for Plesetsk and KY for Kapustin Yar
and orbit abbreviations are SEO for Semi-Synchronous Elliptic Orbit and GSO for Geo-
Stationary Orbit.
47 M. Stoiko, Soviet Rocketry: Past. Present. and Future, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1970, p. 94.
impressive operational characteristics such as the ability to launch within 48
hours of reaching the pad even under very severe weather conditions48 .
The only remaining C-class booster is the C-1 Cosmos, the former U.S.S.R.'s
smallest launch vehicle. Derived from the SS-5 Skean Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM), the two stage C-1 vehicle launches many types of small
communication, navigation and experimental satellites mostly for the military.
Historically, it also played a strong role in orbiting scientific payloads for the
Intercosmos and Cosmos programs. It is the only launch vehicle flown out of
Kapustin Yar and is also the only vehicle not flown from Baikonur. The C-1 was
launched 11 times in 1991 but plans are to transfer most of its payloads to the
newer and more capable F-1 Tsyklon vehicle within the next five years. The two
remaining F-class boosters are the two stage F-1 and the three stage F-2 Tsyklon.
The payload capability of the F-class boosters fills the gap between the A- &
C-class boosters. The F-1 has been used almost exclusively for top secret military
programs such as ASAT weapons, new offensive missiles and ocean
reconnaissance. Due to the decline in these types of programs, the F-1 has
recently been used very sparingly flying only once in 1991. The F-2 vehicle is
formed from the F-1 by adding a third stage. Most of its missions were inherited
from the older C-1 launcher and include military communications,
reconnaissance and Elint as well as civilian meteorology, geodesy and space
science. The F-2 booster flew 8 missions in 1991, all from Plesetsk into high
inclination orbits. F-class boosters were derived from the SS-9 Scarp ICBM49.
Two variants of the D-class Proton booster are presently utilized, the three
stage Proton D-1 (SL-13) which can place over 20 metric tons into LEO and the
four stage Proton D-le (SL-12) used for high energy missions. The Proton was
the first Soviet booster designed specifically for use as a launch vehicle and not
derived from a ballistic missile. Developed in the mid 1960's, for over twenty
years it was the Soviet Union's most powerful booster. The three stage SL-13 is
used primarily to launch large space station modules and remote sensing
satellites. Its sole mission in 1991 was to place the Almaz 1 radar satellite into
LEO. By far the most frequently flown version of the Proton is the four stage
48 P. Clark, "The Sapwood Launch Vehicle, Revisited", Tournal of the British Interplanetary
Societly Volume 35, February 1982.
49 "Soviet Launch Vehicles", ESA Launch Vehicle Catalogue, European Space Agency, 1986,
updated December 1990.
SL-12 used to place geosynchronous communication, remote sensing and
navigation satellites into orbit and to put scientific spacecraft such as astro-
observatories and planetary probes into space. Communication satellites
launched directly into geosynchronous orbit by the SL-12 include those in the
Gorizont, Raduga and Ekran series. The SL-12 also has launched many scientific
spacecraft for solar system exploration including missions to the Moon, Mars,
Venus and Halley's cometso. In 1991 the SL-12 flew 8 times. The present version
of the Proton is designated Proton K and has a fourth stage, called the Block DM,
that uses liquid Oxygen and Kerosene as the propellants. The Block DM was
originally designed as the fifth stage for the N-1 Moon rocket. Two versions of
this stage are now used on the Proton, one using standard Kerosene as the fuel
and the other using the hydrocarbon fuel "Sintin" for increased specific impulse.
A new fourth stage which uses liquid Hydrogen as the fuel is under
development for the enhanced Proton KM version. The Proton KM will utilize
the more energetic fuel and a larger payload fairing to increase payload
capability to geosynchronous orbit to over 4 metric tons.
The first major new launch vehicles to be developed in the former Soviet
Union since the 1960's are those in the J- & K-classes, the J-1 Zenit and K-1
Energia vehicles. The Zenit is a new two stage medium-lift vehicle intended to
replace the A-class vehicles as the core Russian launch system. After 12
successful missions between 1985 and 1990, mostly in support of military Elint
programs, the Zenit experienced three consecutive failures throwing its
reliability into question. Finally in late 1992 a thirteenth successful Zenit mission
was flown. The Zenit makes use of highly automated ground processing that
builds upon the already impressive approach used by the F-class boosters.
Consequently, less than 48 hour pad stay times with fueling and check-out
operations requiring fewer than a dozen personnel are achieved51 . The creation
of a third stage for the Zenit booster from the Proton Block DM or new cryogenic
fourth stage is likely in the near future. In the late 1980's a proposal to launch
commercial satellites on Zenit vehicles from a site in Cape York, Australia was
promoted but U.S. government refusal to support such a scheme led to its
50 Proton Commercial Launch Vehicle: Mission Planner's Manual, Issue No. 1, Space
Commerce Corporation, June 1989.
51 S. J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991.
eventual demise. The K-1 Energia heavy lift launch vehicle utilizes a modular
design with 4 to 8 Zenit derived strap-on boosters around a central liquid
Hydrogen and Oxygen fueled core to boost over 100 metric tons into space.
Payloads for the vehicle include the Buran space shuttle, large space structures,
and a proposed 20 ton geosynchronous communications platform. The stage and
a half Energia vehicle puts payloads on a sub-orbital trajectory requiring an
upper stage for final orbit insertion. Two types of upper stages, one for inserting
LEO payloads and another for boosting satellites to geosynchronous orbit are
under development. The Energia has been flown twice, once in 1987 on a sub-
orbital test mission and once in 1988 to orbit the Buran shuttle. Several times
larger than any other booster in the world, the Energia has had trouble finding
payloads that require its immense lift capability. A two strap-on booster version,
the Energia-M, that can place a more moderate 65 metric tons in orbit has been
recently developed to expand the possible applications for the vehicle52.
Besides the traditional launch vehicles, recent arms reduction treaties may
allow hundreds of Russian SS-18, SS-19, SS-20 & SS-24 missiles to be converted to
launch vehicle service. The two stage SS-18 Satan ICBM is the most capable of
these systems and could place over four tons into LEO. There are 308 SS-18s in
the former Soviet arsenal that are scheduled for decommissioning. In addition to
converted missile launch systems, the Russians also have several air-launched
space plane concepts in various stages of development. Both of these non-
traditional approaches to providing launch services could offer important cost
savings and increased capabilities in meeting the launch needs of Western users.
The diverse family of former Soviet launch vehicles are produced in large
quantities using an assembly line approach and low labor costs to achieve
significant cost advantages relative to Western vehicle manufacturers. By
exploiting these potential cost savings or the greater lift capability that Russian
vehicles offer, the U.S. space program could accrue substantial benefits. Short of
utilizing complete launch systems, specific advanced technologies in such areas
as ground processing and propulsion systems could be transferred from Russian
systems for use in the U.S.. The propulsion systems used on the six major classes
of former Soviet launch vehicles, along with the engines available from the
canceled N-1 moon rocket, are shown in Table 2.3. Russian liquid rocket engine
52 "CIS/USSR Launchers", Interavia Space Directory 1992-1993. Jane's Information Group,
1992, p. 258.
Table 2.3 - Propulsion Systems on Former Soviet Launch Vehicles
Stage Engine Fuel Oxidizer Specific Impulse Thrust(seconds at sea level) (KN at Sea Level)
A-Class Boosters
Each Strap-on (4) RD-107 Kerosene LOX 257 821
Stage 1 Core RD-108 Kerosene LOX 248 745
Stage 2 (SL-3) RD-448 Kerosene LOX 324 (vac) 54.5 (vac)
Stage 2 (SL-4&6) RD-461 Kerosene LOX 330 (vac) 298 (vac)
Stage 3 (SL-6) ? Kerosene LOX 340 (vac) 67 (vac)
C-Class Booster
Stage 1 2 x RD-216 UDMH Nitric Acid 248 735 (each)
Stage 2 ? UDMH Nitric Acid ? 157 (vac)
F-Class Boosters
Stage 1 ? UDMH N204 309 2450
Stage 2 (SL-11) RD-219 UDMH Nitric Acid 293 (vac) 883 (vac)
Stage 2 (SL-14) ? UDMH N204 324 (vac) 956 (vac)
Stage 3 (SL-14) ? UDMH N204 331 (vac) 78 (vac)
D-Class Booster
Stage 1 6 x RD-253 UDMH N204 285 1,474 (each)
Stage 2 4x RD-0210 UDMH N204 327 (vac) 583 (each)
Stage 3 RD-0210 UDMH N204 325 (vac) 630 (vac)
Stage 4 (SL-12) ? Kerosene LOX 352 (vac) 85 (vac)
Stage 4 (Proton KM) ? Hydrogen LOX ? 6.9 (vac)
J-Class Booster
Stage 1 RD-171 Kerosene LO)C 308 7,260
Stage 2 RD-120 Kerosene LOX 350 (vac) 834 (vac)
K-Class Booster
Each Strap-on RD-170 Kerosene LOX 308 7,260
Core 4x RD-0120 Hydrogen LOX 455 (vac) 1,450 (each)
N-Class Booster
Stage 1 30x NK-33 Kerosene LOX 290 1,510 (each)
Stage 2 8x NK-43 Kerosene LOX 346 (vac) 1,760 (each)
Stage 3 4x NK-39 Kerosene LOX 353 (vac) 402 (each)
Stage 4 NK-31 Kerosene LOX 353 (vac) 446 (vac)
technology is the world's most advanced and technology transfer from these
propulsion systems, particularly from the most recent RD-170 & RD-120 engines,
could offer significant technological benefits to U.S. engine manufacturers5 3.
2.2.2 Spacecraft
The spacecraft of the former Soviet Union can be broken down into three
broad categories: manned systems, application satellites and scientific spacecraft.
Each of these classes of spacecraft will be addressed in turn and their possible
applications in cooperative ventures will be cited. One of the most impressive
aspects of the Russian space program is its extensive experience with manned
flight. Since orbiting the first human, Yuri Gagarin, on Vostok 1 in 1962, Russian
cosmonauts have logged over 20 man-years in space. The original Vostok (East)
capsule flew a total of 11 times between 1960 and 1963, 6 times with a single
cosmonaut and the other 5 times with various payloads such as dogs and test
equipment. Two modified Vostoks, the Voskhods, had three men crammed
inside them and were flown in 1964 and 1965 to compete with the American
Gemini program. The basic design of the Vostok capsule has been used on many
subsequent Russian spacecraft including the Resurs-F and Photon satellites. In
1967 the much more capable Soyuz vehicle took over for Vostok in supporting
manned flight. The Soyuz consists of three sections, the forward Orbital Module
for carrying payload and equipment, the mid-section Descent Module for
housing the cosmonauts during launch and re-entry, and the aft Service Module
which contains the propulsion system, supporting tankage and electronics.
Three version of the vehicle have flown accounting for 64 manned flights. The
newest version, Soyuz-TM, began operation in 1987 and provides increased crew
comfort and improved docking capability with the Mir space station. The
Progress vehicle (and the improved Progress-T) is an unmanned derivative of the
Soyuz designed for autonomous space station resupply. It first delivered cargo
to Salyut 6 in 1978 and continues to fly every couple of months to Mir to supply it
with food, propellant, equipment and expendable gases. The final manned
transport system of the former Soviet Union is the Buran space plane. Similar to
the U.S. Space Shuttle, Buran has flown only once in 1988 and its high operating
53 "Soviets Look to Market Energiya Engines", Space Business News Pasha Publications,
September 4, 1989, pp. 6-7.
costs leave its future in doubt. Plans are to dock the Buran with Mir in the next
couple of years but whether this will occur is uncertain.
The core of the Russian manned space effort has been its space station
programs. Beginning with Salyut 1 in 1971, the Russians have followed a
determined path to master long duration manned operations in space. Two
parallel space station programs competed throughout the 1970's, the military
Salyuts 2, 3 & 5 (also called the Almaz stations) and the civilian Salyuts 1, 4 &
Cosmos 557. These stations were only marginally successful and none was
occupied for more than 100 days. The two efforts were merged in 1977 to create
the Salyut 6 station and follow-on Salyut 7 in 1982. These two stations were
occupied for a total of almost 5 years by 46 different individuals and were
supplemented by attached modules Cosmos 1443 and Cosmos 1686. Their
evolution led directly to the Mir station's launch in 1986. Mir's principal
advantage over the Salyut 7 is its modular design around a forward docking
node that contains five open ports for the attachment of future modules. Since its
launch the Mir complex has grown through the addition of the Kvant
astronomical module, the Kvant-2 life support and EVA module and the Kristall
materials processing module. Plans are to attach the Spektrum atmospheric
studies module and the Priroda remote sensing module within the next two
years to complete the complex. The major missions of Mir are to investigate the
effects of long duration spaceflight on man, to utilize microgravity for scientific
and commercial purposes, to monitor processes on Earth and to develop
experience in space operations. Mir has been permanently manned since
February 1986 except for a six month period at the end of 1986 and a three month
period in mid 198954. In 1987-88, cosmonauts Titov and Manarov spent over a
year (366 days) on the Mir station. Maintaining Mir is becoming increasingly
difficult as the station ages and projections are that it will need to be replaced
within the next two to three years. At present, over one half of the cosmonauts'
time is spent on maintenance operations. The form that the new Mir-2 will take
is still being debated but possibilities for combining the Mir and Freedom space
station programs have stimulated much interest because of the potential cost
savings and political benefits that such cooperation would afford. A summary of
operating Soviet spacecraft including manned systems in given in Table 2.4.
54 B. J. Bluth, Soviet Space Stations As Analogs - Volume II MIR, First Edition, NASA
Headquarters, August 1991, pp.17-19 .
Table 2.4 - Operational Spacecraft of the Former Soviet Union
Spacecraft First Launches Description
Launch to Date
Manned Systems
Mir (Peace) Space Station 1986 4 (modules) Permanently Manned Space Station
Soyuz (Union) 1967 68 Manned Transport for Mir Station
Progress 1978 54 Unmanned Cargo Carrier for Mir
Buran (Blizzard) Shuttle 1988 1 Energia Launched Space Plane
Communications
Gorizont (Horizon) 1978 24 GSO, 9 operating, TV & phone link
Raduga (Rainbow) 1975 30 GSO, 8 operating, gov't services
Ekran (Screen) 1976 19 GSO, 3 operating, Direct Broadcast TV
Luch (Beam) 1985 4 GSO, 2 operating, Satellite Data Relay
Molniya (Lightning) 1965 141 SEO, 16 operating, high latitude link
Locsyst/Gonets 1985 72 Low Alt., Military Store & Forward
Navigation
Tsikada/Nadezhda (Hope) 1968 > 60 LEO, Transit-type, Cospas, 4 operating
GLONASS 1982 57 Mid Orbit, GPS-type, 15 operating
Earth Observation
Meteor 1969 56 LEO, Weather, Visible/IR, 4 operating
Prognoz (Nature) 1988 2 GEO, Resource, Visible/IR, 2 operating
Resurs-O 1985 5 LEO, Resource, Visible/IR, 1 operating
Resurs-F 1977 13 LEO, Resource, Short Life Photo Return
Okean-O 1983 7 Oceanography, SA Radar, 3 operating
Almaz (Diamond) 1987 2 SA Radar, 15m resol., none operating
Microgravity
Photon 1988 4 < 500 kg payload, 2 week missions
Resurs-F Capsule 1977 13 < 35 kg payload secondary payloads
Russian application satellites fall into four major classes: communication,
navigation, Earth observation and microgravity processing. The largest
application satellite program both in terms number of missions and resource
expenditure, is the telecommunications program. The Russians maintain
communication systems in three main orbits: geosynchronous, highly elliptical
and low altitude. Most American communication satellites are placed in
geosynchronous orbits allowing them to hover over a fixed point on the equator
and relay signals throughout the country. The Russians have the Gorizont and
Raduga satellites which operate similarly to U.S. geosynchronous
communication satellites except that they have a shorter design life (only 3 years)
and carry fewer transponders55 . These shortcomings will be overcome
somewhat by the Express satellite, Gorizont's greatly improved successor, whose
planned first launch is in 1995. A version of the Express satellite, the Romantis, is
being considered for a joint Russian-German venture to provide
telecommunication services in Eastern Europe. The sparse population
distribution in Siberia makes standard geosynchronous communication networks
impractical in that region. Homes are too far apart for a central dish to receive a
satellite link and economically distribute it to end users by ground lines. To
solve this problem the Russians developed the world's first Direct Broadcast
Satellite, the Ekran, whose signals are received directly by over 5,000 end users in
small communities throughout Eastern Russia using simple antennae56. In 1994,
the more powerful Gals/Gelikon system is to begin replacing the Ekrans offering
more channels and a longer operating life.
The Russian population is not only sparsely distributed but also resides at
high latitudes that cannot be well serviced by satellites over the equator. This
situation led to the development of Molniya satellites that use highly elliptical
and inclined orbits to seemingly hang over northern latitudes for large parts of
the day. Since most contact occurs with Molniya satellites when they are on the
distant edges of their elliptic path, large 12 meter diameter dishes are required by
the Orbita ground stations that communicate with the Molniyas. Three
generations of Molniya satellites make this system the oldest and most widely
used Russian communications network. Low altitude satellites presently play a
relatively small role in civilian communications but this situation may soon
change as the military Locsyst/Gonets system is offered commercially. Another
new civilian use for low altitude satellites is the proposed Marathon system
intended to exploit the burgeoning mobile communications market. In addition
to low altitude satellites, Marathon will employ the geosynchronous Arcos and
55 D. Hart, The Encyclopedia of Soviet Spacecraft. Bison Books Corporation, 1987, pp. 26 & 83.
56 A. Dula, Opportunities From Soviet Industry - A Commercial User's Guide, Space
Commerce Corporation, distributed at 1989 Paris Air Show, pp. 16-17.
the Molniya-type Mayak satellites to create a worldwide mobile communications
network. The final Russian communication service which bears mentioning is
the Luch system, which includes dedicated satellites as well as transponders on
Gorizont and Raduga satellites, for relaying data between the ground and in-
orbit spacecraft.
Russian navigation systems closely parallel those in the U.S. with an older
low altitude Transit-type system, Tsikada and a new Global Navigation System
(GLONASS) that is almost identical to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).
The Tsikada constellation compliments a similar military network that also uses
Doppler ranging to locate the position of ships at sea to within 80-100 meters.
Since 1982, Tsikada spacecraft have been carrying transponders to support the
Russian segment of the international search and rescue effort (COSPAS).
Recently the name Nadezhda has been used to designate these COSPAS related
satellites. COPAS and its U.S. counterpart SARSAT are credited with saving over
2,000 lives since they began operation a decade ago. GLONASS satellites are far
more sophisticated, orbiting at an altitude of over 19,000 kilometers, so that they
are able to determine position to within 10-20 meters and velocity to within
.15 m/sec. A complete constellation of 21 spacecraft is expected in orbit by 1995,
but at present only 13 GLONASS satellites are operational. The extensive
similarity between the GLONASS and GPS systems provides an opportunity for
developing receivers compatible with both systems that have enhanced
performance and reliability. The U.S. firm Honeywell is developing just such a
receiver and intends to flight test it for aircraft navigation in 1993.
The Russian Earth observation program supports two main activities:
meteorology and remote sensing of Earth resources. The principal satellites used
for weather forecasting are the polar orbiting Meteors, three generations of which
have been developed over the last 25 years. To complement this capability, the
Russians plan to launch their first Geosynchronous Orbit Meteorological Satellite
(GOMS) in 1993. The former Soviet Union makes use of a similar pairing of
geosynchronous and low altitude polar spacecraft, the Prognoz and Resurs-O
respectively, for meeting its resource remote sensing needs. The Resurs-O
provides multi-spectral digital images similar to the U.S. Landsat or French Spot
satellites5 7. The Russians also operate two types of radar satellites, the Okean-O
57 Yu. Poletayov & P. Sergeyuk, Commercial Uses of Space Exploration, Glavkosmos
Publishing, Moscow, 1989, p. 39.
which monitors ice formation in northern seas and the Almaz which provides all-
weather general purpose imagery. Originally designed as a military surveillance
platform, the 18 ton Almaz offered the international community the first
commercially available source of Earth radar images58 . A unique Russian
capability is provided by the Resurs-F satellites which return high resolution
photographic film to Earth for use in resource assessments. The Resurs-F is a
civilian version of Russia's military photo reconnaissance satellites which have
flown hundreds of space missions. This remote sensing spacecraft is also capable
of carrying small microgravity experiments as secondary payloads.
The principal microgravity processing spacecraft, Photon, is derived from
the same basic design as the Resurs-F. Several standardized material processing
units have been developed for use on this spacecraft or on Mir's Kristall module.
These include furnaces of the Zona, Splav and Konstanta series for growing
protein and semiconductor crystals and the Kashtan electrophoresis unit for
biological materials processing 59. NPO Lavochkin intends to introduce a new
microgravity spacecraft in 1993 to compete with Photon in what they expect to be
an expanding microgravity processing market. KB Photo is also not standing still
and intends to complete development of its Photon successor, the Nika-T, by
1994. The Russians have the world's most well developed microgravity
processing infrastructure that has only begun to be exploited by West, mostly by
U.S. and German firms.
The former Soviet Union has a long and impressive history in the scientific
exploration of outer space. A summary of its most important missions to date is
included in Table 2.5. The Soviet moon program included more than two dozen
unmanned orbiters, landers and rovers and culminated in three missions which
returned samples of lunar soil. Although hundreds of millions of rubles and
millions of man-hours were expended on the manned lunar program, it was
never successful and was finally terminated in 1974. Efforts to explore Mars and
its moons have resulted in similar disappointments with 10 mostly unsuccessful
missions to Mars in the 1960's and 1970's and a pair of unsuccessful probes to the
Martian moon Phobos in 1988-89. On the contrary, Russian exploration of Venus
58 ALMAZ Radar Remote Sensing Satellite - Buyer's Guide, Space Commerce Corporation,
Houston, Texas, 1990, pp. 2-3.
59 Commercial Space Services Rendered by Glavkosmos of the USSR, set of advertising
brochures, Moscow, 1990.
Table 2.5 - Major Russian Scientific Spacecraft
Spacecraft Years Total DescriptionFlown Fights
Luna 1959-76 25 Explored Moon with Rovers- Returned Samples
Mars/Phobos 1962-89 13 Explored Mars & Phobos (mostly unsuccessful)
Venera/Vega 1%1-1985 26 Explored Venus with Landers & Radar Mapper
Cosmos 1%2-1991 > 2,170 Code Name- Experimental or Military Missions
Intercosmos 1969-91 26 Solar, Terrestrial and Space Physics
Astron/Granat 1983-1989 2 Ultraviolet & X-ray Space Telescopes
Gamma 1990 1 Russia's First Gamma-Ray Observatory
and its affiliated observations of Comet Halley have been very effective. Russian
spacecraft have overcome an incredibly hostile environment to land softly on the
surface of Venus, release balloons into its atmosphere and radar map many
important surface features. However, following the highly successful Vega
missions in 1985, Russian planetary scientists turned away from Venus to pursue
Martian exploration with new vigor60 . Plans to send missions to Mars in 1994
and 1996 that utilize advanced equipment such as atmospheric balloons, robotic
rovers and surface penetrators have generated much international interest and
support. Martian exploration has become a focal point for international
cooperation. In addition to planetary exploration, many Russian spacecraft have
been used to investigate astronomy and space physics. Some of these missions
were included in the supposedly scientific Cosmos series which in reality is a
name used predominately as a cover for military or developmental spacecraft.
Over 90% of all Russian spacecraft have flown under the Cosmos designation.
Intercosmos satellites compose the largest truly scientific spacecraft series and
have carried dozens of instruments to analyze the space environment. The
Russians are now developing a new series of space observatories to supersede
the Astron/Granat type (based on the Venera planetary bus) and the Gamma
type (based on the Soyuz vehicle). The new Spektrum series will begin flying in
1995 and is designed specifically for use in astronomical observing in the X-ray,
gamma ray, ultraviolet and infrared spectra. Opportunities for flying foreign
instruments on these new spacecraft has generated much international interest.
60 A. Proskurin,'Soviet Cosmonautics: Questions and Answers, Novosti Press Agency,
Moscow, 1988, pp. 119-123.
2.3 Major Research, Production & Support Institutions
Thousands of institutions combine their efforts to implement the Russian
space program. Obviously explaining how each of these interact is neither
necessary nor feasible. However, by examining in some detail the most
important institutions, it is possible to gain a clearer conception of how the
Russian space program operates and what aspects of its organization are likely to
be problematic in cooperative ventures. The following overview first discusses
space research institutes, followed by industrial enterprises and concludes with a
synopsis of Russian space infrastructure. The bulk of the discussion focuses on
the industrial enterprises since they represent the majority of institutions both in
number and in resource use. Three general types of organizations are involved
in Russian space activities: research institutes, design bureaus and series
production plants. Unlike in most U.S. firms, the research, design and
manufacturing efforts in the former Soviet Union were split among different
organizations. To help overcome the inefficiencies inherent in this approach,
during the 1970's & 1980's many research institutes, design bureaus and factories
were merged together to form Scientific-Production Associations (NPOs).
However, quite a few organizations remained independent and retained their
former designations of Design Bureau (KB), Experimental Design Bureau (OKB),
Scientific Research Institute (NII) or All-Union Scientific Research Institute
(VNII). These acronyms will be used frequently in the following discussion.
2.3.1 Research Institutes
Almost all basic research and most applied research in the former Soviet
Union is conducted in large centralized research institutes located in large cities
far away from the industrial sites where the research is supposed to be applied.
Although the research establishment created by Soviet central planning was
undoubtedly the largest in the world, it was far from the most prolific. The
research institutes of the former Soviet Union are grouped into three main
hierarchies: (1) the academy system, (2) the military & industrial system and
(3) the educational system 61. The space research activities within each of these
61 L. R. Graham, "Chapter 9: The Organizational Features of Soviet Science", Science in
Russia and the Soviet Union, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 180-181.
systems will be discussed in the following sections along with the primary
institutes which support space activities.
2.3.1.1 Academy of Science Institutes
The Academy of Science system is the most prestigious portion of the
former Soviet research establishment. Headed by Yuri S. Osipov, the Russian
Academy of Sciences (formed in December 1991 from the old U.S.S.R. Academy),
oversees the operation of some 250 research institutes employing over 125,000
researchers. Each of the other republics also has their own academy of sciences.
The title of "Academician", given to all members of the academy (there are
approximately 400 full members at present) is the most respected professional
title in Russia. Academicians tend to be either the director or deputy director of
their institute. The director of each institute is provided with a block of funding
from the central academy to support whatever research efforts he sees fit. There
is no peer review process or multiple sources of funding available for researchers
comparable to the system in the U.S.. The Academicians have unqualified
authority in the research environment similar to the Chief Designers in the
industrial environment.
Of the 250 institutes in the academy system, only about two dozen are
involved to any significant extent in space activities; The most important
academy institute for space is undoubtedly the Space Research Institute (IKI)
located in Moscow. Headed by Albert A. Galeyev, IKI is the lead institute for
space science programs responsible for providing overall scientific direction and
for producing scientific instruments and equipment. Its areas of research include
gamma ray, X-ray & infrared astronomy, lunar & planetary probes, solar studies,
plasma physics and geodesy. From 1973 until 1988 the institute's director was
Roald Z. Sagdeyev, who left to emigrate to the U.S., marry President
Eisenhower's grand daughter and become a professor at the University of
Maryland. IKI works very closely with the Babakin Center of Lavochkin
Association in the production of spacecraft for scientific purposes. Babakin is
responsible for the engineering and production of the spacecraft while IKI
performs all scientific work and produces the scientific instruments. IKI's main
design and production facility for space equipment is the Special Design Bureau
in the Kirgizian capital of Frunze62. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union the
Frunze bureau has been transferred to the Kirgizstan Ministry of Industry
removing a vital manufacturing facility from IKI and leaving the Frunze facility
without its major customer. The future of the Frunze facility's relationship with
IKI is presently uncertain 63 . Other Academy of Science institutes, besides IKI,
with involvement in space activities are summarized in Table 2 .664. Most of these
institutes are located in Moscow but a few have facilities in St. Petersburg.
Table 2.6 - Academy of Science Institutes Involved in Space Research
Institute Research Area
Vernadsky Institute of Geochemistry Geochemistry & Planetology
Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics Trajectories & Orbit Calculations
Lebedev Institute of Astrophysics Astronomy, Space Geodesy & Solar Studies
Izmiran Institute of Radiowave Propagation External Geophysics
Control Problems Institute Spacecraft Control Theory
Problems of Mechanics Institute Orbital Mechanics
Academy of Sciences Computer Center Computer Science
Institute of Lake Studies (in St. Petersburg) Gamma Ray Astronomy
2.3.1.2 Industrial Institutes
The industrial institutes perform the most applied research and in the past
were funded directly by the industrial ministry that they supported. With the
disbanding of the Ministry of General Machine Building following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, most of the space industry research institutes were put under
the control of the RSA. The RSA's main research institutes are: (1) the Central
Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building (TsNIIMASh), (2) the Scientific
Research Institute of Thermal Processes (NII-TP), (3) the Scientific Research
Institute of Chemical Machine Building (NII-KhiMASh) and (4) the Economics &
Production Planning Institute (AGAT). TsNIIMASh (formerly known as NII-88)
is by far the largest and most important of these institutes. It's extensive facilities
62 A. Barshay, "Frunze Special Design Bureau Experiencing Difficulties with Local
Authorities", Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, May 12, 1987, p. 4.
63 Yu. Gruzdov, "Space's Problems on the Ground: There's a Risk But Both Kirgizstan and
the CIS Would Win", Slovo Kirgizstana. March 3, 1992, p. 3.
64 Much of the information for this table is from an article by G. Debouzy in The Cambridge
Encyclopedia of Space., Cambridge, England, 1990, p. 318.
in the Moscow suburb of Kaliningrad employ over 8,000 people and include
supersonic wind tunnels, thermal-vacuum chambers, propulsion test stands and
structural test equipment. Besides its role in research & technology
development, TsNIIMASh also provides systems engineering & program
planning support to the RSA and oversees the operations of the Spaceflight
Control Center (TsUP). TsNIIMASh was the original rocket development center
which produced the R-1 through R-9 missiles that were later modified to create
the Soyuz family of launch vehicles. Sergei Korolyov, the father of Soviet
rocketry, worked at TsNIIMASh until 1956 when he founded OKB-1 to design
space launchers and moved his operations across the street to the present site of
NPO Energia. TsNIIMASh is the lead research center in the fields of systems
engineering, guidance & control, structures, thermodynamics and plasma
physics65. Most propulsion system R&D is done at NII-TP and NII-KhiMASh.
NII-TP performs basic research into gas dynamics, combustion and other
propulsion related processes at its Moscow facilities. NII-KhiMASh is the lead
institute for testing of advanced rocket propulsion systems and its facilities in
Sergei Posad (Zagorsk), about 50 kilometers from Moscow, include large liquid
rocket engine test stands. Each of these institutes employs between 2,000 and
3,000 people and like TsNIIMASh, assist the RSA in technology planning and the
preparation of product specifications within their field of expertise. The final
institute under RSA control, AGAT, is responsible for performing economic
analyzes of the benefits and costs of space activities. It employs over 1,000
people in a massive and costly bureaucracy whose goal ironically is to
demonstrate the economic efficiency of the space program.
There are several other industrial institutes besides those under the RSA
who play a significant role in space activities, most importantly those affiliated
with the aviation and nuclear power industries. The lead aviation research
center is the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Research Institute (TsAGI) located in
Zhukovsky, about 50 kilometers East of Moscow. Formed in 1918, it has
extensive facilities for testing aircraft and satellites and employs over 10,000
people on its R200 million annual budget66. TsAGI is the equivalent in the
aviation industry to TsNIIMASh in the space industry. It has recently been
65 G. Uspensky, Department Head at TsNIIMASh, interviewed in his office in Kaliningrad,
October 21-22, 1992.
66 G. Zagainov, Director of TsAGI, presentation given in Washington, DC, December 1, 1991.
pursuing joint ventures with Western European and U.S. firms which have
resulted in agreements to perform wind tunnel and thermal-vacuum tests at
TsAGI on ESA's Hermes and the British Hotol vehicle designs. In addition to
TsAGI, other aviation industry institutes of importance to space activities are the
Central Institute of Aviation Motors (TsIAM), the All-Union Institute of Aviation
Materials, the Central Aviation Systems Institute and the Flight Research
Institute (LII) in Zhukovsky.67 The town of Zhukovsky is the hub of the aviation
industry much as Kaliningrad is the hub of the space industry. In the nuclear
industry, the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow has played a major role in space
through its development of the Topaz-2 space based reactor. In addition to its
research and design center in Moscow which employs several thousand people,
the Kurchatov institute also oversees the production and testing of nuclear
reactors and weapons at its facilities in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.
2.3.1.3 Educational Institutions
Educational institutions such as universities and technical institutes provide
the final segment of the research establishment in the former Soviet Union.
Educational research in general, and university research in specific, is not nearly
as important in Russia as it is in the U.S. where universities perform most of the
nation's basic research in the scientific and engineering fields. The lion's share of
fundamental research in Russia occurs in the Academy of Science system leaving
the universities and technical institutes with only a minor research role. None
the less, some important space research is performed in educational institutions
and these organizations retain their influence on the space industry by supplying
most of its trained personnel. Technical education in the former U.S.S.R. reflects
the Russian preference for relying on tried and true designs. Even
undergraduate students take very focused courses in how to design specific
components such as gas generators and hydraulic actuators. These courses often
consist of tracing designs from hardware in a laboratory to learn accepted design
practices. Little emphasis is put on furthering creativity or on promoting student
interests in topics outside of their specific field. The result is an exceedingly
narrow education with no instruction in humanities nor development of
communication skills.
67 "Five Research Facilities Band Together To Form Independent Association", Aviation Week
& Space Technology, November 18, 1991, pp. 48-49.
The most important educational institution for the space industry is the
Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI). Like most Russian institutions it is large and
bureaucratic. A total of around 20,000 students, at both the graduate and
undergraduate level, study in MAI's nine colleges. The two colleges most deeply
involved with space activities are the College of Aerospace Propulsion (#2) and
the College of Cosmonautics (#6). The College of Cosmonautics has about 2,500
students and 1,000 staff including professors, lecturers, and research assistants
distributed in it nine departments68 . Its instruction covers most areas of space
vehicle technology with departments in systems design, structures, controls,
fluid dynamics, and life support systems. The College of Aerospace Propulsion
is the center for training in both jet and rocket propulsion systems. MAI
graduates most of the aerospace engineers employed by the aviation and space
industries and also plays an important role in providing technical advice and
research support to these industries. The economic turmoil in Russia has
resulted in declining enrollments and severe shortages of funding at MAI. To
combat this problem, international collaboration is being sought in a wide range
of areas such as educational exchange programs, international short courses, and
joint research projects. Within the College of Cosmonautics, the Cosmos
Association has been formed by a group of professors to help promote such
activities. Besides MAI, several other educational institutions play an important
role in space research and education and bear mentioning here. These
institutions are the Bauman Higher Technical School, the Moscow Physical
Technical Institute, the Moscow State Technical University, the Moscow Institute
of Geodesy, the Institute of Applied Mechanics, and Moscow State University, all
in Moscow and the St. Petersburg Mechanical Institute. St. Petersburg is also
home to the Mozhaysky Military Engineering Institute which is responsible for
training the officers of the military space units who man the launch sites, control
centers and tracking stations throughout the former Soviet Union69.
68 Y. Zakharov, Vice Dean of the College of Cosmonautics at Moscow Aviation Institute,
interviewed at MAI in Moscow, October 30, 1992.
69 A. Radionov, "We Describe for the First Time: Whom the Secret Institute Trains", Krasnaya
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2.3.2 Production & Design Organizations
The following sections will describe each of the principal enterprises that
produce space hardware in the former Soviet Union. The purpose of these
discussions is to provide a broad overview of the organization of the Russian
industry as well as to provide some details on the capabilities of individual
enterprises. Although most contact to date has been with former Soviet policy
making and administrative agencies, as cooperation becomes more extensive
interfaces are likely to broaden to more fully include the production and design
enterprises. For this reason and since these enterprises are responsible for
producing and utilizing most space technologies in the former Soviet Union,
their discussion in this section is given greater weight.
2.3.2.1 Launch Vehicle Producers
Although the space industry of the former Soviet Union consists of over
2,000 organizations, it is dominated by only a few huge production enterprises
that produce all launch vehicles and many important satellite systems and
spacecraft. Most of these enterprises were started in the 1950's by the
Chief Designers Korolyov, Chelomei and Yangel, whose names are now famous
throughout Russia. In the 1960's the "Battle of the Chief Designers" raged in the
space industry as each of these strong leaders pitted their bureaus against each
other for dominance of the Soviet space program. Other important space
industry leaders who participated in this infighting were Glushko,
Chief Designer for Propulsion, and Babakin, Chief Designer for Planetary Probes.
These men and their organizations will be discussed in the following sections.
NPO Energia
Headed by Chief Designer Yuri P. Semenov, NPO Energia is the largest and
most important space production enterprise in the former Soviet Union. It is
responsible for building and operating all manned space systems, and produces
a wide variety of spacecraft and launch vehicles. NPO Energia is headquartered
20 kilometers northeast of Moscow in the suburb of Kaliningrad. Located in
Kaliningrad are the Central Design Bureau of Experimental Machine Building
(TsKBEM), production facilities for the Soyuz-TM and Progress-M spacecraft, test
facilities and several research institutes70 . The TsKBEM is the lead design bureau
in NPO Energia responsible for overall design and management of the Energia
vehicle, the Buran space shuttle and the Mir space station. NPO Energia also has
major divisions in Samara (Kubyshev) and at the Baikonur cosmodrome along
with many minor divisions scattered around the country. In Samara is the
Central Specialized Design Bureau (TsSKB) and its subordinate KB Photon along
with the Progress manufacturing plant and related research and test facilities.
The TsSKB designs and oversees manufacturing at the Progress plant of the
A-series boosters Vostok, Soyuz and Molniya (SL-3, 4 & 6 respectively).
KB Photon designs many Earth observation and microgravity satellites including
those in the Resurs-F, Photon, Nika-T and Bion series, all of which are produced
at the Progress plant. In addition, large components for the Energia vehicle such
as propellant tanks and engine parts are also manufactured in Samara. The
design bureaus in Samara employ about 5,000 people while the Progress plant
employs nearly 25,00071. At Baikonur are the final assembly and check-out
facilities for all spacecraft and boosters produced in Kaliningrad and Samara.
Total employment at NPO Energia probably exceeds 50,000 people.
NPO Energia was founded by the Chief Designer, Sergei P. Korolyov and
has roots going back to the very beginning of the Soviet space program. The
industrial area of Podlipki (known since the end of the Second World War as
Kaliningrad) was originally laid out in 1926 as an artillery factory. Following the
war, Korolyov was put in charge of obtaining German rocket experts and
bringing them to Kaliningrad to help develop Russian missiles. In 1946, NII-88
(which later became TsNIIMASh) was founded in Kaliningrad as a research
center for rocket development. Korolyov worked at NII-88 until 1956 when
OKB-1 was founded just across the street with Korolyov as its Chief Designer.
Under Korolyov's leadership all early Russian ICBMs from the R-1 to R-7 were
developed 72 . Later in his career Korolyov led OKB-1 away from military work
due to his interest in the manned exploration of space.
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Most space production enterprises in the former Soviet Union were in one
way or another spun-off from Korolyov's OKB. In particular, the TsSKB in
Samara and its associated design bureaus and plant were created as a branch of
OKB-1 in 1959 under the leadership of Dmitry I. Kozlov. Kozlov remains the
Chief Designer at the Samara facilities to this day. Korolyov was not so lucky,
dying during a botched operation in January1966. At that time the TsKBEM
(OKB-I's new name) was just beginning the N-1 manned lunar program and the
loss of Korolyov's leadership is cited by many as a major reason for that
program's failure. Korolyov's deputy, Vasily P. Mishin, took over the TsKBEM in
1966 and led the enterprise until 1974 when he was forced out of power by
Valentin P. Glushko. Glushko had been a critic of the moon program's design
and he used its failure to rest control of the TsKBEM from Mishin and combine
Korolyov's old bureau with his own GDL-OKB to form NPO Energia. Upon
taking control, Glushko promptly canceled the N-1 program and began work on
the Energia/Buran launch system. Glushko died in January 1989 and was
succeeded by his two deputies Boris I. Gubanov and Yuri P. Semenov7 3.
Semenov eventually became Chief Designer and separated Glushko's old
GDL-OKB off as NPO Energomash.
As is occurring all over the Russian space industry, declining orders and
reduced budgets are forcing NPO Energia to look to international sources for
funding and to convert much of its production to non-space goods. Energia has
done relatively well compared to other Russian enterprises in obtaining foreign
funding for its operations. It now receives hard currency funding directly from
NASA, ESA, and several private companies to support its work in manned flight
and microgavity research. In an unprecedented move, complete control of the
Mir station was ceded to NPO Energia by the RSA so that whatever measures
necessary could be taken to raise funding for the station's operation. To date this
has included selling Mir visits to representatives of France, Germany, Japan,
England and Austria with several new deals in the works. However, foreign
funding has not stopped the need for conversion of production at Kaliningrad
and Samara to dough mixers, pressure cookers, milk-boilers, vacuum cleaners
and medical equipment. Some 30% of all workers are now involved in non-space
73 V. Golovachev, "Rocket Center Reveals Secrets: Little-Known Pages From the Histroy of
the Space Program", Trud. November 22, 1989, p. 4 .
activities which represent over 80% of profits. The great space design bureau of
Sergei Korolyov now survives by churning out pots and pans74.
KB Salyut
Headed by Chief Designer Dmitry A. Polukhin, KB Salyut is the former
Soviet Union's principal designer of large space station modules, as well as a
major designer and developer of space boosters and satellites. It is the lead
design bureau in NPO Experimental Machine Building which also contains
KB Begoragzon, two affiliated experimental manufacturing plants, and flight and
ground test divisions.75 A movement is now underway to use the famous name
of Salyut for the entire scientific and production organization and do away with
its nearly meaningless present title of Experimental Machine Building. The entire
organization employs about 9,000 people, the majority of which are scientists or
engineers. Its chief customers are the RSA, Ministry of Defense (MoD), other
ministries, NPO Energia and foreign agencies. The design bureaus and their
related test and production facilities perform all functions necessary for the
development of new space systems including the production and testing of
prototypes. Once the design is sufficiently mature, it is handed off along with
detailed production specifications to a series production plant. In KB Salyut's
case, most mass production goes to the Khrunichev plant which is located right
next door to its central facilities in the western Moscow district of Fill.
KB Salyut began in 1951 as part of Vladimir M. Myashishchev's OKB-23
specializing in the design of long-range strategic bombers such as the M-4 Bison
and operating out of Fili Aviation Plant No. 23. In 1960, both the Fili plant and
Myashishchev's OKB where absorbed into Vladimir N. Chelomei's OKB-52
switching their emphasis from aircraft to rocket development. Chelomei was one
of the big three Chief Designers along with Korolyov at OKB-1 and Yangel at
OKB-3. Chelomei founded OKB-2, his first design bureau, in the summer of 1944
for the purpose of producing a Russian equivalent of the German V-1
"Buzz Bomb". In 1953, OKB-2 was liquidated on Stalin's orders due to
unspecified "intrigues" leaving Chelomei without a bureau and sending some of
74 S. Omelchenko, "Space and Commerce", Delovoy Mir, No. 127, July 4, 1992, p. 7.
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OKB-2's people to Myashishchev's bureau.76 Ironically seven years later, many
of the people who had left Chelomei to go to Myashishchev's bureau, found
themselves back under Chelomei's iron leadership in his new design bureau
OKB-52, often contrary to their wishes. One of these people was KB Salyut's
present Chief Designer, Dmitry Polukhin 77. Chelomei was reinstated as a Chief
Designer by Khrushchev in 1959 and formed OKB-52 for the development of
space systems by cannibalizing several aircraft design bureaus including those of
Myashishchev and Lavochkin (to be discussed later). For over twenty years
KB Salyut operated as part of the Chelomei organization. After Chelomei's death
in 1984, his organization was separated into KB Salyut led by Polukhin and
NPO Machinostroyenia led by Yefremov. For a short time during the 1980's,
KB Salyut was a division of NPO Energia but for the last few years it has been the
lead design bureau of the independent NPO Experimental Machine Building.
KB Salyut's primary experience is in the development of large manned
space systems and booster rockets. It developed the civilian Salyut space stations
1, 4, 6 & 7, the Mir space station including the attached modules Kvant-1, Kvant-2
and Kristall, and the soon to be attached Piroda and Spektre modules. Although
NPO Energia is the lead organization for the entire Mir program, KB Salyut is the
lead on most of the individual modules used in the station's construction.
KB Salyut is also the developer of the Proton launch vehicle which is Russia's
primary vehicle for launching heavy payloads to low Earth orbit,
geosynchronous satellites and interplanetary spacecraft.
Spiraling inflation and the decline in demand for its space products are at
present severely impacting KB Salyut. Over the last 3 years it has lost some of its
best people (20%-30% of the total work force) due to low wages and the
uncertain future which it offers its employees. To help stem this tide, conversion
efforts are being given high priority as are foreign sales. The controversial sale to
India of upper stage cryogenic engine technology similar to that being developed
for the new Proton fourth stage, provides 60% of KB Salyut's total current
funding and will extend for three more years. Although the Indian deal has
caused outrage in the U.S. and claims that agreements on non-proliferation of
missile technologies to developing countries have been violated, the
76 C.P. Vick, The Soviet Civil/Military Space Missile & Aircraft Industry, June 1992, p. 42.
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management of KB Salyut denies such violations and argues it is their only
choice for survival.78 Conversion efforts are proceeding slowly, sources of
government funding are drying up, and all Western contacts on space station
technologies have been monopolized by NPO Energia leaving few choices for
KB Salyut in determining how to survive.
Khrunichev Plant
Headed by General Director Anatoly I. Kriselev, Khrunichev plant is a
major manufacturing site for large manned & unmanned space stations, rocket
boosters, and satellites. It mass produces hardware predominantly for the old
divisions of Chelomei's design bureau, KB Salyut and NPO Machinostroyenia,
although it is free to obtain its designs from other sources.79 The plant employs
some 15,000 people at its sprawling facilities in Fili, approximately one third of
which are skilled technicians or engineers. Until 1989 the plant officially
consisted of only a "post office box" at which its mail was received, everything
else about it being secret. But since its declassification 3 years ago, over 221
delegations from all over the world have visited its immense facilities.80 These
facilities provide a full service production capability which may include
machining, forging, casting, welding or chemical processing operations.
Khrunichev works closely with the design bureaus who typically provide the
specifications for the hardware it produces, however such support is becoming
less important as the plant converts more to simple consumer goods81 .
The plant was formed in 1917 by the "Russo-Balt" Society to produce
automobiles. In 1922, the German aircraft firm Junkers was given the plant and it
constructed the main assembly buildings for the production of U-20 airplanes. In
1927 the Germans were kicked out and production of Russian planes by the
designer Andrei N. Tupolev was begun. Aircraft production was the main stay
of the plant until 1961 when it was named after the former Minister of Aviation,
78 Y. N. Groshev, Deputy General Designer, KB Salyut, interviewed at KB Salyut
headquarters in Moscow, October 26, 1992.
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Mikhail Khrunichev, and converted to rocket and spacecraft production.82 For
over 30 years the plant has been specializing in the manufacture of large space
stations, both manned and unmanned, as well as in booster and missile
production. All Salyut space stations, Mir space station modules, Cosmos
manned modules, Almaz radar satellites, Proton Launchers and most SS-19
missiles were produced at Khrunichev.
Reduction in military and space orders as well as acute problems in
obtaining supplies, particularly from non-Russian enterprises, is forcing major
adjustment at the Khrunichev facility. Proton production remains relatively high
at nine vehicles per year according to the Khrunichev management, but it is
highly uncertain if all of these vehicles will be needed.83 Manufacturing of the
Piroda and Spektre modules is nearing completion but follow-on work on Mir-2
remains uncertain, as is additional production of Almaz satellites. The cessation
of military production of SS-19 missiles several years ago has relaxed secrecy
constraints, and allowed international contacts and conversion to begin in
earnest. In 1989, 70% of Khrunichev's production was of space products but this
fraction had dropped to around 30% by the end of 1992. Under its conversion
program, Khrunichev has begun production of medical equipment, general
aviation airplanes, remotely operated vehicles as well as a whole host of
consumer products. To deal with supply problems, Khrunichev is increasingly
sourcing only from domestic Russian suppliers.
NPO Yuzhnoye
With primary design and production facilities located in Dnepropetrovsk,
Ukraine, NPO Yuzhnoye (Southern), is the largest ballistic missile production
enterprise in the former U.S.S.R.. It is also a major manufacturer of launch
vehicles, satellites and components for space systems produced by other
enterprises. NPO Yuzhnoye is a fully integrated developer of missile and space
systems containing multiple design bureaus, test facilities and production plants.
Yuzhmash, the main manufacturing plant in Dnepropetrovsk, has over 2 million
square feet of floor space for final assembly of products. The Dnepropetrovsk
complex is complimented by a factory and test facility in Pavlograd, Ukraine
82 V. Umnov, "The Secret at Fili", Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 14, 1989, p. 1.
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which builds and tests components such as rocket motors. The total employment
at NPO Yuzhnoye is greater than 35,000 people and it operates on an annual
budget exceeding R100 million.
NPO Yuzhnoye is a descendent of OKB-3 which was formed in 1954 by
Academician Mikhail K. Yangel, as the first major off-shoot of Korolyov's bureau.
Korolyov had a general mistrust of hypergolic fuels due to their materials
compatibility and handling problems. His lack of enthusiasm for such a
militarily promising technology as hypergolic propellants led many Generals to
distrust him and to push for the forming of a new design bureau that Korolyov
did not dominate. Consequently Yangel, one of Korolyov's deputies, was
promoted to Chief Designer and put in charge of OKB-3 to develop hypergolic
fueled missile technology. Originally much of the production work at Yuzhmash
was of R-7 boosters and other hardware for the Korolyov bureau. However in
1959, the Korolyov bureau opened a new dedicated factory in Samara
(Kuibyshev) leaving Yuzhmash to concentrate on the production of missiles and
spacecraft that were being developed by Yangel at OKB-3. None the less, to this
day Yuzhmash continues to supply many important components for
NPO Energia launchers and spacecraft. 84 In October 1961, a terrible explosion
during the test of an R-16 ICBM on the pad at Baikonur cosmodrome killed many
of the best designers at OKB-3. Yangel himself narrowly escaped being killed in
the tragedy. In 1971, following Yangel's death, control of OKB-3 shifted to
Academician Vladimir F. Utkin. Utkin ran OKB-3 for nearly twenty years and in
the early 1980's amalgamated the bureau with its associated factories and test
facilities to form NPO Yuzhnoye. In 1990, Leonid Kuchma became General
Director but his term of control was cut short by his election on October 13, 1992
as Ukraine's new Prime Minister.85 Kuchma's departure left control of
NPO Yuzhnoye in the hands of Stans'slav N. Konyushkov and put a friend of
Yuzhnoye in a very high place in Ukrainian politics.
NPO Yuzhnoye pioneered the research into storable and hypergolic fueled
rockets in the U.S.S.R. through the development of the SS-4, SS-5, SS-7 and SS-9
missiles in the 1960's.86 This missile technology led to the development of the SS-
84 C.P.Vick, The Soviet Civil/Military Space Missile & Aircraft Industry. June 1992, pp. 45-46.
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18 Satan and SS-24 Scalpel ICBMs and the Cosmos(SL-7/8), Tsyklon (SL-11/14),
and Zenit (SL-16) boosters. All of these liquid fueled launchers, along with the
strap-on boosters for the Energia vehicle that are derived from the Zenit, were
manufactured at NPO Yuzhnoye until recently. Propulsion systems such as the
Tsyklon Stage 3 engine and Vernier control engines for several other vehicles are
also the products of the enterprise. Besides launch systems, NPO Yuzhnoye has
produced an impressive list of spacecraft including the Okeans, some of the
earlier Meteors, over 200 Cosmos & Intercosmos, and a whole host of military
satellites such as the Rorsats & Eorsats. The main emphasis of NPO Yuzhnoye's
satellite work is in the production of non-photographic Earth observation
spacecraft. 87
The situation of NPO Yuzhnoye is unique among the major enterprises that
previously formed the Soviet space industry because Yuzhnoye is in Ukraine and
not in Russia. It is now separated from its former partners in the space program
by national borders and is controlled by a somewhat hostile Ukrainian
government. In December 1991, the independently minded Ukrainians decided
to suspend all military and space production at NPO Yuzhnoye by March 1992
since the Russian government would no longer provide funding. Space
production was to be replaced by conversion to aircraft, trolleybus, and
consumer goods manufacturing. Recently however, after realizing the Draconian
effects of simply halting all space manufacturing, the Ukrainian government has
backpedaled some and agreed to fund a limited amount of space work at NPO
Yuzhnoye. This has not however stopped the continuing decline in Yuzhnoye's
production capability which has become irreversible. Much of this decline in
capability is due to the loss of individual expertise from people who have left the
enterprise to find work which pays more than the R2,000 (less than $10 at present
exchange rates) per month offered to Yuzhnoye engineers88.
NPO Polyot
Headed by General Director V. Zaitsev, NPO Polyot (Flight) is an important
designer and manufacturer of launch vehicles, satellites, propulsion systems and
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other space hardware located in Omsk, Siberia. The association consists of a
design bureau, several research institutes, a manufacturing plant, test facilities
and a training institute for engineers. Its primary rocket engine test facilities are
located 55 kilometers from Omsk in the town of Krutaya Gorka. Much of
Polyot's work is done in support of programs headed by the three main
enterprises previously discussed. NPO Polyot is also a major producer of
consumer goods with annual consumer sales exceeding R120 million.
NPO Polyot's predecessor, the Omsk Aviation Plant, was formed in 1941
when two Moscow area plants were evacuated to Siberia and merged together.
During the Second World War it produced Tupolev TU-2 dive bombers and
Yakolev Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters. In 1969, Cosmos (SL-8) production was
transferred from Yangel's bureau to Omsk beginning the enterprise's shift from
aircraft to space production. The plant specialized in booster engine technology
and Cosmos production and in the 1970's took the name NPO Polyot. Like many
enterprises in the space industry, even NPO Polyot's existence was secret until
very recently.89 NPO Polyot now produces Cosmos boosters, thrust chambers
and other components for large liquid engines such as the RD-170, and satellites
used in the Glonass, Cospas, Nadezda and Tsikada systems. Most of its satellites
support the Russian navigation or search & rescue programs. Domestic orders
for space products at NPO Polyot are less than half what they were just two years
ago forcing the enterprise to seek international sales or conversion to non-space
production for self preservation. International marketing has resulted in
production of the Aryabhata and Bhaskara 1 & 2 satellites for India and the Sneg
spacecraft system for France. Conversion efforts include the production of: the
AN-74 multi-purpose Arctic research aircraft which is to begin this year, the
Sibir-6 washing machine over 5 million of which have been sold since 1985, and
equipment for the food processing and construction industries.90
2.3.2.2 Principal Spacecraft Producers
This section discusses the major production enterprises of the former Soviet
Union that focus on spacecraft and satellite manufacturing. They comprise the
second tier of the space industry usually operating in a subordinate position to
the enterprises previously discussed. However, this situation has begun to
89 Y. Shapkov, "Top Secret: Polyot Flies High", Pravda Second Edition, January 16,1990, p. 8.
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change as market forces are introduced into the space industry allowing each
enterprise to assert its independence and compete for government and
international contracts on more equal terms.
NPO Lavochkin
Headed by General Director Anatoly M. Baklonov, NPO Lavochkin is the
sole producer in the former U.S.S.R. of planetary and deep space probes. Its
main research, design, production and testing facilities are located in the Moscow
suburb of Khimky where it employs nearly 12,000 people. Babakin Center,
headed by Roald Kremenov, is a division of Lavochkin with a staff of 600,
responsible for spacecraft design and international cooperation91. Besides the
Khimky facilities, Lavochkin also has operations at the deep space tracking
centers in Yevpatoria and Bear Lake. NPO Lavochkin has a long and impressive
line of products which fall into five main categories: Lunar probes, Venus
probes, Mars probes, space observatories and other exploratory spacecraft. Its
Lunar probes include the two Lunokhod rovers which traversed the moon's
surface in the early 1970's and the Luna-24 spacecraft which returned Lunar soil
to the Earth in 1976. Its Venus probes include those in the Vega and Venera
series which soft landed on Venus and radar mapped much of the planet's
surface. Its probes to Mars have been very ambitious although to date not very
successful. They include a series of Mars landers and orbiters, the Phobos 1 & 2
spacecraft and the upcoming Mars '94 & '96 missions. NPO Lavochkin produces
several space observatories including the ultraviolet observatory Astron, the
gamma & X-ray observatory Granat and the new Spectrum series for
observations at a wide range of frequencies. In addition, Lavochkin has
developed a few other exploratory spacecraft which are worthy of note. These
include the Vega probe to study Halley's comet and the Prognoz (Forecast) series
for monitoring interaction of solar radiation and the Earth's magnetosphere 92.
Founded in 1937 as an aircraft manufacturing company, Lavochkin
Association produced over 22,000 "La" fighter planes during the war under the
direction of its Chief Designer Semen A. Lavochkin. In the 1950's the company
developed rocket powered winged missiles which eventually lost out in the
91 Y. I. Ivanovsky, Chief of Systems Design at Babakin Center, interviewed at Babakin
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competition for military contracts to Korolyov's strictly ballistic R-7 missile
design. In 1965 Georgi N. Babakin took over the enterprise and shifted its
activities from aircraft to spacecraft production. A group of experts in
interplanetary space travel were spun-off from Korolyov's OKB-1 to form the
nucleus of the new spacecraft design bureau under Babakin 93. The enterprise's
new emphasis on space exploration resulted in the long series of accomplishment
enumerated in the previous paragraph. Babakin died in 1971 and since then the
association has been run by a series of different Directors. Most programs are
performed in cooperation with the Academy of Sciences (particularly IKI), with
Lavochkin producing the spacecraft and an Academy institute producing the
scientific instruments. Recent funding shortfalls have caused Lavochkin to delay
programs and have resulted in the loss of some key personnel. However, since
planetary exploration is considered a clearly peaceful pursuit, the enterprise has
been relatively successful in attracting international support for its projects.
Lavochkin in not nearly as financially desperate as other organizations in the
former Soviet space industry94. None the less, NPO Lavochkin is engaged in
several commercial projects such as the Lavochkin microgravity research satellite
and conversion of SS-20's to commercial launchers to help earn hard currency.
NPO PM (Prikladnoi Mekhaniki)
Headed by Academician Mikhail F. Reshetnev, NPO Prikladnoi Mekhaniki
(Applied Mechanics) has produced almost all of the former Soviet Union's
communications satellites. It is also a major producer of submarine launched
ballistic missiles and spy satellites which fly under the generic Cosmos
designation. This strong military affiliation helps explain why NPO PM is
located in the small town of Zaozernyy, one of the ten "closed cities" of the
former U.S.S.R. 95. The enterprise consists of two design bureaus, research
institutes, test stands and the Krasmash dedicated production plant all of which
are located about 70 kilometers north of Krasnoyarsk in the forests of Siberia.
Nuclear weapons are also produced near the satellite manufacturing enterprise
helping to enhance the area's military secrecy. NPO PM was formed in the early
93 V. Serebrennikov, Deputy Chief Designer of NPO Lavochkin, interviewed at "The MIT
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1960's when Sergei Korolyov sent Mikhail Reshetnev to Siberia to found a bureau
for developing communications and intelligence satellites. Reshetnev has been
its Chief Designer ever since.
Communications satellites produced at NPO PM include the Molniya semi-
synchronous satellites over 135 of which have been launched, the Gorizont
(Horizon) and Raduga (Rainbow) geosynchronous satellites about 25 of which
have been orbited, and the Ekran direct broadcast satellites 19 of which have
flown since the mid 1970's9 6. Luch (Beam) data relay transponders and
spacecraft are also build by NPO PM for relaying communications from Russian
manned spacecraft and for other data relay missions. New communications
systems under development at NPO PM include the Express satellites to replace
the Gorizonts, the Gals/Gelikon satellites to replace the Ekrans, and the Arcos
system for providing mobile communications. For the first time NPO PM is
beginning to face competition from other design bureaus such as Energia,
Yuzhnoye and Lavochkin in the communications area. This is making the
organization much more aggressive in its pursuit of international sales and
funding. NPO PM also produces Glonass navigational satellites and many early
warning, communications and reconnaissance satellites for the military. Its
military production has included approximately one third of all the Cosmos
satellites that have been launched to date. Conversion efforts are underway at
NPO PM but they are relatively small when compared to those taking place in
the missile and launch vehicle production enterprises.
VNII EM (Elektromekhaniki)
Led by Chief Designer Nikolai K. Sheremetyevsky, VNII Elektromekhaniki
is the former Soviet Union's leading producer of meteorological and Earth
resources satellites. Its facilities in the suburb of Istra, east of Moscow, include
the main research and design institute as well as a dedicated production factory.
VNII EM has been producing spacecraft for the Meteor series of polar orbiting
meteorological satellites since 1969. Three generations, encompassing more than
50 satellites of the Meteor design have now been flown. The enterprise is
presently developing its first geosynchronous weather satellite, the GOMS
96 "USSR Communication Satellites", Interavia Space Directory 1991-92, Jane's Information
Group, 1991, pp. 408-411.
(Geostationary Orbiting Meteorological Satellite) which has experienced funding
delays but is expected to be launched in 199397.
VNII EM began its production of Earth resources satellites by building the
Meteor 1-31 Priroda in the early 1980's. In 1988 it launched its fifth Resurs-O
satellite to complete the operational constellation. The Resurs-O satellite is a
multi-spectral digital Earth observing satellite which flies in a sun-synchronous
orbit similar to the U.S. Landsat. The digital Resurs-O should not be confused
with the photographic return satellite, Resurs-F, produced by NPO Energia's
KB Photon. Besides complete satellite systems, VNII EM also produces
instruments for other Earth observing platforms such as Almaz and Mir. The
enterprise's funding channel from the government have been sporadic recently
leading VNII EM to seek international joint ventures and to use conversion to
provide supplemental support. For example, it has combined forces with
General Electric to produce CAT scanners for hospitals in Eastern Europe and
hopes to make strong profits from this venture to support its core activities.
NPO Machinostroyenia
Headed by General Designer Gerbert A. Yefremov, NPO Machinostroyenia
is Russia's major producer of heavy unmanned orbital stations, mainly for use in
Earth observation. The design and research bureaus of the enterprise are located
in the Reutov district of Moscow, about 10 kilometers east of the city's center.
Most series production of NPO Machinostroyenia designs is performed at the
Khrunichev plant in Fili, although arrangements with other factories are possible.
The organization was originally a part of Chelomei's OKB-52 where it was
responsible for developing the Almaz space station design, which competed with
a design from Chelomei's other bureau, KB Salyut, for application in the manned
space program. Machinostroyenia's design was used on the military space
stations Salyut 2, 3 & 5, but it eventually lost out to KB Salyut for use on Salyut 6
& 7 and on the Mir space station. Following Chelomei's death in 1984, the two
design bureaus were separated off into the independent enterprises KB Salyut
and NPO Machinostroyenia. Since that time, NPO Machinostroyenia has used
its background in the development of manned stations to become the major
producer of large unmanned Earth observation platforms, both for military and
97 "Russians Plan 1993 Launch of GOMS Weather/Telecom Satellite", Aviation Week & Space
Technolobgy, June 1, 1992, p. 70.
civilian use9 8 . It designed the Almaz-1A radar imaging satellite whose images
were marketed in the U.S. by Space Commerce Corp., Almaz Corp. and Spot
Image. However, the early re-entry of the Almaz-1A on October 17, 1992 after
only a year and a half in orbit leaves NPO Machinostroyenia's commercial future
in doubt99. There are plans to launch an improved Almaz-1B but funding
constraints may make this impossible. For now NPO Machinostroyenia is
relying on its military orders and conversion to consumer goods to keep the
organization solvent.
NPO Molniya
Headed by General Director Gleb E. Lozino-Lozinsky, NPO Molniya
(Lightning) is the former Soviet Union's leading designer and manufacturer of
hypersonic vehicles and space planes. Its central design and production facilities
are located in the Tushino district of Moscow but it also has operations at its
separate Myashishchev and Bourevestnik divisions. The enterprise began in the
1960's as a design group in the famous Mikoyan OKB (producer of MiG fighters)
responsible for developing hypersonic aircraft and manned space plane
technology. In 1975 the group was spun-off under Lozino-Lozinsky's leadership
forming NPO Molniya and began concentrated development of a space shuttle
system. All of Mikoyan's remaining space work was transferred to NPO Molniya
in 1981100. Besides its expertise in hypersonics, NPO Molniya is also very active
in the development of air-to-air and air-to-surface missile technology.
The enterprise's most important space activity is development and
production of the Buran (Blizzard) space plane. It works very closely with
NPO Energia, the lead enterprise for manned space operations, on this program.
NPO Molniya, with its background in aviation and hypersonics, is responsible
for the development of the space plane itself while NPO Energia is responsible
for its launch and operation. However, since Buran's automated maiden flight in
1988, funding constraints have caused the program to be put on the back burner
and when the vehicle will fly again is uncertain. NPO Molniya has responded by
converting most of its resources to the production of a small six-seat civil aviation
98 Moscow Second Television Channel, Editorial Report, 1615 GMT, May 23, 1991.
99 V. Kiernan, "Almaz Falls From Orbit", Space News, October 26, 1992, pp. 1 & 28.
100 G. E. Lozino-Lozinsky, General Director of NPO Molniya, interviewed at the National
Press Club in Washington, D.C., on July 16, 1992.
aircraft 101. At present, the future of the Buran program and of NPO Molniya's
role in the space program remains in doubt.
2.3.2.3 Major Component Suppliers
The final category of space enterprises to be discussed are the producers of
major launch vehicle and spacecraft components, most importantly the rocket
engine manufacturers. Although they generally operate as subcontractors to the
vehicle and spacecraft integrators, they often have substantial influence due to
their critical importance to program success.
NPO Energomash
Headed by Boris I. Katorgin, NPO Energomash is the former Soviet Union's
lead enterprise for developing and producing large liquid rocket engines. At its
Khimky plant outside Moscow are located complete facilities to research, design,
produce and test high thrust liquid rocket engines. Most impressive are its
completely enclosed full scale engine test stands which provide sufficient
exhaust scrubbing and noise dampening to allow firings within a mile of
residential neighborhoods. Energomash has other large engine test stands at its
NPO Start division in Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk). The enterprise also maintains
a manufacturing facility in Perm where the RD-253 Proton engine is
assembled 102. The history of Energomash is tightly bound to that of its Chief
Designer of many years, Valentin P. Glushko. Begun as the Leningrad Gas
Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) in 1928, Glushko entered the enterprise in the early
1930's to develop electric rocket engine technology. He quickly moved to a
leadership position and during the War led the organization's development
efforts on liquid rocket engines with Sergei Korolyov as his deputy. Later
disputes with Korolyov would cause divisive battles within the Soviet space
program. In 1974, Glushko succeeded in merging his OKB-GDL with the former
Korolyov bureau, OKB-1, to form NPO Energia. Glushko led the combined
organization in the development of the Energia launch vehicle until his death at
the end of 1988. At that time the former Korolyov and Glushko bureaus were
101 G. Fadeyeva & A. Kornilov, on "Vesti" newscast, Moscow First Television Channel,
1600 GMT, May 22, 1992.
102 Y. Shatalov, "Space and the Market: Proton is Flying Toward a Deep End", Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, October 7,1992, p. 3.
again separated producing the present NPO Energia and NPO Energomash
enterprises10 3. NPO Energomash works closely with the rocket engine research
institutes of the RSA in its development work and with several supporting
manufacturing enterprises, such as NPO Polyot, in its production work.
However, nearly 95% of all the parts used in its engines, including seals, valves
and castings, are produced in-house at the Khimky facilities 10 4.
The first stage engines for all operational Soviet launch vehicles are
produced by NPO Energomash except for Energia's core engine which is
produced by KB Khimavtomatika. Most large liquid fuel missile propulsion
systems are also made by Energomash. Its products include the RD-107 &
RD-108 which power respectively the strap-ons and core stage for the Vostok,
Soyuz and Molniya vehicles, the first and second stage engines for the Cosmos
and Tsyklon launchers, the RD-253 Proton first stage engine, and the RD-171 &
RD-120 first and second stage engines for the Zenit vehicle. A simplified version
of the RD-171 (the RD-170), the most powerful rocket engine ever built, is also
used to power the strap-on boosters for the Energia vehicle. The high
performance, ease of maintenance and compact size of the RD-170 makes it the
world's most advanced rocket propulsion system. Besides its production
engines, NPO Energomash also has several engines in development of potential
interest to the West. Most significant of these is the RD-701, a tripropellant
engine designed to operate in two modes for powering a single stage to orbit
vehicle or a reusable space plane. Approximately 80% of the development work
has been completed on the RD-70110 5. To replace its declining sales due to a
reduced number of Russian launches, NPO Energomash has implemented
conversion to consumer production and pursued international collaboration. On
October 26, 1992 Pratt & Whitney was given exclusive U.S. rights to use and
market Energomash technologies. NPO Energomash hopes this joint venture
will provide an opening to the U.S. market so that it can begin to earn hard
currency income from its vast store of world class technologies.
103 M. Chernyshov, "The Work of Valentin Glushko", Space Flight March 1991, pp. 88-90.
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Other Propulsion System Manufacturers
KB Khimavtomatika (Automated Chemical Processing) is the second most
important propulsion system supplier in the former U.S.S.R.. Headed by
Academician Alexander D. Konopatov, it is the leading producer of second and
third stage engines for missile and launch vehicle applications. Its design,
production and test facilities are located in the city of Voronezh, approximately
800 kilometers south of Moscow 1°6. The enterprise began in the 1950's under the
direction of Semyin A. Kosberg, with the goal of developing liquid rocket
propulsion for use on aircraft. Konopatov took over upon Kosberg's death in
1965 and continued the firm's transition into an upper stage engine
manufacturer. In 1974 the enterprise was reorganized and renamed
KB Khimavtomatika. It produces the RD-448 (Vostok Stage 2), RD-461 (Soyuz &
Molniya Stage 2), RD-0210 (Proton Stages 2 & 3) and Molniya Stage 3 engines. Its
most recent development has been the RD-0120, the large cryogenic core engine
for the Energia launch vehicle and KB Khimavtomatika's first booster engine.
Conversion efforts and sales to international customers are being pursued to
supplement declining funding from the Russian government. The enterprise's
name may soon be changed to something more representative of its true
activities (unlike the deceptive title Khimavtomatika), possibly to KB Kosberg.
NPO Trud (or KB Kuznetsov) produced most of the engines for the failed
N-1 rocket at its facilities outside of Samara, but nearly all of its rocket engine
development work ceased with the termination of the N-1 program in 1974. The
sole exception has been its continued production of the Proton Stage 4
(Block DM) engine. The enterprise, led by Chief Designer Vladimir N. Orlov, has
since concentrated on the production of aircraft engines and small attitude
control thrusters. Besides its large design bureau, NPO Trud also contains the
dedicated Frunza factory and extensive test facilities (including large engine test
stands) which are also used by NPO Energia's TsSKB. The enterprise began as an
aircraft engine developer in the 1940's and for many years was headed by
Nikolai D. Kuznetsov. During the 1960's Korolyov assigned production of the
moon rocket engines to Kuznetsov following a dispute with Glushko, who
would have been the more suitable choice. NPO Trud still has in storage
62 NK-33 (N-1 Stage 1), 12 NK-43 (N-1 Stage 2), 10 NK-39 (N-1 Stage 3) and
106 V. Stepnov, "It Is Not Only Flames That Fly Out From a Rocket Nozzle", Pravdal
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10 NK-31 (N-1 Stage 4) engines remaining from the Moon program that it would
like to sell to generate some badly needed cash for its operations 10 7.
KB Isayev is the major supplier of spacecraft propulsion in the former
U.S.S.R. having developed over 100 liquid engines for spacecraft and missile
terminal stage propulsion. It is led by Chief Designer Nikolai I. Leontyev and
has design and production facilities near NPO Energia in Kaliningrad The
enterprise was started in 1944 by Alexei M. Isayev to perform research on
storable liquid rocket engines. Over the years it has produced engines for
attitude control and mid-course correction on planetary probes, lunar and
planetary landers, manned spacecraft, orbital stations and military systems. Its
most recent work includes the development of a new cryogenic Stage 4 engine
for Proton. Related to this effort is a joint program with KB Salyut and the Indian
Space Research Organization to transfer cryogenic engine technology to Indian.
This activity and its alleged violation of missile technology non-proliferation
agreements has gained KB Isayev much negative notoriety in the U.S.108 .
KB Fakel is the primary producer in the former U.S.S.R of plasma thrusters
and ion injectors for space applications. Its design center and manufacturing
facilities are located in the city of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea (the former
Germanic city of Koningsburg not the suburb of Moscow). Fakel performs all
engineering design and production of plasma thrusters while most fundamental
research in this area is done within several departments of TsNIIMASh and at
the Research Institute for Applied Mechanics and Electrodynamic (RIAME) of
the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI)109 . Over 50 plasma thrusters have been
produced and flown in space since 1972 when a Meteor satellite first carried such
a device. Russia is the only nation in the world to fly operational plasma
thrusters. All of Fakel's devices are based on the same well-proven technology of
Stationary Plasma Thrusters (STP) and range in power from 600 to 6,000 watts.
Kiser Research of Washington, D.C. is marketing Fakel thrusters in the U.S. 110
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and Loral Space Systems of Palo Alto, California also has a joint venture with
Fakel to use its plasma thrusters on their satellites.
Non-propulsion Component Suppliers
There are literally hundreds of component and equipment suppliers to the
major space production enterprises. The vast majority of these suppliers are in
Russia with Ukraine and Belarus being the next two most significant supplier
locations. A summary of the most important supplier enterprises and their
products is included below in Table 2.7. Having presented the most important
launch vehicle, spacecraft and component suppliers to the former Soviet space
program, we conclude this outline of the space industry. The next section will
complete our institutional overview by describing those organizations that
provide infrastructural support to space operations.
Table 2.7 - Leading Non-Propulsion Component Suppliers
Name of Enterprise Location Major Products
NII Kosmisheski Pribor (Space Devices)
NPO Elektropribor
Moskovskaya Energetitsheski Institute
PO Komunar
NPO Radio
NPO Istok
NPO Musson
NPO Polyus
NPO Istochnik
NPO Kvant
NPO Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)
Zvezda (Star)
NII Chimash
NPO Kompozit
NII Grafit
NPO Elas
Splav Technical Center
NPO-NTs (Scientific Centers)
NPO Saturn
NPO Tekhnomash
Moscow
Kharkov
Moscow
Minsk
Moscow
Fryazino
Sevastopol
Tomsk
St. Petersburg
Moscow
St. Petersburg
Tomilino
Moscow
Kaliningrad
Obninsk
Zelenograd
Moscow
Zelenograd
Moscow
Kaliningrad
Wide Range of Satellite Payloads
Avionics & Onboard Computers
Solid State Recorders for Space
Inertial Guidance Systems
Telecommunications Payloads
Traveling Wave Tube Amplifiers
Mobile Communication Terminals
Power Supplies & Orientation Systems
Spacecraft Batteries
Solar Arrays for Space Applications
Nuclear Power Systems
Space Suits & EVA Systems
Spacecraft Life Support Systems
Advanced Materials & Instruments
Carbon-Carbon Composite Structures
Astronomical Instruments
Microgravity Research & Payloads
Electronics & Microgravity Equipment
Turbomachinery & Gas Generators
Engineering Consultancy
2.3.3 Spaceflight Support Facilities
With a demonstrated capability to launch over a hundred missions a year,
often with several on the same day, the former Soviet space infrastructure is large
and very capable. The majority of its facilities including the cosmodromes, most
of the control & tracking network, and the cosmonaut training center are
operated by the Ministry of Defense Space Units. The principal exception to this
rule is the civilian Flight Control Center in Kaliningrad which is administered by
TsNIIMASh, an RSA controlled institute, and run mainly by NPO Energia staff.
2.3.3.1 Launch Sites (Cosmodromes)
The Baikonur Cosmodrome (also called Tyuratam), located at 45.6" North
latitude, is the principal launch complex responsible for all manned, planetary
and geosynchronous missions. It is the only facility capable of launching the
Proton, Zenit and Energia vehicles and can support the flight of all other Soviet
vehicles except for the small SL-8 Cosmos. Due to range safety constraints at
other cosmodromes, it is also the unique site in the former Soviet Union for
launching spacecraft into retrograde orbits. Baikonur, named for a city over
370 kilometers away to deceive Western specialist, is the original cosmodrome
from which both Sputnik and Gagarin were launched. Located on a 7,360 km 2
site east of the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan, the launch complex has recently been
given much attention as the newly independent republics of Russia and
Kazakhstan struggle over its control. Most of the workers at Baikonur live in
Leninsk, a nearby city of 100,000 mainly Russian people111. The launch complex
is staffed primarily by soldiers, most of which are draftees, who rioted in early
1992 to protest poor living conditions in the city. Rocket stages and spacecraft
are transported to Baikonur by rail or air for final assembly on site. Separate
assembly buildings and pads exist for the Proton, Zenit, SL-11, Soyuz/Molniya,
and Energia/Buran launch systems. There is also a Buran shuttle airstrip with a
microwave system for fully automated landings 112. Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft processing is done in the same building with the Soyuz launchers.
Payload processing facilities for commercial customers are available in the
111 A. Lapin, "The Burans' and Shaft Diggers: Report From a City That's Not on the Map",
Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 13, 1989, p. 4.
112 I. Kabak, "The Cosmodrome Without the Halo: Baikonur Covers 7,360 Square
Kilometers", Argumenty I Fakty, No. 15, April 1991, p. 6.
Proton integration complex. Unlike at Western launch sites, vehicles are
assembled and transported horizontally before final erection on the launch pad.
The recent history of launch activity at Baikonur and the other cosmodromes is
shown in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8 - Annual Launch Rates from the Former Soviet Cosmodromes
Cosmodrome Total 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985to Date
Baikonur 896 22 27 29 43 47 35 35
Plesetsk 1,366 37 48 45 47 47 56 62
Kapustin Yar 83 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
CIS Total 2,345 59 75 74 90 95 91 98
The Plesetsk Cosmodrome, located at 62.8' North latitude, is the world's
busiest launch facility responsible mostly for polar orbit and high inclination
missions. The complex is the former Soviet Union's leading military space center
supporting spy satellite launches and missile testing and guarded by a ring of
surface-to-air missiles. Located 170 kilometers south of Archangel in the
Northwest corner of Russia, Plesetsk was not officially acknowledged until 1983
after more than 900 launches 113. Most of the cosmodrome's staff live in the
nearby city of Mirnyy. Unlike in the U.S., the Russians launch over land
allowing spent stages to fall on sparsely populated areas. The stories of
shepherds making their homes in old propellant tanks and reindeer breeders
feeding their flocks from charred nose cones are common throughout Archangel
Oblast. Although the people have learned to live with the "gifts from the sky",
recent environmental concerns have led to extensive clean-up efforts around
Plesetsk 114. The cosmodrome consists of nine operational pads (as of late 1991)
which can support five different launch vehicles. The most powerful vehicle
launched from Plesetsk is the SL-6 Molniya and the newest is the SL-14 Tsyklon.
Plesetsk's fleet is only able to launch payloads weighing less than 7,000 kg. Just
as at Baikonur, all vehicle processing is done horizontally and is rapid and highly
automated. For example, the SL-14 is launched just three hours after delivery to
the pad. Two new SL-16 Zenit pads are under construction with a planned
113 N. L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space - 1989, Teledyne Brown Engineering,
February 1990, p. 10.
114 V. Bokan, "A Cosmodrome is Not a Harmful Neighbor", Patriot, No. 7, Feb. 1992, p. 5.
completion in 1995. This new capability may foreshadow further expansion at
Plesetsk as the Russians transfer operations from the now foreign Baikonur to
sites within the Russian Republic.
Kapustin Yar (also known as the Volgograd Station) was the first rocket
development center and is now a minor launch facility. Originally built in the
mid 1940's to test captured German V-2 rockets, the center played an important
part in the development of Russian ballistic missile technology. The 6,900 km2
facility is located on the banks of the Volga river 965 kilometers Southeast of
Moscow. A total of 83 orbital missions have originated from Kapustin Yar but
since 1987 it has not launched a single spacecraft. The SL-8 Cosmos is the only
launch vehicle that can presently be flown from Kapustin Yar.
2.3.3.2 Flight Control & Tracking Network
The hub of the spacecraft control & tracking network is the Control Center.
The former Soviet Union maintains two main Control Centers, one for manned
spacecraft and scientific probes and the other for military and application
satellites. The Spaceflight Control Center (TsUP) located in the Moscow suburb
of Kaliningrad, is the manned and scientific operations center. It is administered
by TsNIIMASh, but most of its controllers are from industrial enterprises,
primarily NPO Energia. Established in 1970, it presently employs about 2,000
people in its two main Control Rooms and five smaller support rooms. One of
the main Control Rooms is dedicated to Mir space station operations. It has three
adjacent smaller rooms used for controlling autonomous flight of the Soyuz and
Progress vehicles and for providing private communications between
cosmonauts and their families. The other main Control Room supports Buran
flight operations and it has two smaller support rooms which are used to control
scientific probes such as those to Phobos and Mars115. Most Mir controllers work
24 hour long shifts except for those involved in dangerous operations who work
only twelve hours at a time. Although these are strenuous hours, the tension is
somewhat mitigated by the fact that most of a controller's day is spent waiting to
communicate with Mir. Since many of the space support ships were returned to
port to save money, contact with Mir now occurs only about 10 times a day for
less than an hour at a time leaving the controllers idle for most of the day. Poor
115 B. Mouzytchouk, Deputy Director of the Spaceflight Control Center (TsUP), interviewed
in his office in Kaliningrad, October 21, 1992.
pay and working conditions led to rumors in January 1992 of an impending
strike at TsUP which was only averted by a last minute raising of controllers'
salaries 116.
The Golitsyno-2 Spaceflight Control Center located in the forests
surrounding Moscow is responsible for controlling the 160 satellite constellation
that the Russians maintain in Earth orbit. Until April of 1992 this facility was top
secret and the 20,000 person town which was built-up to support its operations
did not appear on any map. Over 1,000 contacts with spacecraft each day are
processed by Golitsyno's military personnel to maintain all communication,
navigation, remote sensing and military satellite systems11 7. The two main Flight
Control Centers are supported by the Yevpatoria facility in Crimea, an old retired
control center that is now used primarily as a back-up. The Long Range Space
Communications System (TsDUC) also headquartered in Yevpatoria, has
principal communication responsibility for high Earth orbit and deep space
missions, similar to the U.S. Deep Space Network.
If the Control Centers are the brains of the flight control system, the
communications antennae network is its eyes and ears. The most powerful
network is TsDUC with 70 meter dishes in Yevpatoria and Ussurisk and a
25 meter dish in Ulan Ude. A 70 meter radio telescope is also being built on the
Suffa Plateau in Central Asia to support the TsDUC system. "More than 30 fixed-
site and mobile control and telemetry facilities scattered over the territory of the
U.S.S.R. and the world's oceans"118 keep the Control Centers in contact with the
spacecraft being controlled. Molniya communications satellites play a central
role in relaying information from these diverse sites to the central Control
Centers. Since Low Earth Orbit satellites are only over Russian territory for 9 out
of every 24 hours each day, a flotilla of space communication ships were built to
provide around the clock communications coverage. The flotilla included more
than 10 vessels led by its flagship, Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, which carried
75 antennae, two of which are 25 meters in diameter. The recent deployment of
Luch data relay satellites has reduced the demand for communications ships.
116 V. Gubarev, "Space Strike - A Final Cry for Help", Pravda, January 28, 1992, p. 1.
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This and the need to save money has forced most of the space tracking vessels
back to port and several have been decommissioned or even sold for scrap.
2.3.3.3 Cosmonaut Training Facilities
The Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center in Star City (Zvezdny Gorodok) is
the central facility for preparing cosmonauts for flight. Located 30 kilometers
Northeast of Moscow, the facility includes classrooms, laboratories, a health
center, flight simulators, full scale spacecraft mock-ups, centrifuges, a neutral
buoyancy tank and whatever else is needed to prepare cosmonauts for space. Its
neutral buoyancy tank is 23 meters in diameter and 12 meters deep allowing
training on full-scale space station modules. Its large 18 meters radius centrifuge
can subject pairs of cosmonauts to accelerations of up to 30 g's simultaneously in
multiple directions119. About 4,000 people live in the town of Star City including
most military cosmonauts (the civilian cosmonauts tend to live near NPO
Energia's facilities in Kaliningrad). About 10 experienced and 35 rookie
cosmonauts are presently active in the program. From these, five two man crews
consisting of one veteran and one rookie are in training for Mir missions at any
one time. Foreign cosmonauts are also trained at the Star City facilities in a
course which usually takes about 18 months to complete. The former cosmonaut
and first man to walk in space, Alexei Leonov, was head of training at the center
until he was forced to resign following his support of the August 1991 coup
attempt 120 . Most but not all training facilities for the new Russian Space Shuttle
are housed in a specially designed hanger in Star City. The principal exception is
the Buran flight simulator which is located at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics
Institute (TsAGI) in Zhukovsky.
2.4 Operations & Management Practices
Now that this review of the organization, capabilities and institutions of the
former Soviet space program is nearing its end, what general principles can be
distilled from the knowledge of Russian space activities presented here?
Hopefully this overview provides the reader with an appreciation of the vast
119 V. I. Labunen, Administrator of the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, interviewed in
Star City, October 27, 1992.
120 V. Buldakov & R. Morozov, "A. Leonov Retires", Argumenty I Fakty, No. 44,
November 1991, p. 6 .
reach of Russian space activities both in terms of capabilities and institutions
involved. The Russian space program is not a monolithic entity but is composed
of thousands of separate organizations and hundreds of thousands of individuals
each with their own histories and interests. To be able to benefit from the
achievements of the former Soviet space program we must learn to understand
and cooperate with the institutions and individuals that comprise it.
Enumerating the enterprises and capabilities of the Russian space industry does
provide factual information on its organization and strengths but there is much
more that can be derived from this knowledge. From examining many
organizations and how they interrelate, general conclusions about the culture of
the Russian space industry can be made. Similarly, by examining Russian
hardware and space systems, general conclusions about their design practices
and technological strengths can be deduced. Although thousands of
organizations exist each with their own idiosyncrasies, they all are part of a
greater Russian space industry and this environment plays a significant role in
shaping their actions. The following discussion will build upon the information
presented in the previous sections to derive several general characteristics of the
former Soviet space industry that are important for consideration by potential
Western partners. These characteristics are true to a greater or lesser extent
depending on the specific organization examined but they exist at some level in
all institutions comprising the former Soviet space industry.
Before describing these general characteristics of Russian space enterprises,
a brief discussion of the conditions that created them will be given. The
communist system was undoubtedly a dominant factor in forming the operating
practices of the Soviet space industry. Communism relied heavily on central
planning and authoritative decision making and both of these traits not
surprisingly found their way into space program management. Capitalistic
structures such as markets were nonexistent resulting in prices and consequently
cost accounting systems that were essentially meaningless. Marketing of
products was given little weight as both the marketing and financing functions
were subsumed into the centrally planned allocation system. Authority was
concentrated in hands of the central planners who operated the space program
with little or no input from other sectors of the society. There were however
other significant environmental factors besides communism that helped form the
culture of the Russian space industry. The Cold War with the capitalistic West
played a major role in developing management practices as political and
technological competition with the West became the central focus of space
activities. The major criteria for approving new programs in this competitive
environment was whether they improved the U.S.S.R.'s image as a prosperous
nation and as the world's technological leader. Besides the geopolitical factors of
communism and Cold War competition, other domestic factors affected space
industry practices. These included the relatively recent arrival of
industrialization in Russia, the lack of democratic traditions and maybe most
importantly, the legendary ability of the Russian people to persevere. The stoic
Russian character, able to endure hardships that would be unthinkable in other
nations and still not lose hope, played a very large role in setting many business
practices. Business leaders could have grand production plans and implement
them with Draconian measures with little fear of worker resistance. The simple
"boot strapping" of a nation of peasants into a space faring world power in less
than forty years attests to the strength of Russian perseverance and its successful
utilization by industrial leaders.
Dominance By Technical Specialists
One of the most striking aspects of the Russian space industry, and Russian
society in general, is the great influence and prestige held by scientists and
engineers. It may not seem surprising that scientific people dominate such a
technologically intensive field as space exploration but the extent of their control
and influence beyond their technical specialty is truly remarkable. From the
beginning the Soviet government put unprecedented faith in the power of
science to solve societal problems, essentially designating science as the new state
religion. Although the early Soviet leaders were apprehensive of giving too
much power to an elite class of technically trained professionals, eventually they
succumbed to the need for technical expertise in running a centrally planned
economy. Scientists and engineers started as advisors to government but over
time began to hold the top level leadership positions themselves. Unlike in other
nations, technical training and not a legal or business education became the
prerequisite for advancing to the highest levels in government or industry. For
more than three decades the top Soviet leaders, including most General
Secretaries, have held engineering degrees. And engineering degrees in the
former Soviet Union tend to be much narrower in scope than in the West.
Undergraduate degrees with such unbelievably narrow purviews as "Ball
Bearing Production for Paper Mills" are not uncommon. Essentially no social
sciences or humanities (except for Marxist dogma) are taught to engineering
students giving them an almost exclusively technical perspective. The result is
that the technocratic leaders who manage Soviet industry, and in particular the
space industry, tend to pay insufficient attention to the social or environmental
impacts of their activities or even to broader business ramifications. As
discussed in Section 2.1, beginning in the late 1960's the technocratic leaders of
industrial enterprises captured control of the space program using their
specialized knowledge and influence in the bureaucracy to become the main
customers as well as the producers of space products. Once this type of manager
with a narrow technical outlook took control, it was inevitable that grandiose
projects with exciting technical traits would be given precedence over projects
that provided broader benefits to society but were less intellectually stimulating.
The great prestige enjoyed by scientists and engineers resulted in their
promotion to upper levels of management but also tended to lead to conflicts in
applying technology for useful purposes. Businessmen were considered inferior
and the best and brightest technical experts preferred to have little to do with
business activities such as financing or marketing new systems. They would
produce their designs and perform their research but provide little assistance in
applying the results or in customizing the design according to user needs.
However, recent economic turmoil and the need to supplement earnings has
greatly increased interest in business among all members of society, including
scientists and engineers. This has been accompanied by a decrease in the
prestige of science in general as people turn away from an institution that the
Soviet government promised would provide all the answers but which has failed
to do so. An indicator of the declining influence of science in Russian society is
the growing public fascination with astrology and other pseudo-sciences as
indicated by the booming sales of books on these subjects121.
The results of having space enterprise managers trained solely in the
scientific and engineering disciplines, instead of including those with business
and legal educations as well, have been devastating to the Russian program. The
industrial leadership looks to technical solutions and scientific expertise to solve
all of its problems. The top management assumes that the most highly trained
and experienced personnel always have the best solutions. Little effort is made
121 N. Vorontsov, comments at the seminar Crisis in Russia: What is to be Done?, held at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 29, 1992.
to obtain input from customers or any non-specialists since only those with years
of training are considered competent enough to have useful ideas. The experts
presumably know what is best for everyone even when those same experts are
crippled by an exceedingly narrow education and isolated from broader concerns
and interests by limited contact with non-specialists. Consequently the needs of
the customer or user of a space system often receive little attention. The planning
process for new Russian space systems is condensed so that the engineers can
dive right in and begin designing even before the requirements are clear. Unlike
a new start for NASA where four or five years can be spent in Phases "0", A & B
determining system requirements and user needs, the Russians typically start
with a technical proposal and within the project's first year are developing
detailed designs 122. They waste little time in assessing whether anyone really
needs the new system, if it can be built and if it is supported by the Chief
Designer, the project gets the go-ahead. After millions have been spent and the
technocrats need more money, then they begin to look for uses for the new
system and post facto calculate its benefits to society (these calculations
themselves tend to be a monument to narrow technical perspectives). The lack of
adequate up-front planning leads to many programs that due to inertia continue
for years yet have no real customers beyond the benefits to the manufacturers
themselves. The Russian space enterprises have brought their lack of customer
orientation along with them in their attempts at international cooperation. They
have little appreciation for developing close customer relationships and soliciting
outside input on their product designs. Instead, they would prefer that
customers simply buy their products "as is" and not waste so much of their time
in the selling process. Potential partners must recognize the contempt which has
developed in the former Soviet Union for "sales people" and the great prestige
held by technical experts. And Russians must begin to realize that often a
successful manager must be both.
Conservative Design Approach
Russian industry's incremental approach to developing space systems
makes continued use of proven designs and technologies for decades,
performing fundamental design changes only when absolutely necessary. This
122 N. Tolyarenko, "Design and Construction of Space Vehicles", lecture given at the
International Space University in Toulouse, France, July 1991, Figure 2.
practice contrasts sharply with that in the U.S. were spacecraft technologies
rapidly become obsolete and nearly every spacecraft has its own unique design.
But it should not be concluded from this that the Russian industry does not push
the leading edge in space technologies because in fact many of Russia's
operational space propulsion and power systems are the most advanced in the
world. However, these advanced systems tend to be integrated into old work
horse designs and are utilized only when the previous approach proves to be
wholly inadequate. There are several important reasons why Russian designers
tend to be so conservative relative to their Western counterparts. Firstly, Russia's
relatively late industrialization and its delayed participation in the scientific
revolution put it in a position playing catch-up to the West in high technology.
Although Russia has been fully industrialized for decades, its self image as a late
starter along with the inefficiencies in its research establishment brought by
communist control have perpetuated the perception that Russian technology is
inferior. Although many would not admit it, most Russian designers tend to be
skeptical of technologies developed at home. Therefore designers have been
reluctant to utilize these technologies until they are well proven through years of
testing. Another important reason for Russian conservativeness in design results
from the extreme tenacity of the Russian people as previously discussed. Most
space system designs in the former Soviet Union were developed through years
of hard work and entailed countless failures. For example, in the study of Venus
the first real success came only after seventeen failures. Following all those
disappointments, a Venera spacecraft design was finally derived that
successfully orbited and landed on Venus more than a dozen times. Who could
blame the Russians for wanting to use the Venera design as much as possible
after they had paid for it so dearly? Since many failures requiring great
perseverance to overcome seem to be the rule in designing new space systems in
the former U.S.S.R., it is not surprising that once they have a design that works,
they stick with it. Finally, as previously discussed, engineers have a strong hold
on the management of space enterprises in Russia and as we all know engineers
like to be as conservative in design as possible. In the U.S. conservative
engineering tendencies are countered by competitive business forces which
demand ever more capable systems. In Russia where the engineers "rule the
roost" and the producers dictate to the customers, the old reliable designs
preferred by the engineers are utilized for decades before they are finally retired.
The impact of Russia's incremental design approach has been both positive
and negative. The most obvious negative result from such a slow and
methodical approach to utilizing new designs is that technology advances may
be retarded. This has been the case for most Russian spacecraft which are
generally much heavier and have shorter operating lives than similar Western
systems. Russian spacecraft buses also tend to provide fewer services requiring
the instruments they carry to provide their own power conditioning, thermal
control, on-board memory and many other functions commonly provided by
U.S. spacecraft. The reason for this poorer performance is that most Russian
satellites are derived from basic designs from the 1950's and 1960's which have
been modified little to meet changing needs over the past thirty years. For
example, the Vostok spacecraft, first used in 1961 to carry Yuri Gagarin into
space, continues to be used in various forms as a military photo reconnaissance
satellite, the Resurs-F Earth resources satellite, the Photon microgravity
processing spacecraft, and the Bion biological research spacecraft and has been
flown in these different roles over 600 times. Clearly the Vostok spacecraft,
designed for manned flight, cannot be optimal for performing all of these diverse
missions. The Russians pay the price of reduced performance to be able to reuse
designs in which they have developed high confidence. Unfortunately, such an
approach allowed many promising technologies such as microelectronics to go
undeveloped because the old technologies appeared good enough, at least to the
conservative design engineers in charge.
Although conservative design practices have had a negative impact on
spacecraft performance, they have led to Russia's development of the world's
most capable launch vehicle fleet. Heavier spacecraft require larger launch
vehicles so that Russia was forced to develop vehicles with great lift capability.
The shorter life span of Russian spacecraft meant that more replacements were
needed along with more launch vehicles to put them into space. This allowed
the Russians to put both their spacecraft and launch vehicles into mass
production and reap the cost benefits which come from economies of scale123.
High annual production rates along with the longevity of launch vehicle designs
makes production runs of Soviet boosters an order of magnitude greater than
those in other space faring nations. The A-class booster provides the most
extreme example having put Sputnik-1 in orbit in 1957, orbited Gagarin in 1961,
123 A. Dupas, "The USSR's Prudent Space Policy", Space Policy. August 1987, p. 241.
and since then launched nearly 1,400 other spacecraft, more launches than all
U.S. vehicles combined. Production of over a thousand units provides a large
base over which to amortize fixed costs for development and tooling and permits
many learning curve effects that result in reduced recurring costs to be fully
realized. Consequently, one would expect Russian enterprises to be able to
produce launch vehicles far cheaper than U.S. companies who operate with
much smaller production runs. In the end the former Soviet space program
probably paid more than it had to for its space capabilities because the cost of
additional spacecraft likely outweighed the reduced per unit cost from mass
production. But for someone examining Russian capabilities as a potential
partner, the low per unit cost of its systems, especially its launch systems, can be
very appealing. The result of Russia's conservative design philosophy has been
to create second class satellites but world class boosters, both of which are
produced in mass quantities very cheaply.
Central Role of Chief Designers
In a communist nation whose central ideology is equality of all workers, it is
ironic that so much authority is vested in the hands of the industrial leaders,
known affectionately as the Chief Designers. Part of the Chief Designers
authority is derived from the high regard given to technical specialists in general
as previously discussed. Chief Designers are often considered to be the leading
technical expert in their organization and therefore are given great respect.
However, simple respect for technical abilities cannot explain the near worship of
some of the most prominent Chief Designers such as Korolyov and Glushko.
From the description of enterprises in Section 2.3, the dominant role of Chief
Designers in their respective organizations is apparent. They are the final
authority for approving programs and budgets within their enterprise and its
chief representative to the outside world through their participation in such
groups as the Council of Chief Designers. Chief Designers tend to hold their
position for incredibly long periods (30 or 40 years in some cases) being replaced
only after a dramatic overthrow or their own death. The fact that most
enterprises are named in common usage after their former or present Chief
Designer (e.g. Korolyov's bureau. Yangel's bureau, Reshetnev' bureau, etc.)
attests to their dominant role in these organizations. Much of the organizational
structure of industrial enterprises was copied directly from the Soviet society in
which they existed. Thus it is not surprising that strong individuals rose to near
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dictatorial power in industry just as they did in society in general. Strict
hierarchy and central authority provide fertile ground for producing an autocrat.
But more was at work in Russia than mere authoritative structures in forming the
very personal admiration and awe in which Chief Designers (and Soviet leaders
generally) were held. Unlike in the U.S. where impartiality and rule of law are
the norm in the business environment, Russian business has always relied
heavily upon personal contacts and trust. Much as in other sectors of Russian
society, business operates on a very personal basis where loyalty to one's
associates is more important than strictly following the law. In such an
environment, it is not surprising that people strove to have friends in high places
by honoring those in power since powerful friends were indispensable to
professional advancement. The personal nature of business along with the
central authority and technical prestige commanded by the Chief Designers led
to a personality worship of industrial leaders that is unique to the Soviet business
environment. Recognizing the esteem in which Chief Designers are held and
learning to adapt to organizations managed through a personal hierarchy is a
major challenge for potential Western partners.
Close Association with the Military
The final characteristic of the Russian space industry which needs to be
mentioned is its well known close association with the military. The military is
important to the industry not only because it is the major customer of space
services but also because it controls most of the infrastructure that the industry
relies upon for launching, tracking and recovering its spacecraft. Consequently
many military concerns and perspectives are also shared by the space industry.
For example, secrecy and distrust of foreigners are common throughout the
space industry. As contact with international partners has grown, much of this
distrust has disappeared but skepticism of foreigners' intentions remain just
below the surface. Similarly, much secrecy has been done away with but a
heritage of concealing information still makes it difficult for many space industry
officials to be fully forthcoming. The space industry has spent decades
competing with its Western counterparts and it will take some time for its people
to feel comfortable with the emerging cooperative role. However, in the
foreseeable future the Russian space industry will continue to play a major
military role and most of its military activities will continue to be off-limits to
foreigners. Thus potential Western partners must be careful to push for access to
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all information legitimately required for cooperative activities but also be
sensitive to the fact that their partners possess military secrets that they are not
able to disclose. To be effective partners, U.S. organizations need to become
cognitive of the differences between American and Russian business practices.
Only through a better understanding of each others' modes of operation, which
could take years of hard work to completely develop, will the benefits of
international joint activities in space ever be fully realized.
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Chapter 3
Suggested Areas for Russian Cooperation
This chapter will identify the most promising areas for NASA to pursue
joint projects with the Russian space program. It's objective is to determine,
through an assessment of the benefits and costs for each category of potential
projects, those areas for cooperation that offer the greatest net benefit to the U.S.
as a whole. The assessment begins in Section 3.1 with a comprehensive
examination of the cooperative areas that are presently being pursued by NASA,
other government agencies, U.S. companies and organizations abroad. The
purpose of this initial overview is to bound the analysis by enumerating all areas
throughout the world where cooperative activities with Russia are being either
performed or considered. Section 3.2 discusses and critiques the selection
process that is currently used by the U.S. government, and NASA in particular,
for determining which areas of space cooperation to pursue. It argues that
shortcomings in this process have led to poor decisions concerning when Russian
space cooperation is considered desirable. Recommendations for improving this
process will be put forth later in Chapter 4. The focus of this chapter is to
determine what areas should be pursued, not the process question of how to
pursue them. To this end, Section 3.3 proceeds through each area identified in
the first section, weighing the benefits against the costs to determine a list of
recommended areas in which NASA should pursue cooperative projects with
partners from the former Soviet Union.
Before beginning the assessment of the most promising areas in which to
cooperate, it is important to first clearly define what is meant by the term
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cooperation. In this analysis, the term cooperation is used mostly in a general
sense to refer to any type of activity that allows two or more nations to benefit
from each other's resources or capabilities. It may include use of another nation's
data, people, facilities, technologies, services, hardware, or complete space
systems. There are of course many different levels at which nations may conduct
cooperation. Figure 3.1 distinguishes the four main stages in a cooperative
relationship. It is not necessary to progress through these stages in a linear
fashion however as one moves to the right, greater commitment is required and
consequently the advanced stages are usually proceeded by success in simpler
cooperative activities.
Figure 3.1
Stages of International Cooperation
Purchases Possible
I I I
Exchange Coordinate Cooperate Combine
Results
Do own thing, Separate but Separate but Joint
share results complimentary shared hardware Program
programs or technologies
The simplest method of cooperating is for nations to conduct independent
programs and to share whatever results they obtain. A somewhat more complex
approach is for nations to coordinate their programs so that their results will
compliment each other when they are shared. The next level of sophistication is,
for lack of a better term, cooperation in the strict sense. Strictly speaking,
cooperation entails separate programs that share not only results, but also the
means for achieving results (e.g., facilities, technologies or hardware). Nations
may chose to use foreign assets to perform a diverse range of functions all the
way from adding complimentary capabilities not critical to a program's success,
to providing essential elements necessary to implement the core program. Even
in its strict sense, space cooperation entails a wide variety of options. The final
and most advanced stage of international cooperation is the combination of
separate national projects into a single multinational joint program. The
administration of projects under the auspices of the European Space Agency
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represent the only truly joint space activities conducted in the world today. In
strictly cooperative or joint projects when the inputs to space ventures may be
shared, it becomes possible to cooperate by selling space assets between nations.
Fundamentally cash purchases are no different than bartering a hardware
contribution to obtain another nation's assistance. Cash purchases simply allow
transactions in a more complicated environment such as when the barter
contributions from individual partners are not exactly equal. International
financial transactions in the space community are the natural result of more
intimate and complex cooperative relationships. The opportunity to purchase
Russian assets does not at all change the benefits of cooperating in space, only
the means that can be used to achieve these benefits.
3.1 Areas of On-Going Joint Activities
The purpose of this section is to use the experiences of other organizations
to help derive a complete list of areas in which NASA may wish to seek
cooperation with the Russians. The different areas of cooperation that both
public and private organizations around the world are pursuing will be
examined. In addition, this investigation will provide a description of NASA's
present position in Russian space activities relative to other foreign and domestic
partners. Particular attention will be paid to those cooperative areas where
international partners are very active yet in which NASA has few joint projects.
The overall landscape of present cooperative activities between Russia and
international partners is shown in Figure 3.2. This figure is a matrix that relates
the different partners of the Russian space program with the areas in which they
cooperate. The determination of the level of activity of each partner in each
cooperative area is somewhat subjective but is meant to convey only the gross
differences in activity levels based upon extensive knowledge of on-going
projects worldwide. Cooperative Russian space activities can be grouped into
five main categories or areas: 1) manned systems, 2) space sciences, 3) satellite
applications, 4) launch vehicles, and 5) sub system-level inputs. This
classification is obtained by using the top level designations for all cooperative
areas shown in Figure 3.2. Since most aerospace component purchases and
service agreements are affiliated with an effort to obtain access to Russian
technologies, it makes sense to combine the last three columns in the figure. This
assertion is supported by the common interest of almost all partners in Russian
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hardware and services along with technology that is shown in Figure 3.2. The
five categories given above will be used in all further analysis to assess the most
promising areas for NASA to cooperate. These categories are very broad and it is
assumed that they contain all on-going activities with the Russians as well as
possible future cooperative projects not yet being pursued. For example, a future
joint mission to Mars would not be beyond the classification system. If the
mission included humans it would fall into the manned systems area and if it did
not it would be part of the space sciences area.
In examining the summary of information shown in Figure 3.2, a few key
points jump out immediately. First of all, cooperation between the U.S. and
Russia can be divided into three main clusters where each cluster's activity is
controlled by a different mix of governmental and industrial players. One cluster
is in the areas of manned systems and space science. Here NASA and its
aerospace contractors play the dominant role in managing and conducting
activities. Manned systems and space science are two of NASA's major program
areas and its Russian cooperation in these areas is conducted largely at the
coordination stage. For example, NASA has for decades been coordinating its
solar system exploration missions with its international partners and over the last
few years this has come to include coordination with Russian planetary
scientists. The next cluster is in the areas of satellite applications and launch
services with users of space systems (telecommunications firms, users of remote
sensing data and microgravity processing, etc.) being the main partners. These
areas of cooperation entail the use of complete Russian systems or services that
tend to be sold for hard currency. The final cluster is around the areas comprised
of sub-product level inputs (aerospace components, technologies and
engineering or testing services). All major space partners in the U.S. play a role
in these basic areas. In particular, the breadth of interest in Russian space
technologies shown by the substantial amount of activity with partners
worldwide, demonstrates the importance of this cooperative area. Cooperation
in space technology is one of the few areas were U.S. space organizations have
been unambiguous in their support of increased Russian interaction.
Many U.S. organizations are pursuing Russian technologies using whatever
means are available (e.g., buying, bartering or stealing). Ironically, the lead
government agency in the pursuit of Russian technology has been the Strategic
Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) whose primary mission is to defend against a
Russian ballistic missile attack. SDIO has purchased four SPT-70 Stationary
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Figure 3.2
Map of Present Cooperative Activities with the Russian Space Program
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Plasma Thrusters, several taciturn high temperature switches, and two Topaz-2
nuclear space reactors 124 with plans to purchase an additional four reactors by
the summer of 1993, all at a costs of less than $35 million. The military's clear
intention to reverse engineer these products to transfer to the U.S. the
technologies that are imbedded in them raises serious questions of intellectual
property protection for international partners. SDIO has a detailed plan to
acquire Russian technologies in some fifty different areas at an expected cost of
$50 million providing an estimated savings in development costs of over $4.5
billion to U.S. taxpayers 125. Recently, SDIO created the Defense Technology
Institute whose expressed purpose is to promote U.S.-Russian collaboration in
the development of defense technologies 126 . SDIO's long-term intentions in
Russia are uncertain and many see them simply as carpetbaggers who are taking
advantage of the desperate financial situation in Russia. The Department of
Energy as well as other government agencies are also pursuing the acquisition of
Russian space technologies as have many private U.S. companies. Pratt &
Whitney's agreement with NPO Energomash for access to Russian large liquid
rocket engine technology (in particular, RD-170 engine technology) is a typical
but prominent example. Rockwell International, Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas,
General Dynamics, Lockheed, Loral Space Systems and Aerojet General are all
actively pursuing acquisition of space technologies in Russia. Although NASA
has allowed SDIO and U.S. industry to take the lead in utilizing Russian
technologies, it is now beginning to recognize the value of these assets and to
take action to acquire some of them. Recently, NASA initiated limited projects to
investigate Russian technologies in optics, lasers, space power, materials,
propulsion systems and space batteries for their possible use on U.S. spacecraft.
When examining the clustering of cooperative activities in Figure 3.2
outside of the U.S., a very different picture emerges. In Europe, cooperation with
Russia is much more broad-based with many different national and international
players involved in substantially more Russian-related projects than in the
United States. As in the U.S., the Europeans are strongly pursuing Russian
124 J. Asker, "Purchase of Russian Space Hardware Signals Shift in U.S. Trade Policy",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 6, 1992, p. 25.
125 "SDIO Plans to Acquire Russian ABM Technology, Specialists", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 10, 1992, pp. 18-20.
126 "Cold Warriors Funding U.S.-Russian Research", Space News, January 18-25, 1993, p. 2.
108
technology opportunities but they are also utilizing Russian facilities, expertise
and flight systems to a much greater extent than the Americans. Part of this is
due to the greater needs of the European space program because of its relatively
small size and part is due to the common continent-wide interests that the
Russians and other Europeans share. But there are also important competitive
motives at work in Europe's broad-based response to Russian space
opportunities. It is clear from Ariane's dramatic penetration into the world
launch services market in the 1980's that the Europeans take international
competition in space products seriously. Russian assistance in manned systems,
scientific missions, application satellites and possibly even launch vehicles has
the potential to propel Europe into a position of prominence in the international
space community. The only area where Europeans have shown an aversion to
using Russian assets is in launch services and this is obviously because they wish
to deter Russian entry into an international market that they already dominate.
Outside of Europe, the map of cooperative activities breaks down into two
main clusters. One is in the areas of manned systems and space science with
Japan as the exclusive partner and the other is in technologies, services and
hardware and includes Japan as well as other partners. Japan is the only nation
outside of the U.S. and Europe that can afford manned flight and scientific
activities and thus it is the only one cooperating in these areas. However, as is
occurring worldwide, Japan and many Third World Nations are making use of
Russian space technologies. Japan's proven ability to turn externally developed
technology into a competitive weapon in the international marketplace should be
enough to make its activities in Russia a concern to the U.S. aerospace industry.
But so far, most concern in the U.S. has focused on developing nations, in
particular India, and their attempts to acquire Russian launcher and spacecraft
technologies. The U.S. fears that such technology could help these nations
develop missile delivery systems and thus contribute to the proliferation of high
technology weaponry. Such national security concerns are of course important,
but so should be industrial competitiveness concerns. Indian has also been the
only international customer to date for Russian launch services having launched
twice on Russian vehicles. The international telecommunications organization
Inmarsat will soon join India as a Russian launch services customer having
purchased a 1995 launch for its Inmarsat-3 satellite on a Proton vehicle.
Of the five main areas for cooperation, NASA is active in three: manned
systems, space sciences, and sub system-level inputs. Of these, NASA is the lead
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U.S. organization in the first two but has lagged behind other organizations in its
pursuit of Russian technology and technical services. The June 1992 U.S.-Russian
space cooperation agreement gave a great boost to NASA's manned cooperative
activities. It called for an exchange of astronauts and cosmonauts on U.S. and
Russian spacecraft and the docking of the U.S. Space Shuttle with the Mir space
station. The agreement also provided for expanded joint life science work
including the flight of U.S. experiments on Mir and Russian Bion capsules. And
lastly in the manned systems area, it suggested the use of Russian hardware in
the space station Freedom program, in particular the use of the Soyuz vehicle as
an interim Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV). The most remarkable aspect
of these developments is that some of the projects entail direct funding of an
international partner, apparently relaxing the "no exchange of funds" policy that
has always been followed in the pastl 27. Nonetheless, the majority of these
projects consist of coordinating activities and they are far less ambitious than
those being undertaken by the Europeans. NASA's other major cooperative area,
space sciences, also received a boost from the recent agreement however there
has been cooperation in this area for years, mostly consisting of data exchanges.
Recent expansions in space science cooperation include the flight of U.S.
instruments on Russian spacecraft (both planetary and Earth observing), the
sharing of deep space tracking and communications systems (both in-space
relays and surface antennae), and the initiation of joint studies and equipment
testing. As in manned systems, NASA is becoming increasingly involved with
the Russians in space sciences but at a slower pace than the Europeans.
NASA has almost no involvement in Russian space cooperation in the areas
of satellite applications and launch services. The agency sees itself as a developer
of space systems and technologies for use in the scientific exploration of space.
When technologies it has helped to create find non space science applications,
such as telecommunications or weather forecasting, NASA assumes little
responsibility in assuring that they are put to effective use. Consequently, unlike
in other nations, the practical products derived from the space program
(e.g., application satellites and launch vehicles) are ignored by the space agency
and their utilization is left solely in the hands of industry. NASA believes its
only interest in these areas should be as a buyer of the products or services. In its
127 "Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on Cooperation in Space", White House press release,
June 17, 1992.
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capacity as a buyer, the agency has investigated the possibility of using Russian
launch vehicles to orbit large payloads or to reduce launch costs but for political
reasons these investigations have not gone far. NASA's lack of concern for
assisting industry beyond the needs of its present programs also helps to explain
its relatively restrained approach in pursuing Russian technologies. Because of
the limited scope of its mission, NASA has focused its efforts in the manned
systems and space science areas paying almost no attention to other possible
cooperative projects except for those in the technology area, and only limited
attention there. Why has NASA drawn the borders of its mission and
consequently of its cooperative ventures so narrowly? To answer this question it
is necessary to closely examine the space policy making process in the U.S. as
will be done in the next section.
3.2 Selection Process for Cooperative Projects
This section will describe and critique the present process for selecting
cooperative Russian space ventures and argue that the flaws in this process have
resulted in poor policy making. The national or interagency process is described
first, followed by a presentation of the specific procedures used within NASA.
The final subsection concludes with a discussion of how shortcomings in the
project selection process, both within NASA and at the national level, have led to
inferior strategies for pursuing Russian space cooperation. Recommendations
for improving the selection process to avoid future problems is left for Chapter 4,
when other implementation issues will be addressed.
3.2.1 The National Selection Process
Space cooperation with the Russians is a national concern involving many
private and public interest groups throughout American society. In addition to
effects on the space program, space cooperation agreements impact foreign
policy, national security and industrial competitiveness and therefore the
Departments of State, Defense and Commerce all play important roles in
addition to NASA. Other important players in the formation of U.S.
international space policy are the intelligence community (e.g. the C.I.A.),
developers of space-related technologies (e.g. the Department of Energy), users
of space systems (e.g. the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration) and regulators of space systems (e.g. the Department of
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Transportation). Through its lobbying efforts and advise to policy making
bodies, industry also plays an important role. The diverse interests of these
organizations were supposed to be coordinated in the policy making stage by the
National Space Council, headed by the Vice President, and in the implementation
stage by an interagency review process (known as the Circular 175 process) 128.
However the recent disbanding of the Space Council, and its prior inability to
deal with the avalanche of new Russian cooperative opportunities, has resulted
in most policy making occurring at the interagency review level. When there is
no clear direction from the executive level regarding a certain area of proposed
cooperation, the decision to pursue or not pursue an opportunity in this area has
in the past set U.S. policy by default.
The State Department administers the Circular 175 process and
consequently it has substantial authority, some would say too much authority, in
directing the outcome 129. The Defense Department also possesses major
influence due to its control of export licensing for defense-related equipment (i.e.,
most space hardware). The objective of interagency review is to maintain
consistency and a focus on national level objectives in U.S. space policy, but in
fact it has produced just the opposite effect. Each agency included in the review
process takes a parochial point of view, arguing only for its own interests with
the process regulating the debate until a particular viewpoint wins out.
Sometimes the State Department wins and foreign policy concerns are given
most weight while other times the Commerce Department wins and protection of
domestic industry prevails. The result is an uncoordinated, often contradictory
policy which flip-flops between the narrow interests of the competing agencies.
For years, no U.S. spacecraft could be launched on Russian vehicles, then a one
time exception was made for an Inmarsat launch on Proton. Once again, no U.S.
satellites were allowed on Russian vehicles, and then a Lockheed agreement to
market Protons in the U.S. was approved. The flip-flopping U.S. policy
regarding American use of Russian launch vehicles apparently depends on the
outcome of the latest interagency battle.
Not only does the present process result in inconsistent policies, but it also
unfairly supports the interests of government agencies at the expense of private
128 J. Hofgard, Chief of International Program Office, NASA Headquarters, interviewed in
his Washington office, January 22, 1993.
129 A. Lawler, "State Trumps Policy Foes", Space News, January 18-25, 1993, pp. 4 & 8.
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interests. For example, the Department of Energy (DoE) is allowed to purchase
40 kilograms of Plutonium-238 from the Russians130 which undoubtedly helps to
maintain their nuclear weapons production facilities, while small entrepreneurial
U.S. firms are denied access to low cost Russian launch vehicles supposedly
because of technology transfer concerns. Surely it is more dangerous to U.S.
security to fund the production of radioactive materials than to allow low
technology electronics to be flown on Russian vehicles! But the DoE has
considerably more clout in the selection process than do the small space system
users who are basically unrepresented. Although the inconsistencies due to
governmental in-fighting makes it difficult for the various government agencies
to create long-term plans for Russian cooperation, they at least have some say in
the decision making process. Industry is at the complete mercy of government
decisions that they have little ability to effect.
Pratt & Whitney's efforts to obtain access to Russian liquid rocket engine
technology is a good example of how the present process neglects the needs of
industry in determining when to support cooperation with the Russians. As has
been previously mentioned, Pratt & Whitney announced a joint venture with
NPO Energomash in October, 1992 for exclusive rights to utilize its large liquid
rocket engine technology in the U.S.. Of most interest was the technology from
the Energomash's RD-170 engine (Zenit first stage) which is the world's largest
and most advanced engine. To form this joint venture and give the U.S. access to
leading-edge Russian space technologies, Pratt & Whitney had to invest large
amounts of its own capitall3t . This investment represents an enormous risk to
the company since there is no government commitment that Russian rocket
technologies will be allowed into the U.S. market even if they result in lower cost
and more powerful engines' 32. Pratt & Whitney decided to take the gamble
because it felt that the profit potential the Russian technologies offer if they are
permitted into the market outweigh the financial risks. Even though Pratt &
Whitney decided to forge ahead with its Russian joint venture, it is clear that the
130 V. Kiernan, "U.S. Buy of Russian Plutonium for Space Mission Criticized", Space News.
January 4-11, 1993, p. 7.
131 J. Roberto, Director of Business Development & Planning, Pratt & Whitney, interviewed
by phone at his office in West Palm Beach, Florida, November 6, 1992.
132 J. Rymarcsuk, "Pratt & Whitney: Using Russian Liquid Fuel Rocket Engine Technology
as a Competitive Weapon in the U.S. Market", Managing International Trade &
Competition term project, Harvard Business School, Autumn, 1992.
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financial and operational risks placed on companies by the government's lack of
clear, steady direction is slowing U.S. involvement with the Russian space
program. Many U.S. companies, most notably the other two liquid rocket engine
manufacturers, Aerojet General and Rocketdyne, have been scared-off by the
government's indecisiveness towards Russian cooperation. Given the
technological superiority of many facets of Russia's space program, this
governmental impediment to enhanced Russian cooperation will likely result in
diminished U.S. technological competitiveness in the international market. This
is particularly true since in nations such as Germany and Japan, their
governments are not only creating an environment more conducive to Russian
joint ventures, but they are also actively supporting private interests in the
exploitation of Russian space assets.
3.2.2 NASA's Selection Process
Within NASA, Russian cooperation activities are coordinated by the
International Relations Division at NASA Headquarters in Washington.
Suggested cooperative projects come to this organization both from principal
investigators within NASA who identify opportunities in Russia and from
external directives to pursue certain cooperative areas. NASA then internally
assesses the various possibilities for cooperating using long established
guidelines. For decades, NASA's participation in joint international projects has
been guided by a few basic principles133 :
* A preference for specific project-oriented agreements rather
than generalized "umbrella" agreements.
* A preference for cooperating with government agencies rather
than with private foreign organizations.
* A desire for U.S. control of all elements on the critical path.
* An insistence on clean technical and managerial interfaces.
* No or minimal exchange of funds between cooperating partners.
* No or minimal technology transfer to be assured through
creation of a detailed technology safeguards plan.
* Open access to all scientific results.
133 J. Schumacher, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Policy Coordination and
International Relations, NASA Headquarters, interviewed in his Washington office,
January 22, 1993.
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These principles guide not only when NASA engages in cooperative activities but
how it cooperates. Consequently they will be referred back to many times in both
this and the following chapter. Given their importance to NASA's policy making
and program implementation, it is critical to understand how these tenets were
first developed and why they have been adhered to so steadfastly over the years.
NASA's approach to international cooperation, as exemplified by the above
principles, was created at a time when the U.S. was clearly the dominant Western
space power and international space policy generated little interest in the U.S.
beyond the space agency. NASA could use its dominant position to exert
tremendous control over its international partners as well as other government
agencies in formulating cooperative space projects. It could dictate control of the
critical path, disallow exchange of funds, limit technology transfer, and insist on
working only with government agencies because its partners had little other
choice put to follow NASA's rules or be left out of international space activities.
Being an organization dominated by scientists and engineers, NASA put great
emphasis on simple and efficient interfaces, project-oriented management, and
sharing of all scientific discoveries. The space agency structured its international
activities just as it did all of its domestic work, putting most effort into
addressing scientific and technical concerns and little into management issues.
The scientists and engineers ran the programs while professional managers, with
their interests in areas such as strategic business planning and cost control
mechanisms, were relegated to the role of "bean counters". Although NASA's
position both in the U.S. government and in the international space community
has substantially changed over the years, there has in fact been little change in its
approach to cooperation. As the bureaucracy at NASA has matured, its
bureaucratic structures have become calcified resulting in the agency's inability
to adequately adapt to changing environmental conditions. The guidelines
presented in the previous paragraph are basically the same as they were in the
1960's, as are most other management practices within NASA. The agency's
resistance to change has caused many of its programs, both domestic and
international, to become incredibly inefficient and mired in practices that have
been out-of-date for decades. Granted, in recent years NASA has begun to
interpret its cooperative guidelines more broadly, and at times even ignore them.
Yet the ideals that these guidelines represent continue to exert strong influence
over the space agency's thinking towards international cooperation.
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The changing world environment has made anachronisms of many of
NASA's principles for cooperating. The last two decades have seen the
development of much greater parity in the capabilities of international space
powers but NASA still demands a privileged role in all joint ventures. The
globalization of the world economy has driven private industry to seek
international "strategic alliances" to cooperate over an extended period of time
and over a series of situations. NASA still seeks only short-term, well defined
projects in which to cooperate. The onset of space commercialization and
internationalization has given many private concerns and supra-national
organizations important roles in the space community. NASA still insists on
cooperating only with national governmental agencies. With commercialization,
the international competitiveness of a nation's space industry has become more
important. Optimizing economic factors such as system costs, reliability, and
flexibility to meet the needs of multiple customers is now more important than
maximizing technical performance. Access to technologies for improving
economic performance will be a major determinant of the future competitive
strength of the U.S. space industry 3 4 . Yet NASA still insists on minimal
technology transfer in its cooperative projects through clean managerial and
technical interfaces and no exchange of funds for purchasing foreign
technologies. NASA continues to cling to some of its competitive feelings
towards the Russians developed during the Cold War. Consequently, it tends to
underestimate Russian technical capabilities and neglect technologies that were
"not invented here". A clear example of this is NASA's consideration of Russian
electric propulsion technology as "experimental", when thrusters using this
technology have been flow on operational Russian spacecraft since the 1970's.
The world has experienced substantial changes over the last thirty years yet
NASA's approach to international cooperation, and many of its other
management practices, have failed to keep pace with these changes.
The process for selecting cooperative space projects at NASA has of course
seen some evolution since the 1960's. As previously mentioned, interpretations
of NASA's basic guidelines for international cooperation have become
progressively looser. In the Russian case, NASA has gone so far as to award
several contracts directly to Russian enterprises. This violates both the "no
134 J. Johnson-Freese, "Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space", lecture
delivered at the International Space University in Toulouse, France, July, 1991.
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exchange of funds" rule and the rule for cooperating only with government
agencies. NASA is also funding Russian research centers to obtain access to their
technologies. However in both these situations, the agency considers the present
agreements only short-term remedies that are justifiable only because of the
extreme circumstances in Russia. In the long-term, NASA intends to return to
pursuing Russian cooperation using its old principles of engagement. Yet
whether or not this will be possible remains uncertain. Once the floodgates of
Russian space cooperation are opened up, it will be very difficult to close them.
NASA is already beginning to experience a shift in the sources from which
Russian joint projects emanate. Previously, specific areas for cooperation were
determined by a high level agreement and then scientists and businessmen were
encouraged to pursue projects in these designated areas. Now, since a broad
framework for U.S.-Russian cooperation was agreed upon last June, the initiative
for defining new areas for space cooperation has shifted from the politicians to
the scientists and businessmen. The creation of new Russian cooperative
ventures is no longer a "top down", but a "bottoms up" activity and since there
are more people to initiate projects at the bottom, there is a potential for many
more projects. Soon NASA may have so many projects that rely on its more
liberal approach to cooperation that it may be unable to revert back to its old way
of doing business. Although, NASA's policies toward international cooperation
have experienced some recent liberalization, change has been relatively slow and
there remains a real danger of reversion unless a top-level commitment is
obtained for the new policy direction.
3.2.3 The Results of a Poor Selection Process
One of the greatest limitations of the present selection process, both at
NASA and at the national level, is its lack of a long-term national perspective.
This results not only in insufficient consideration of the needs of all U.S. players,
but it also neglects the needs of Russian partners. A major motivation for U.S.
space cooperation with the former Soviets is to help maintain their aerospace
industrial base during its transition to a capitalistic structure. Without such
support Russian technologies could be irretrievably lost or dispersed to other
countries who may use them militarily against the U.S.. Therefore, it is in the
America's best interest to pursue cooperative projects that not only benefit U.S.
participants, but also Russian partners attempting to preserve peaceful sectors of
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their industry. Yet except for the State Department, who has only limited insight
into the needs of the Russian aerospace industry, no U.S. agency even considers
Russian requirements. The declining economic condition of Russian space
enterprises makes international activities far more attractive if they include the
possibility to earn hard currency. But NASA still pushes for projects that entail
no U.S. funding for Russian contributions even though such financial support is
critical to preserving Russian industry. For example, in manned spaceflight
NASA has an agreement with Russia to fly a U.S. astronaut to Mir similar to the
flights that were taken by German, French, English, and Japanese astronauts.
The big difference is that all of these other nations, realizing the desperate
economic situation of Russian space enterprises, paid the Russians hard currency
for their flights while the U.S. obtained its flight gratis. Of course the U.S.
provided a free flight to a cosmonaut on the Space Shuttle in exchange but the
Russians have dozens of man-years in space; they hardly need a few days more
on a U.S. spacecraft. What they do need is cash to maintain and transition their
industry, but NASA is too cheap or short-sighted in its policies to provide
support. NASA has no problem spending hundreds of millions of dollars at
home to implement the astronaut-cosmonaut exchange flights135, but it stiffs the
Russians the $12 million (the amount per flight the French are paying) to save a
few bucks. That amount of money, although less than NASA spends on faxes
each year, if given to the Russians could fund over 25% of their annual operating
budget for the entire Mir program. But since NASA considers only its own
narrow interests and no one pays any regard to Russian needs, NASA saves a
few dollars at the expense of Russian (and American) national interests.
To make wiser decisions concerning which projects to pursue with the
Russians, it is essential that the interagency review process and NASA's internal
selection process put greater emphasis on understanding the long-term effects
that proposed projects will have in Russia. The present approach of addressing
opportunities only from a simplistic U.S. perspective not only does great
disservice to Russian hopes of a rapid transition to a market economy but also
ignores many subtler U.S. interests. As discussed in Chapter 2, the organization
and operation of the former Soviet space program differs substantially from that
in Western nations. The entire industry is dominated by scientists and engineers
135 "NASA Awards Contracts for Shuttle-Mir Docking Mission", Space News. September 28-
October 5, 1992, p. 2.
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who have little interest in marketing or financial considerations. Each enterprise
is run by an autocratic Chief Designer who rules the enterprise as his own
personal kingdom. And there is no established central authority for space
activities so the Chief Designers are continuously struggling amongst each other
for control of the space program. U.S. organizations attempt to operate in this
complex, foreign and uncertain environment when they pursue Russian
cooperative ventures. The natural reaction of many of these organizations, most
notably NASA, is to impose their understanding of U.S. program structure on the
Russians. In the U.S., companies produce space hardware while in Russia NPOs
produce hardware. Therefore they conclude that NPOs must be the same as
companies. But in many very important ways, NPOs are nothing like private
Western corporations. Similarly they observe that Russia has a space agency
(RSA) and the U.S. has a space agency (NASA) and therefore these agencies must
perform similar functions. In fact they are quite different. NASA employs tens
of thousands of people, has been around over thirty years and controls almost all
civilian space funding. The RSA employs a few hundred, has existed less than a
year and manages only a small fraction of the space program's budget.
Nonetheless, NASA insists on working almost exclusively with the RSA because
it sees the RSA as its Russian counterpart. And when it does consider working
directly with Russian industry, NASA goes to NPO Energia as if it were the only
Russian space enterprise. There are over a thousand Russian enterprises
involved in space, many with far better technologies than Energia, but since it
has established contacts and no better information, NASA works predominantly
with Energia. Many other Russian enterprises resent Energia's apparent
monopoly on NASA contacts 136 . Tying itself so closely with NPO Energia is not
only unfair to the rest of the Russian industry but it also limits NASA ability to
exploit the full range of capabilities that the Russian industry has to offer.
The U.S. has an unprecedented opportunity to mold the Russian space
industry according to U.S. interests but it is squandering this opportunity by
pursuing cooperative ventures in a haphazard manner. Russian enterprises'
urgent need for new funding sources and the incredible ruble-dollar exchange
rate means that even small investments could have major impacts on Russian
industry. However, the lack of national coordination of U.S. investments in
136 Yu. Tsurikov, Department Head in KB Salyut, interviewed at KB Salyut headquarters in
Moscow, October 26, 1992.
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Russia has allowed each organization to consider only its own short-term needs
in deciding where to invest which has led to funding in many disparate areas.
But no matter how successful Russian enterprises are in attracting foreign funds,
a consolidation of their industry is immanent now that the Russian government's
demand for space products has so markedly declined. If properly managed, the
U.S. could use its financial influence to support those sectors of the Russian
industry that are most important to American interests (i.e. non-military, unique
capabilities with U.S. applications) and let the other more threatening sectors be
pruned away 137. The present approach of the Russian government is to attempt
to keep the entire industry solvent which is unlikely to succeed. But such a
dispersed funding approach by the Russians could make strategic funding of
particular sectors by the U.S. even more effective in molding the Russian
industry into a friendly and productive U.S. partner.
3.3 Recommended Areas for Pursuing Cooperation
NASA's out of date criteria for selecting cooperative projects along with the
highly partisan manner in which U.S. agencies interact in setting space policy has
led to poor decisions concerning which cooperative areas to pursue. To obtain
better results, it is necessary to take a step back from the fray and examine the
broader national objectives that may be advanced through Russian space
cooperation. Just such an approach will be taken in the following assessment.
Building upon the discussion of the costs and benefits of international space
cooperation that were presented in Chapter 1, this section will assess the net
benefits of U.S.-Russian joint ventures in each of the potential cooperative areas.
In particular, it will determine which of the five cooperative areas identified in
Section 3.1 are appropriate for NASA to pursue with the Russians. The criteria
for determining an area's suitability for cooperation will be whether it supports
U.S. national objectives more than it deters from them (i.e., whether its long-term
benefits outweigh its costs). Knowledge of U.S. and Russian needs along with
evidence from cooperative projects with other countries and in other industries
will be used to support the conclusions. However, in the real world policy
formulation is driven by more than logical arguments such as the cost/benefit
137 A. Aldrin, Russian Space Researcher at Rand Corporation, interviewed by phone at his
office in Santa Monica, California, November 18, 1992.
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analysis presented here. It is set through a complex negotiation process
involving many different interest groups and many political factors. The
recommendations in this section are only the first step. They provide guidance
on the ideal areas for cooperating but do not address how such ideal solutions
can be reached. Chapter 4 will provide this critical next step by recommending
changes in the policy making process to make it more effective in selecting and
exploiting the best opportunities for cooperation.
To better structure the following analysis, the costs/benefits terminology of
Chapter 1 has been modified into the "deters from" and "supports" national
objectives terminology shown in Table 3.1. As was previously noted, the benefits
from international cooperation support three main national objectives:
improving the space program's efficiency, advancing foreign policy goals, and
enhancing the competitiveness of domestic industries. The specific benefits from
joint space activities are listed below in the middle column across from the
particular objectives that they support. Likewise, the costs of international
cooperation can be considered to deter from fully meeting these same three
national objectives. The specific costs imposed by joint space projects are listed
in the last column of the table below across from the particular objectives from
which they deter. The benefits and costs contained in these two columns are
identical to those derived in the first chapter.
Table 3.1 - Criteria to Assess a Project's Fitness for Cooperation
Cooperation Objectives Supports Objective Deters from Objective
SLowers Program Costs e Inflates Overhead Costs
Improve Space * Improves System Performance
* Increases Program Risks
Program Efficiency * Foundation for Future Work
* Assists Economic Transition * Sustains Potential Adversary
Advance Foreign * Avoids Weapons Proliferation * Unwanted Tech. Transfer
Policy Goals * Stimulates Int'l Goodwill * Harms Traditional Partners
Enhance Industrial to Unique Capabilities * Invites in New Competitors
* Provides Low Cost Sources
Competitiveness
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The five potential areas in which NASA could pursue Russian cooperation
are: manned systems, space sciences, satellite applications, launch vehicles, and
sub system-level inputs. To be considered a candidate for pursuit, a cooperative
area must support at least one national objective more than it deters from it. Yet
that is not enough since a project's net effect may be to support one objective
while deterring from another. In such a case, unless the project's relative impact
on the conflicting objectives differs substantially, a difficult weighing of national
objectives against each other becomes necessary. Whenever possible, prioritizing
of national objectives will be avoided but in the event there is no other
discriminator, recent presidential and legislative direction will be used as
guidance. Besides having the capability in theory to further national objectives, a
potential joint space project must be implementable to actually have an impact.
Consequently, although specifics of an implementation plan will be put off until
the next chapter, a cooperative area's potential "implementability" will be given
substantial weight in determining its suitability for pursuit.
Manned Systems
NASA is the sole U.S. agency involved in human spaceflight and
consequently has exclusive responsibility for pursuing Russian cooperation in
this area. The agency is considering joint projects with the Russians in three sub-
areas of manned systems: astronaut/cosmonaut exchanges and spacecraft
dockings, joint space life science research including NASA's use of Mir, and
application of Russian hardware and technologies on U.S. manned systems. The
astronaut/cosmonaut exchanges represent the highest profile projects and build
upon experience from the Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975. The main benefits of
these exchanges are that they generate international goodwill and lay a
foundation for future cooperative work. They also provide some exposure to
Russian techniques for performing operations in space and therefore could assist
the U.S. in improving the effectiveness of its space operations. However, the
costs involved in implementing these joint programs are immense, running into
the hundreds of millions of dollars. From the space program efficiency
perspective, it is difficult to justify these costs on the possibility of learning
improved space operations techniques. The only way that exchange projects
may provide substantial gains in efficiency is by laying the foundation for future,
more clearly beneficial activities. Consequently, they are worthwhile only to the
extent that they lead to future more productive joint ventures. Similarly, their
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foreign policy benefit in stimulating international goodwill provides only short-
term advantages that will quickly turn negative unless followed by real
cooperation. A few initial exchange efforts to "break the ice" from the Cold War
may well be warranted, but they must not be viewed as ends in themselves since
they entail only short-term benefits and substantial costs. Other longer-term
foreign policy benefits, such as assisting Russia's economic transition, could be
realized if NASA provided some financial support to Russian enterprises in these
joint projects. But the agency's insistence on minimal exchange of funds actually
conflicts with foreign policy goals by diverting limited Russian resources to these
largely symbolic projects and away from more substantial efforts to convert the
economy to a capitalistic basis. Although the Russians are committed to these
exchange programs for political reasons, they are uncertain of how they will pay
for their half of the project 138.
The other two sub-areas (joint life science research and utilization of
Russian manned space systems) provide projects that more clearly support U.S.
national objectives. Both of these areas offer many opportunities to improve the
space program's effectiveness by using Russian assets to lower program costs
and improve the performance of U.S. systems. But in implementing joint projects
in these areas, NASA must guard against escalating overhead costs for increased
management and integration functions that could negate the system cost savings.
Use of the Soyuz-TM as an Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) for space
station Freedom provides a good example. The Russians could modify and build
a couple of Soyuz capsules for use on Freedom for $30-$40 million, an order of
magnitude less than NASA could develop and produce a similar system. But
NASA's intent to use a U.S. firm as a middleman in the procurement of Soyuz
capsules has some members of the Senate Appropriations Committee worrying
that "this approach would eat up potential cost savings by adding another layer
of management ... and costs with few discernible benefits"139. However,
opportunities such as those provided by access to the Mir space station and use
of highly developed Russian rendezvous and docking technologies could,
without a doubt, be profitably applied to the U.S. space program if properly
138 S. Leskov, "America and Russia have Signed an Agreement, But They Don't Know How
They Will Finance It", Izvestiya Morning Edition, May 19, 1992, pp. 1 & 8.
139 A. Lawler, "Senate Panel Opposes Broker For Soyuz Deal", Space News, August 24-30,
1992, p. 6.
123
managed 140 . These opportunities could also be exploited to help enhance the
international competitiveness of U.S. firms by supplying them access to leading-
edge technologies. Finally, if financial assistance was given to the Russians in
exchange for access to their highly developed manned systems, it could also
support U.S. goals to help their economy transition. Since there are few defense
applications of manned systems and no international market for manned
spacecraft, there is little downside to pursuing cooperation in this area. It is
therefore recommended that NASA continue and expand cooperation in the
manned systems area since, if properly managed, it supports the effectiveness of
U.S. space activities far more than it detracts from it. However, NASA should
shift its emphasis from crew exchanges and the short-term political benefits that
they provide to the more long-term and clearly beneficial opportunities in joint
life science research and use of Russian human spaceflight capabilities.
Space Sciences
Space sciences is another area in which NASA plays the leading U.S. role in
cooperating with the Russians. Although cooperative projects in this area tend to
be divided up into categories according to the scientific specialty they support
(i.e. astronomy, planetary sciences, solar terrestrial physics, and Earth sciences),
the reasons for cooperating in any of these specialties are basically the same.
Space science cooperation is pursued predominantly for the increases in program
efficiency that it can provide, although secondary foreign policy benefits can also
be important. The potential to reduce costs and improve program effectiveness
by sharing scientific results, coordinating activities or sharing hardware and
flight opportunities are enormous. In pursuing scientific discoveries in space, the
U.S. and Russia have many similar non-political objectives that can be
simultaneously realized in the most cost-effective manner by working together.
For example, both nations have a strong interest in better understanding the
cause of Ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere and in monitoring the extent
of the damage. Since each nation can afford to launch only a relatively small
number of remote sensing satellites, it is not possible for either to obtain
complete data on this scientific phenomenon. But by combining efforts through
sharing data, coordinating satellites to obtain maximal coverage of areas of
140 W. Broad, "Russians Offer Use of Mir Space Station as a Prelude to Mars",
New York Times, February 23, 1992, p. 26.
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interest, and flying each other's instruments when domestic launches are not
available, our nations can together more fully understand the problem.
However, as in the manned systems area, complicating factors may negate this
synergy unless care is taken. Continuing with the Ozone depletion example, in
1987 NASA reached agreements with the Russians to fly a Total Ozone Mapping
Spectrometer (TOMS) on a Russian Meteor-3 satellite. A major justification for
the joint project was the cost savings it promised the U.S. for not having to build
and launch a dedicated satellite to carry the TOMS. But technical differences in
U.S. and Russian design practices required that an Interface Adapter Module
(IAM) be constructed so that the TOMS could be integrated into the Russian
spacecraft. In the end, the IAM cost more to produce than the instrument itself141
and when combined with additional expenses for the technology safeguards that
are required to export space hardware to Russia, little net cost savings was
realized. Although the TOMS project provided few cost savings, it was still
invaluable since it laid a foundation for future work and to this day continues to
provide essential data on the Ozone depletion problem.
Besides the difficulty in actually realizing costs savings from joint projects,
relying on a foreign partner can substantially increase a project's risk. The U.S.
has conducted only limited cooperative activities with Russia resulting in only
minor increases in risk, but it's activities with Europe have been far more
extensive. Fortunately, a U.S. project has yet to suffer a major impact due to a
lack of support from its European partners, but unfortunately the reverse is not
true. The Ulysses project provides a particularly poignant example of how a
partner's poor performance can destroy the benefits of international cooperation.
Begun in 1978 as the International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), it originally
consisted of two spacecraft (one European and one U.S.) to be launched in the
early 1980's.by the Shuttle using a 3-stage Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). In 1980,
NASA decided not to develop the 3-stage IUS complicating the project's launch
plan. In 1981, NASA withdrew its offer to build one of the spacecraft. Slips in
the Shuttle manifests and the 1986 Challenger accident led to further launch
delays. Eventually in 1990, a single European-built spacecraft started on its
journey to the sun, a mere shadow of the program intended at its inception
thirteen years earlier. The costs imposed on the Europeans by NASA's failure to
141 P. Backlund, Earth Sciences Project Manager, NASA Headquarters, interviewed at his
office in Washington, D.C., January 19, 1993.
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keep its commitments were enormous teaching them a hard lesson on the risks
incurred by taking part in international joint ventures.
Space science cooperation, like cooperation in manned systems, can also
support foreign policy goals by increasing international goodwill and helping to
transition the Russian economy through financial assistance. Until recently,
nearly all space science cooperation was conducted without any exchange of
funds but Russia's desperate financial state has now caused this to change. To
keep Russia's Mars '94 & '96 projects from falling apart, first the Europeans'142
and then the U.S. 143 agreed to provide direct financial support. This type of
assistance can play an important role in sustaining the Russian aerospace
industry during the present turmoil so that it will be around in the future to be a
potential partner. The possibility that sensitive defense technologies may be
unknowingly transferred as a result of joint ventures in this area represents a
substantial threat to U.S. security and commercial interests. Consequently,
sophisticated and costly technology transfer countermeasures, as mentioned in
the TOMS example above, are often necessary. These precautions reduce costs
savings but are necessary to avoid negative impacts on U.S. foreign interests.
The many opportunities for improving the effectiveness of U.S. space activities
along with secondary foreign policy benefits make space science a promising
area for pursuing Russian cooperation. However, the potentially high costs and
risks involved in implementing projects in this area necessitates that great care be
taken in structuring joint activities to minimize these negative effects so that the
overall net effect is beneficial.
Satellite Applications
Included in this area are satellites for the following applications (in order of
decreasing level of commercialization): telecommunications, Earth observation,
microgravity processing, navigation, and search & rescue. Unlike the previous
two areas discussed, NASA is only one of several U.S. players active in this area.
As a government agency supported by tax dollars, NASA believes that it has a
duty to buy American products if at all possible. It tends to purchases whatever
satellites it requires from U.S. industry, developing new capabilities only when
142 M. Dornheim, "France and Germany will Help Fund Russian Mars 1994 Space Mission",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 25, 1992, pp. 79-80.
143 "NASA Antes Up Money For Russian Mars Mission", Space News. Dec. 7-13, 1992, p. 22.
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they are demanded by its own needs. Although it is a major developer of
satellite technologies (along with the DoD and private companies), NASA prefers
to let industry take the lead in finding external applications for the technologies it
develops. The agency puts little effort into assuring that space capabilities with
broader applications beyond its own requirements are created, since it does not
see such work as central to its mission. Therefore, believing it has no
responsibility to support the broad interests of the space industry and barring
itself from directly purchasing Russian satellites through its "buy American"
philosophy, NASA has shunned Russian overtures to cooperate in this area. It
should be noted that of the five potential areas for cooperation that are being
discussed, Russian technical capabilities in this area are by far the least
impressive. Because of their relatively low performance, Russian application
satellites offer fewer opportunities to potential U.S. partners but they still offer
some important advantages. NASA's complete reluctance to cooperate in this
area is more a result of how it views its mission relative to U.S. industry than a
result of Russian technological shortcomings in this field.
From a national perspective, cooperating in satellite applications could help
to improve industry competitiveness and to further foreign policy goals.
Although Russian application satellites do not have all the sophistication of their
Western counterparts, they are much cheaper to make. Access to low cost
Russian space services could allow many small entrepreneurial firms in the U.S.
and abroad to utilize space for the first time for communication, navigation and
microgravity processing purposes. Use of lower cost inputs would permit these
firms to produce more competitive products and similar benefits could also help
to make NASA's program more cost-efficient. This is particularly true for
microgravity experiments, where flights on Photon capsules or the Mir station
are substantially less expensive than on the Shuttle. On the negative side,
allowing Russian satellite manufacturers entry into the U.S. market could hurt
domestic producers of similar services by stiffening competition. But in fact,
since Russian satellites are so much cheaper and lower performing than U.S.
satellites, they serve a completely different market. General Electric and Hughes
could continue to sell their sophisticated satellites to companies such as AT&T,
while the Russians could provide their services to small start-up firms such as
Rimsat and Sokol America who could never afford to buy from U.S.
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manufacturers44. In addition to supplying lower cost options, Russian satellites
also provide some unique capabilities not available in the United States. Of
particular note are their long-duration microgravity processing capabilities on
Mir and on free-flying capsules that have allowed small U.S. firms, such as
Payload Systems Inc., to exploit the market for in-space manufacturing. No
comparable capability exists in the U.S. so without Russian cooperation, domestic
firms would be unable to compete in this potentially lucrative market.
The major foreign policy benefit of cooperating in this area is the support it
provides the Russian industry by purchasing of its products and services. As
previously mentioned, any financial support that assists Russian industry in
retaining its personnel and in transitioning to a greater reliance on market
mechanisms is in America's best interest. But there are also important foreign
policy risks that must be managed. As in any cooperative area where high
technology pieces of hardware are exchanged between two countries, the risk of
undesired technology transfer becomes a concern. To help prevent the transfer
of defense-related technologies to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, a
Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) was set up by the
Western powers145. This committee established rigid controls on exports to the
U.S.S.R. with the intent of blocking the transfer of any equipment or technology
with military applications, including most space hardware. For over three
decades, COCOM regulations made cooperative projects that required the
exchange of space equipment or technologies impossible. However, since the
break-up of the Soviet Union, Western nations have begun a thorough review of
their export control procedures which has already resulted in over 70% of the
space-related items on the COCOM control list being removed 146. As the process
continues, the objective is to develop a system that creates a free enough
environment so as not to hamper cooperative efforts, but possesses sufficient
discipline to stop any unwarranted technology transfers that could jeopardize
foreign policy goals.
144 D. Marcus, "Firms Stretch Dollars in Russia", Space News. November 23-30, 1992, p. 4.
145 B. Forman, "The Impact of International Export Controls on International Cooperative
Space Programs", lectured delivered at the International Space University, Toulouse,
France, July, 1991.
146 J. Boright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science and Technology Affairs,
remarks at the National Space Outlook Conference, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1992.
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With proper management of the technology transfer concerns, the net effect
of cooperation in this area will likely be to improve industrial competitiveness,
further foreign policy goals and possibly even make NASA's space activities
more cost-efficient. But smaller U.S. firms, and not NASA or the large
established aerospace companies, undeniably have the most to benefit from
access to low cost Russian satellites. It is difficult to justify NASA's cooperation
in this area based solely on its own limited opportunities for directly using
Russian satellites. But if NASA has a broader mission to help promote the
commercialization of space activities, as it should according to the Commercial
Space Act of 1984147, then it has a responsibility to assist U.S. entrepreneurs in
finding commercial uses for low cost Russian systems. Since NASA has taken a
very parochial perspective, focusing on its own narrow interests, it has chosen to
play only a minor role in pursuing cooperation in this area. If it considered its
broader mission to support the U.S. space industry and to promote foreign policy
goals, NASA would aid those attempting to commercialize space in their
attempts to utilize Russian systems. NASA's pursuit of cooperation in this area
would require a change not only in the agency's international space policy but
also in its relationship with domestic industry. However, since for years NASA
has had legislative direction to promote space commercialization, it is not a
change in policy for it to begin supporting domestic industry, only the long
overdue implementation of existing policy. Once it is agreed that NASA has a
responsibility to assist companies in commercializing space, the clear benefits to
industry of having access to Russian satellites makes NASA's support of
cooperation in this area highly desirable.
Launch Vehicles
The debate on whether Russia should be allowed to enter the international
launch services market has been one of the most hotly contested issues
surrounding Russian cooperation. This issue has caused such a fervor because of
the major impact that Russian entry would have on a whole host of players in the
U.S. space community, particularly ob its more commercial elements. There are
numerous reasons why Western organizations may want to utilize Russian
launch vehicles but the most important is the potential cost savings that they
offer. The Russians use mass production techniques to produce launch vehicles
147 A. Dula, "Private Sector Activities in Outer Space", International Lawyer, Win. '85, p. 181.
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on assembly lines much as companies in the U.S. produce automobiles, and at a
correspondingly low cost. The result is that Russian boosters can place payloads
into Low Earth Orbit for a cost of between $300-$700 per pound compared to a
cost of over $3,000 per pound for U.S. vehicles. As was concluded in a recent
study by Rockwell International, Russian "economic capabilities in the field of
Earth-to-Low-Earth-Orbit transportation exceeds our most hopeful dreams. The
United States cannot match the Soviet transportation system in terms of
reliability, dependability, lifting capability, low cost, or proven track record" 148.
The impressive capability of Russian launchers, including the ability to place
over 100 tons in orbit on a single launch, could help NASA, other government
agencies and industry to reach space more cost-effectively. Furthermore,
employing Russia's unique heavy lift capability would make many new missions
possible such as orbiting of a space station or Mars vehicle on a single launch.
Unfortunately, as a result of NASA's Byzantine accounting system there is little
incentive for the agency's managers to seek the cheapest or most efficient launch
option that the Russians can provide. Launch costs are often not allocated to
specific programs and when they are they tend to be dramatically
underestimated. Consequently, program managers focus all their efforts on
minimizing payload costs and almost none on reducing the costs for launch
services since they are beyond their control. Empowering program managers
with a budget to purchase the most cost-effective launch vehicle instead of giving
them a "free" Shuttle ride, would allow fairer consideration of other launch
systems, including Russian systems, and could dramatically reduce the agency's
overall expenditures for launch services.
The sale of Russian launchers in the West would provide significant
financial support to the Russian space industry. A launch vehicle, even at the
low Russian price, is a big ticket item so that a single Western sale of a large
vehicle such as the Proton could provide enough hard currency to fund its
manufacturer for an entire year. Purchasing launch vehicles from Russian
manufacturers allows them to keep their rocket specialists gainfully employed so
that they are not tempted to sell their services in the Third World and it also
provides capital for restructuring their business away from military production.
Both these results support important U.S. foreign policy goals.
148 E. Keith, Low-Cost Space Transportation: The Search for the Lowest Cost, AAS 91-169,
Rockwell International's Space Systems Division, Downey, California, 1991, p. 19.
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Although the benefits from utilizing Russian launchers are formidable, so
are the potential costs. The fear that Russian competitors would decimate the
domestic launch industry has been the greatest deterrent to allowing them into
the U.S. market. An important national objective of cooperating in space is to
enhance the competitiveness of the domestic industry and if a cooperative project
strongly deters from this objective it should not be pursued. U.S. launch vehicle
manufacturers would almost certainly be negatively impacted by the entry of
Russian competition, at least in the short-run. But the space industry consists of
more than just the vehicle manufacturers, it also includes the spacecraft
manufacturers and others who purchase launch services. These players would
benefit by access to low cost vehicles that would allow them to more
competitively price their end products whose price is strongly driven by
transportation costs. Consequently, the competitiveness of some sectors of the
U.S. industry would be harmed while the competitiveness of other sectors would
be enhanced by access to Russian launchers. Yet the direct nature of the impact
on the launch vehicle manufacturers as well as their strategic importance to
national security tends to make their protection evoke the greatest concern. The
threat to the launch industry is exacerbated by the potential of U.S. and Russian
retired missiles being converted for use as space boosters. Hundreds of Russian
SS-18's, SS-19's, SS-24's and U.S. Minuteman II's, being decommissioned to meet
the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, could soon be flooding
the small launch vehicle market unless steps are taken to protect existing
producers 14 9. Small launch vehicles are produced predominantly by
entrepreneurial firms that were formed over the last decade as a result of
government calls for increased commercialization of space activities. To first
encourage the creation of these firms and then destroy them by allowing low
priced products to be dumped into their market would set a terrible precedence
and deter other entrepreneurs from entering the space business. Clearly some
protection of the burgeoning commercial space launch industry is required. To
this end, the U.S. is now conducting trade talks with the Russians (and the
Chinese) to set internationally approved practices for competing in the launch
services market. The goal of these talks is to allow the Russians into the
international launch market so that the benefits enumerated above may be
149 A. Lawler, "Missiles Tapped for Post-Cold War Launchers", Space News. November 30-
December 6, 1992, pp. 3 & 27.
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realized and at the same time to provide adequate protection against unfair
competition for U.S. manufacturers.
Some in the U.S. defense establishment argue that the Russian launch
industry should continue to be isolated from world markets so that their ability
to produce missiles (a close cousin of launch vehicles) that can threaten the U.S.
militarily is decreased. However, in attempting to extinguish Russian missile
production capabilities through financial privation, the U.S. may inadvertently
promote the dispersion of these capabilities to other nations. The Russian missile
threat is a known quantity that the U.S. has learned to manage over the last three
decades. Although it is unpleasant, it is far preferable to dispersing missile
capabilities to adversaries that the U.S. has little experience with and little
knowledge of how to control. Therefore risking such proliferation in an attempt
to drive the Russian space industry out of existence is an unwise strategy.
Because of its considerable potential to lower launch costs for the U.S.
government and industry as well as its support of foreign policy goals, it is
recommended that U.S. organizations be allowed to utilize Russian launch
services on a limited basis. However, the potentially catastrophic impact on U.S.
launch vehicle manufacturers as a result of Russian entry into the launch services
market requires that restraint be applied in cooperating in this area. The U.S.
launch industry should not be sacrificed for foreign policy reasons or to lower
the short-term costs of a few programs. Nonetheless, Russia's presence in the
international space marketplace cannot be ignored. NASA should seize the
opportunity to use Russian launchers when they offer unique capabilities that do
not directly compete with American products. The prime example of this is the
Energia launch vehicle that provides unique heavy lift capabilities that are not
available in the United States. For the near-term however, to support the U.S.
industry during a difficult transition period, NASA should restrict its use of
Russian vehicles to those providing unique capabilities. As a government agency
with responsibilities for assisting industrial development, it is wholly
appropriate for NASA to "buy America" when the industry is in trouble. But in
the long-run U.S. industry must adapt and reduce costs to be able to compete
internationally to avoid becoming parasites on sympathetic government
agencies. NASA's goal should be to nurture the launch industry while it
improves its competitiveness, not protect it so that it may remain uncompetitive.
Private launch service users on the other hand, should be allowed to utilize
Russian launchers as soon as the on-going launch pricing negotiations are
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completed since it is unfair to punish them for the launch industry's lack of cost
control. Eventually NASA will also want to include the possibility of flying
spacecraft on smaller Russian vehicles, particularly as a Russian "contribution in
kind" to an international joint venture. However for the immediate future, in
accordance with America's national emphasis on improving the domestic
economy, the needs of the U.S. launch industry should outweigh the needs of the
Russians in NASA's decision making on launch services.
Sub System-Level Inputs
The use of Russian technologies, components and engineering or testing
services provide some of the clearest benefits to U.S. partners with minimal risks.
In contrast to the cooperative activities involving complete systems that were
discussed in the previous sections, utilization of Russian space technologies and
services is of broad interest to organizations both inside and outside of the space
community. The reason for this broad appeal is that Russian technical
capabilities offer many opportunities to lower costs and to improve the
performance of industrial products and processes. The Soviet Union's long-
standing commitment and extensive allocation of resources to developing
superior technologies for space systems has made it a world leader in such
broadly applicable technologies as advanced materials, low-cost manufacturing
techniques and power conversion systems 150 . Technologies can readily be
transferred to products or manufacturing processes beyond those for which they
were developed allowing their benefits to be leveraged into completely new
areas. And unlike procuring complete Russian systems, accessing technologies
and services entails far less upfront financial commitment and therefore is less
risky. Beyond the confines of the space community, many U.S. companies from
medical equipment manufacturers to construction firms are now making use of
Russian technologies and services. For example, the Cummins Engine Company,
America's leading manufacturer of heavy-duty diesel engines, is conducting
several joint ventures in the former Soviet Union that entail sharing of design
techniques, production technologies and may soon include the joint production
150 R. Perry, Comparisons of Soviet and U.S. Technology, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
California, June 1973, p. 5.
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of a U.S.-Russian engine1 t5 . Similar types of cooperative programs could be
created in the space community as well. From a space program perspective, joint
projects in technologies and services are highly desirable because they offer
substantial cost savings and performance enhancements with minimal
implementation risks and expense. From a space industry perspective, similar
technical benefits and ease of implementation also make joint ventures in this
area worth pursuing. Since most Russian technologies or services being
considered for cooperative ventures are unique or complimentary to U.S.
capabilities, they offer only minor competition to U.S. domestic systems.
From a foreign policy perspective, cooperation in this area receives
somewhat mixed reviews depending on the particular approach taken. Direct
purchases of Russian technology, such as those being undertaken by SDIO,
provide some immediate financial support to the Russian industry but in the
long-run these transactions strip the Russians of their competitive technologies
leaving them with little in return. For the long-term health of the Russian
industry, it would be better to create cooperative projects in which the Russians
provide value-added services that entitled them to substantial compensation
instead of forcing them to sell off their existing assets to the highest bidder.
Unfortunately, many U.S. players are considering only their own short-term
gains and not the long-term effects on the Russia economy and U.S. foreign
policy interests. The U.S. could learn much from the Europeans who have taken
a longer-term outlook in their dealings with the Russian space community. The
Europeans are now providing substantial funding to scientists and engineers in
Russia to work directly on European space programs. They are also utilizing
Russian facilities to test their space hardware including a project to test a Hermes
mock-up in a supersonic wind tunnel at TsNIIMAShl 52. These activities give
Russian the critical financial support that is needed to sustain its space industry
while at the same time they supply Europe with low cost access to world-class
technologies and services. The success of some organizations in the Russian
aerospace community in selling their technologies and services abroad
demonstrates the appeal of these capabilities. One of the most remarkable
151 D. Yoffie, "The Cummins Engine Company in the Soviet Union", International Trade and
Competitiono McGraw-Hill, 1990, p. 328.
152 P. Orlov, "Foreign Interests in Soviet Space Systems", from the Vremya newscast,
Moscow television, 1700 GMT, September 27, 1990.
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success stories is that of the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI) who
at present relies on Russian government funding for only 29% of its budget,
obtaining the rest from private sources at home and abroad 53 . This institute has
used its U.S. division, TsAGI International, a Washington state based joint
venture to assist it in marketing and raising capital in the U.S. and in other
Western nations. TsAGI's remarkable success in selling its services in aviation
testing and design provides a concrete example of how Russian technical services
can be put to use internationally.
NASA has been slow to utilize Russian technologies and services mainly
because it is used to relying exclusively on U.S. domestic capabilities. However,
the political changes in Russia as well as the economic changes in the world
space industry make America's continued technological self-sufficiency in space
a difficult and costly policy to pursue. For the benefits that Russian capabilities
can provide to its own systems as well as to U.S. systems in general, NASA
should begin to more aggressively seek cooperation in the technology and
services area. The low risks and low costs for accessing Russian technologies and
services, when combined with their potentially huge payoffs in reduced program
costs and increased performance, make this the most promising (and presently
the most popular) area for U.S.-Russian cooperation. Yet NASA has allowed
other government agencies and U.S. firms to take the lead in pursuing Russian
technologies. Recent NASA contracts to TsAGI for spaceplane technology, to
TsIAM for scramjet flight testing, and to the Ukrainian Paton Institute for
manufacturing technologies 154 , demonstrates that the agency is beginning to take
cooperation in this area more seriously. It is recommend that such activities be
continued and expanded and that NASA look for other fields in which
technological cooperation may be beneficial. To best promote foreign policy
interests, NASA should pay Russian enterprises for their technological
contributions but not using SDIO's "cash & carry" approach, instead working to
develop long-term relationships with the Russians to obtain value-added
products and services that are mutually beneficial to both partners.
153 D. Mussington, researcher in Russian technology policy, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, interviewed in Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 1, 1992.
154 J. Hofgard, "U.S.-Russian Programs: Contracts and Grants", NASA Headquarters
presentation, January 19, 1993.
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Conclusions
NASA has an important role to play in pursuing all areas of Russian
cooperation. At present, its emphasis on cooperating only in the manned
systems and space sciences areas is too confining and should be expanded. The
manned systems area does offers many promising opportunities for improving
NASA's program and supporting foreign policy goals that should be pursued.
But the agency's present focus on crew exchanges and their short-term political
benefits neglects the longer-term payoffs of more tangible joint manned projects.
Cooperation in space sciences is also very promising and activities in this
area should be expanded. However, NASA must not fall into the trap of
pursuing international activities as an end in themselves. Joint projects are
conducted to obtain specific technical and political benefits and if escalating costs
and risks jeopardize these benefits, joint activities should not be pursued.
NASA has avoided cooperation in satellite applications and launch vehicles
because it restricts itself to purchasing domestic systems and believes that it has
no responsibility to assist U.S. firms in accessing Russian capabilities. Unique or
low cost Russian satellites may not offer much directly to NASA's programs, but
to entrepreneurial U.S. firms Russian satellites are very appealing. NASA should
use its space expertise and experience with the Russians to assist U.S. companies
in improving their effectiveness by utilizing Russian satellite capabilities.
Potential Russian penetration of the U.S. launch services market poses a real
threat to the future well-being of the U.S. launch industry and consequently
cooperation in this area must be handled gingerly. For the present, NASA
should continue to purchase most of its launch services exclusively from U.S.
sources to help preserve the domestic industry. However, NASA should
vigorously pursue the substantial cost savings and increased performance that
Russian launchers offer in areas such as heavy lift boosters, where Russian
capabilities are unique and face no domestic competition.
Russian technologies, services and components offer the most promising
opportunities for cooperating in the space field with their high payoffs and
minimal costs and risks. NASA has only begun to scratch the surface of the
possibilities in this area. The agency should become more aggressive in utilizing
Russian technologies and services for its own purposes as well as in helping
companies, both aerospace and otherwise, to exploit Russian capabilities to
improve their international competitiveness.
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Chapter 4
Implementing Cooperative Activities
This chapter will describe how the U.S. government, and NASA in
particular, could better pursue cooperative space activities with the former Soviet
states. Its objective is to recommend specific strategies for improving the
implementation of cooperative ventures in the areas identified in the previous
chapter. The analysis will address a broad range of implementation issues
including the selection, coordination, and management of joint space projects.
Section 4.1 begins with an evaluation of the current national policy making
process for international space activities. This process has been pieced together
over time as cooperative activities have evolved and become more complex.
Recommendations for improving its efficiency and responsiveness to U.S.
national objectives is presented along with suggestions for their implementation.
Section 4.2 builds upon these recommendations by discussing their impact on
NASA's role in Russian cooperation. NASA's present outdated approach to joint
space activities is critiqued and a new strategy is proposed that is more
compatible with global developments and more supportive of national policy
goals. Finally, Section 4.3 discusses issues of concern in implementing individual
projects with Russian enterprises. Whereas the second section provides high
level strategic recommendations for improving NASA's overall implementation
process, the final section provides specific project level advice for making
Russian joint projects more productive. This advice is derived from a thorough
understanding of the needs and business practices of the Russian space industry
and their impact on the suitability of particular cooperative approaches.
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The most important reason why a new approach to implementing
cooperative projects is required is because of the dramatic changes that have
occurred throughout the global space community. The break-up of the Soviet
Union and its impact on world space activities has already been discussed at
length but this event has not been the only perturbation to an otherwise
unchanging international landscape in the space field. International space
activities have been continuously evolving for decades. The days when the U.S.
dominated the entire world space community (outside of secretive Russian
activities) are gone. Now there are many nations, with more nearly equal
capabilities, involved in the exploration and utilization of outer space. The
nations of Europe and Asia no longer have to rely upon U.S. or Soviet systems to
obtain access to space, they have their own independent capabilities. In the past,
U.S. motivations for conducting international space projects were predominantly
scientific or political in nature. Its partners cooperated to obtain access to
leading-edge American space systems and technologies. Cooperative activities
were conducted on a project-by-project basis, with no exchange of funds and
included the open sharing of all results155 . As the capabilities of international
partners have grown, they have assumed larger roles in cooperative projects with
the U.S. and other areas besides space science have been included in
international activities. The U.S. has lost its ability to completely dominate space
projects in which it is involved. Since the Spacelab project with ESA in the early
1980's, the U.S. has begun to increasingly rely upon international partners for
major hardware contributions to its space systems.
With the changing international balance in space capabilities, motivations
for cooperating in space have also changed with economic considerations
becoming an important factor in justifying new space projects. To obtain
political support, the Space Shuttle promised to be a low cost "truck" to space.
Although this claim proved to be completely fictitious, the fact that such a claim
was necessary to obtain legislative approval demonstrates that a new era in space
activities was emerging. Cost-effectiveness and commercialization were the new
rallying cries in the space industry. Economic motivations joined political and
scientific benefits as reasons for pursuing international cooperation. With the
emphasis on economic performance and the increasing capabilities of foreign
155 J. Johnson-Freese, "Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space", lecture
delivered at the International Space University. Toulouse, France, August, 1991.
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players, it was inevitable that commercial competition would arise as a force in
the international space arena. As in other industries from automobiles to
computers, this led to a challenge to America's economic leadership in aerospace
products. The entry of Russian systems and technologies into the international
market has exacerbated the competition and threatens to destabilize what little
balance existed. America's position in the global space industry is less secure
than ever prompting many government agencies besides NASA, the traditional
focal point for all space issues, to become involved in international space matters.
Space cooperation is being used by interest groups both inside and outside of the
U.S. government to advance their own agendas. The demands on cooperative
programs have increased while at the same time NASA has lost its role as
exclusive manager of space activities. These developments, along with the
growing power of other spacefaring nations, are creating an ever more complex
environment in which NASA must mange its international space activities.
Structuring cooperative activities in this new international environment
offers many novel challenges. When NASA was concerned primarily with
scientific and political pay-offs and its partners were mainly interested in
utilizing American technologies, it was easy to arrange mutually beneficial
projects. But as space capabilities and the motivations for cooperating began to
converge, creating single projects that met the needs of multiple partners became
more difficult. When both partners have similar goals such as improving their
industrial competitiveness and they offer similar technical capabilities, the
benefits to cooperating tend to be incremental and only accumulate to a
significant degree over a long time period. Private companies have recognized
this for years, leading them to form strategic international alliances that provide
for cooperation over a period of time and a range of situations. These
arrangements allow a company to obtain assistance in a particular area and at a
particular time while providing assistance to its partner on a different project and
possibly at another time. The net result is that both partners benefit but the
benefits are not equally distributed across all projects. In fact, it is possible that a
particular project may not benefit one partner at all, but by cooperating in this
area he may receive support in another that outweighs his immediate losses.
This type of approach is completely contrary to NASA's present project-oriented
philosophy that demands that each project stand on its own isolated merit.
However, other agencies in the U.S. government are not nearly so rigid and
NASA could learn from their example. In particular, the Defense Department
139
either directly or through its industrial contractors, selectively allows the transfer
of technology and funds to international partners in support of joint research and
development efforts. These are not individual projects with specific beginning
and ending dates but long-term, open-ended commitments to cooperate in
certain areas. The DoD has also promoted transnational firm-to-firm cooperation
in defense technologies since it believes that "cross-border defense industrial
cooperation can spread the costs of development and provide economies of scale
in production, often allowing industry to provide better value to participating
governments" '15 6 . NASA's project-oriented approach is long-established and has
been largely successful in the past in organizing its international space activities
and thus it will be difficult to change. But the changing environment of the
world space community demands a more long-term and strategic approach to
fully realize the benefits of international cooperation and remain competitive in
the global marketplace. Consequently, in the following discussion cooperative
relationships will be defined not as a collection of disparate individual projects as
in the past, but as a long-term commitment to combine efforts in a specific area.
Cooperation should be driven by a broad commitment which then leads to
individual projects to implement this commitment. It should not emphasize the
creation of individually justifiable projects that somehow in the aggregate are
expected to promote strategic national goals. This analysis will focus on how to
implement cooperation in specific areas and the aggregate benefits that will
result and not on how to implement particular projects with short-term benefits.
In the new global environment that emphasizes economic competitiveness
(which is closely related to technological competitiveness) and other complex
national goals, the old rules for cooperating no longer apply. NASA must learn
to balance its programs to include the needs of other U.S. interests and foreign
partners to maintain the agency's long-term health. It must also learn to mange
its interaction with these new players in a more effective manner. The agency is
no longer in a position to dictate space policy in either the U.S. or abroad. New
motivations for pursuing joint space activities, most notably improved industrial
competitiveness, must be considered in formulating NASA's strategies for
cooperating. It is imperative that these new drivers of space policy and the more
156 Atlantic Partnership Steering Committee, The Atlantic Partnership: An Industrial
Perspective On Transatlantic Defense Cooperation, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, D.C., 1991, pp. ix-x.
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complex environment be considered in structuring future cooperative activities.
This chapter will discuss in detail how the agency should modify its
implementation strategies to meet the demands of the new environment in the
long-term. It will include recommendations for improving both NASA's
interaction with external organizations and its internal management approach.
The end result will be an action plan for making NASA's space activities with
Russia more compatible with the demands of global economic competition and
the needs of the many players impacted by its international space activities.
4.1 Restructuring the Coordination/Selection Process
The shortcomings of the process for coordinating and selecting international
space ventures in the U.S. were described at some length in the previous chapter.
In that discussion it was argued that the Space Council's inability to keep up
with the rapidly changing global space environment had by default led to most
U.S. policy being set in the interagency review process. The inherently parochial
nature of the interagency debate has resulted in policies toward Russian
cooperation that are inconsistent, ineffective and neglect long-term national
objectives. This section will identify several reforms that should be made to the
top level policy making process to make it more effective and more responsive to
national needs. Of course, NASA as an agency within the U.S. government is not
free to modify the highest level policy structure at will, however it is able to work
within the system as an advocate for change. NASA should promote structural
changes in the national policy making process to achieve the ends specified in the
following paragraphs.
4.1.1 Focus on National Objectives
As applied in the previous chapter, the three national objectives in pursuing
space cooperation: advancing foreign policy goals, enhancing industrial
competitiveness, and improving space program efficiency, should provide the
criteria for determining whether cooperation should be pursued in a particular
area. Yet in the present adversarial interagency review process these broad
objectives play little role. To better focus cooperative activities on these
objectives as well as to provide more consistency in U.S. policy, it is essential that
a high level body with national perspective be formed to coordinate international
space cooperation, particularly Russian cooperation. The National Space Council
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has been unable to perform this task and it is uncertain whether President
Clinton's new Science, Technology and Space Council will be able to do any
better. The problem is that international cooperation in space entails so many
complex and divergent issues that it is difficult for a council imbedded in the
space program to make effective policy. There are important foreign policy
concerns and industrial policy issues that are much larger than the space
program per se. Consequently, to arrive at a policy that meets the needs of all
those concerned, it is necessary to take a broader perspective. Relying on the
interagency review process to thrash out all of the complicated issues is a wholly
inadequate approach. A special council at the executive level (possibly a
subcommittee of the newly formed White House Science, Technology and Space
Council) is needed to assure that U.S. space policy towards the Russians meets
broadly defined U.S. objectives and is not arrived at piecemeal. The council
would set policy to promote national objectives and it would assure that all
relevant U.S. laws and regulations (e.g. export control laws) supported the stated
policy. Its position would be sufficiently high to allow it to include the needs of
NASA, other government agencies, U.S. industry and international partners in
establishing policy. Under the proposed scheme, the interagency review process
would be relied upon only to assure that national policy towards the Russians
was properly implemented. To better understand the benefits of such a council,
the following paragraphs describe why it is needed to effectively support
national objectives in each of the three areas identified above.
Advance Foreign Policy Goals
Several governmental agencies consider the advancement of foreign policy
goals part of their mandate. Unfortunately, the various international agendas of
these organizations are often in conflict with each other or with other national
objectives. Therefore an international space coordination council has a critical
role to play in assuring that U.S. foreign policy goals are promoted in a consistent
and effective manner. A coordination council could provide guidance to
individual agencies concerning the appropriate cooperative areas to pursue as
well as the preferred implementation approaches to be utilized. Such guidance is
necessary because the approach used to implement a joint project makes a big
difference in how well it supports foreign policy goals. Russian cooperation that
provides no financial support or does not involve those who work on weapons
technologies will not help assuage the risk of proliferation. Joint activities that
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make use of only government-to-government contacts will not teach Russians
about Western business practices and therefore will do little to help their
transition to capitalism. And cooperative projects that allow for no exchange of
funds will be of little interest to a financially strapped Russian industry and will
not help them in the costly conversion to nonmilitary production. It is not only
important for foreign policy reasons to pursue Russian cooperation in particular
areas, but to pursue it using the right approach.
Without an executive council to manage cooperative space projects, the
Department of State (DOS) has assumed most of the responsibility for
coordinating international activities at the national level. However, the DoS
considers exclusively the impacts on foreign affairs in determining its position
and therefore is in no better position than any other agency to create well
balanced policy. Its high profile actions in support of Russian economic
stabilization has prompted many in the United States to label the DoS as the
leading advocate for increased cooperation with the Russian space industry. It is
ironic that the Russians see the State Department as playing just the opposite
role. Since the DoS is responsible for administering export control regulations for
military (and consequently most space) hardware, every time an export to Russia
is blocked, the Russians believe that their efforts to cooperate in space have been
foiled by the U.S. State Department 157. In fact, in most cases the DoS supported
the action but was overruled by military or commercial concerns, leading to a
denial of the export over State's objections.
As previously discussed, the DoS supports cooperation because it can help
the Russian aerospace industry transition to free market capitalism, convert its
production away from military hardware, and stem the proliferation of advanced
weapon technologies to Third World nations. U.S. businessmen believe that
Russian industry in general, and their aerospace industry in particular, is
suffering from several "systemic" gaps that make it impossible for it to fully
enter the community of Western industrialized nations. Two of the most
important of these are its marketing gap and its management gap. Products in
the former Soviet Union are distributed, not marketed and the concept of
customer-orientation is almost completely unknown. Similarly, in all of Eastern
Europe "there is a serious absence of leadership ability and advanced business
157 M. Smith, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service,
interviewed in the "Newsmaker Forum" of Space News. November 23-29, 1992, p. 22.
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know-how among managers ... and even more limited use of modern
management methods and techniques" 158 . The result is that the Russians are in
dire need of assistance if they are to stand any chance of successfully
transitioning to a capitalistic economy.
Policy makers in Washington have recognized this need and the importance
of a stable Russian economy to U.S. interests abroad. Washington's response to
this need has been to provide billions of dollars in direct assistance to Russia to
help it during this difficult transition period. But simply giving Russia money is
a one dimensional approach that supports only foreign policy goals and
degrades the Russians in the process 159. Instead, by purchasing Russian assets in
fields such as aerospace where they have much to offer, other national objectives
can be simultaneously supported and a long-term and mutually beneficial
relationship can be established. Yet coordinating purchases to meet the needs of
diverse U.S. interests is far more difficult then just sending a check, so for ease of
implementation the U.S. has tended to use the latter approach. However, with
the top level coordination of an executive council, purchases of Russian space
assets could be managed to simultaneously benefit the space program (i.e. meet
NASA's needs), support Russia's economic transition (i.e. meet DoS's needs),
have no negative security ramifications (i.e. meet DOD's needs), and provide the
U.S. low cost products and services (i.e. meet industry's needs). The U.S. must
not pass up realizing so many concurrent benefits just because of difficulties in
coordinating activities. Even if one does not accept that Russian space
cooperation provides many mutual benefits, it still makes sense to coordinate all
economic "aid" to Russia, including support to the space industry. This can be
accomplished most effectively by a central body for managing all Russian space
interactions that is responsible for creating projects consistent with the broader
U.S. program to assist Russia's economic transition.
As stated by U.S. Representative John Dingell of Michigan, "this is our
moment - our chance to help transform the new republics of the former Soviet
Union into political and economic allies, so that our nation might never again
have to divert so much of our precious domestic resources toward preparation
158 P. Kraljic, "The Economic Gap Separating East and West", The McKinsey Ouarterly,
Spring 1990, pp. 66 & 69.
159 B. Lambeth, Senior Defense Analyst at Rand, "Foster Russian Democracy, Don't Hinder
It", Viewpoint, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 23, 1992, p. 9.
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for war" 160 . It is particularly critical that the U.S. focus on transforming the
Russian space industry because of the many military applications of space
systems. The Russian's desperate need for financial and business assistance
means that joint activities with Western partners can have tremendous impacts
on the viability of particular enterprises and consequently the overall industry
structure. The Russian space industry is presently undergoing a substantial
consolidation due to declining domestic spending on space activities. Through a
coordinated U.S. effort in support of certain sectors of the Russian space
industry, the U.S. could mold the industry along the lines of its national
interests. The incredible leverage of foreign currency in Russia makes it possible
to implement such a strategy at a relatively low cost to the U.S.. For example
when converted at present exchange rates, the total Russian space budget is less
than $25 million. So by strategically placing purchases on the order of $10-$20
million, the U.S. could greatly influence which sectors of the Russian industry
survive and which are pruned away in the shake-out. Obviously, it is in
America's interest to see threatening military capabilities pruned away and
capabilities of direct commercial value to the U.S. supported. Implementing such
a national level strategic investment approach in Russia requires the type of top
level coordination and direction that only an executive level council can provide.
Thus, realizing the important foreign policy goal of transforming the Russian
space industry into a friendly and supportive partner requires that cooperative
activities with Russia be coordinated by a central policy making body.
The final foreign policy objective that would be better managed by a
national coordination council is control of technology transfer, both for defense
and commercial reasons. The international COCOM system, formed in the Cold
War era, is hopelessly out of date and needs a thorough reviewl 61 . This has
already begun to some extent but further reforms in both domestic and
international technology control regimes are necessary. Separating the control of
military technology in the State Department and of commercial technology in the
Commerce Department is becoming increasingly untenable. There are too many
dual-use technologies in the space field to make such a distinction meaningful. A
160 J. Dingell, "Russians Need Our Capitalist Expertise and Our Money", Con essional
Record, Vol. 138, No. 23, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, February 25, 1992, p. E-409.
161 W. Wirin, U.S. Laws and Policies Restricting Soviet Space Opportunities in the United
States, Space Commerce Corporation Memorandum, March 16, 1990, p. 1.
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better approach would be to have a single agency responsible for all export
licensing from the United States. But short of this unlikely development, central
coordination would provide more consistent technology controls. Only an
executive council with broad national interests in mind can possibly weigh-off
the manifold commercial and security technology transfer concerns against the
possible benefits to the nation. Therefore, to assure that cooperative projects are
implemented in an appropriate manner supportive of foreign policy goals, to
allow for simultaneous pursuit of several national objectives, to manage the
strategic restructuring of the Russian space industry, and to support a uniform
approach to controlling technology transfer, it is necessary to have national level
coordination of Russian space policy. Without such coordination through an
executive level council, the complex foreign policy benefits of cooperating with
the Russian space industry will have little chance of being fully realized.
Enhance Industrial Competitiveness
A national coordination council would also play an important role in
balancing competing domestic viewpoints on the use of Russian assets for
stimulating U.S. industrial competitiveness. As discussed in the previous
chapter, some Russian systems and technologies represent little threat to
domestic producers and therefore their use enjoys wide support in the U.S..
Other Russian products however, pose significant competitive threats to some
American firms and therefore allowing their entry into the market has both
supporters and detractors in U.S. industry. A top level coordination council is
needed in the former case only to make sure that all government policies are
clearly defined and widely understood. However, when some sector of the
domestic industry is threatened by allowing in Russian competition, top level
coordination becomes critical for guaranteeing that policy decisions are
consistent with broad national interests. Assuring appropriate use of Russian
products in the former category is relatively easy. As the head of the Russian
Space Agency has stated, "it is not help we need from the West, but simply that
they recognize us as equal commercial partners" 162. With clear policies on export
regulations and governmental rules for utilizing foreign assets, individual
organizations can be set free to exploit whatever Russian capabilities they feel
162 Y. Koptev, "A Roof In Space for the Common European Home - Now We Can Build It
Together", Izvestiya, Union Edition, October 8, 1991, p. 2.
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would improve their competitiveness. The government could also play a more
proactive role in facilitating contact with Russian space enterprises to assure that
U.S. industry makes full use of Russian assets. Such governmental support
would be consistent with U.S. policy to assist strategic sectors of the economy in
maintaining their international competitiveness. How NASA might perform
such a role will be discussed in the next section. But the really important need
for a national coordination council arises when Russian entry into the U.S.
market could assist competitiveness in some sectors of the domestic industry and
harm it in others.
The debate over Russian participation in the international launch services
market is a case in point. The question is whether allowing Russian launch
vehicles into the market would benefit or injure the U.S. space industry as a
whole. U.S. launch vehicle manufacturers would be harmed so their supporters
in the administration insist that the Russians must be banned from the market to
protect American interests163. U.S. firms have taken even a harder line against
permitting Russian launch services competition than the Europeans who stand to
lose much more since their Ariane vehicle already dominates the marketl64. On
the other hand, satellite manufacturers and other launch service users argue that
access to low cost Russian transportation systems would produce lower in-orbit
costs for U.S. satellites making them more competitive in the world market.
Since no top level council exists for weighing the validity of these competing
claims, the U.S. policy has been erratic, approving some Russian launch requests
while denying others. There is no consistency in U.S. policy making companies
apprehensive to invest in projects that involve use of Russian vehicles, possibly
foregoing substantial opportunities to improve their competitiveness.
U.S. launch vehicle manufacturers argue that Russian enterprises present
"unfair" competition because they receive state subsidies that allow them to sell
launch services for less than U.S. manufacturers. This "fairness" argument
appeals to many in the administration who still believe that international
competition occurs in a free market. In fact all countries subsidize their space
system manufacturers in one way or another and due to limited resources, the
163 J. Rockefeller, U.S. Senator, "U.S. Firms Must Be Shielded", Space News.
November 2-9, 1992, pp. 19 & 20.
164 P. de Selding, "ESA Ministers Go Easy on Proton Marketing", Space News,
November 16-22, 1992, p. 24.
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Russian government tends to do less subsidizing than most. These types of
"fairness" arguments have led the U.S. government to initiate trade talks with
Russia to establish guidelines for "fair" pricing of launch vehicles. Presumably,
if these talks determined that the Russians really could produce launch vehicles
for only one fifth the cost of U.S. manufacturers, they would be allowed to charge
only one fifth the price. But that will certainly not happen. What will most likely
result is an international fixing of launch prices that forces the Russians to charge
higher amounts than needed so that Western firms can retain most of the market.
Such a solution sacrifices potential cost savings to launch service users in the
name of "fairness" without weighing the overall effect on U.S. competitiveness.
A far better approach would be to recognize that "fairness" has nothing to do
with the debate. The U.S. has a national objective to support the competitiveness
of its domestic industry and Russian entry into the market should be allowed
only if its net effect is to support this as well as other U.S. national goals. Only an
executive level council that can weigh the effects on different national objectives
is in a position to make an informed decision on which policy should be pursued.
Improve Space Program Efficiency
The objective to improve space program efficiency is relatively straight
forward and its pursuit rests almost entirely within NASA's institutional
purview. Consequently, there is little role that a high level executive council
need play in this area. It is in NASA's best interest (and in the best interest of
other space system users) to insure that they obtain access to the best space
technologies and systems at the lowest possible cost. Certainly NASA does not
always perform its programs for the lowest cost, but this is more a result of
operational rather than strategic problems. The agency fully recognizes the value
of lowering expenses yet its poor cost control mechanisms often allow expenses
to get out of control on individual programs. There are only a few organizations
capable of improving the space program's efficiency and it is in their own best
interest to pursue this objective. As a result. narrow agency and national goals
converge in this area and there is little need for executive level coordination.
In conclusion it is essential that an executive level council be formed to
create and maintain a national perspective in Russian space cooperation,
particularly in supporting foreign policy and industrial competitiveness goals.
This council could also coordinate space cooperation with nations besides Russia
but its authority should be confined to the space area due to its specialized needs
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and issues. Without such a body, obtaining consistent and well coordinated
policy over time is impossible. Besides coordinating policy between agencies
and overseeing the interagency review process, the council would also provide
direction to individual agencies on how to implement activities with the Russian
space industry to be more responsive to national needs. Thus, in the case of
NASA, the council could specify the need to infuse capital into Russian and to
support particular Russian organizations to achieve foreign policy and
competitiveness goals.
4.1.2 Broaden NASA's Mission Statement
In the past, NASA like most other government agencies has taken a very
narrow view of its organizational mission. The space agency is responsible for
exploring and utilizing space in the most effective manner but has considered
any foreign or industrial policy ramifications of its work to be of only secondary
importance. To meet the ever more global and commercial challenges of space
operations, it is essential that NASA abandon this limited view of its mission and
accept responsibility for utilizing space to advance broader national goals. A
broader agency perspective is required to make NASA's programs consistent
with the demands that will be placed on them by the newly formed executive
council. NASA's extensive involvement in a diverse range of space activities
makes it uniquely qualified to take a national perspective in managing space
ventures. The highest level policy decisions that trade-off foreign policy,
commercial and space program concerns against each other would of course be
decided by the national council discussed in the previous section. But this
council alone is incapable of assuring that the implementation of space activities
is consistent with national objectives. As the one who carries out most space
projects, NASA must also recognize the importance of promoting multiple
objectives and restructure its organization to be responsive to these needs. The
national council can provide NASA guidance on which objectives are most
important in particular areas but it should not be expected to micro-manage
NASA to assure that proper weighting of these objectives is obtained in its
programs. For example, the council may conclude that transitioning the Russian
industry to a capitalistic and nonmilitary basis is more important than obtaining
short-term technology benefits for the U.S.. Consequently, it may direct NASA to
make sure that its efforts weigh these objectives accordingly. NASA must then
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decide whether by working with the RSA they are supporting the status quo and
consequently stifling the incentives to transition the Russian industry. Although
interfacing through the RSA may be the best approach for obtaining access to
Russian space technologies, it could also be adversely affecting the industry's
transition. NASA must understand the inter-related effects of its cooperative
space activities on both national objectives and the Russian industry well enough
so that it can make informed decisions on how best to implement its programs.
The agency must also possess a grasp of national objectives so that it can use its
intimate knowledge of the space industry to effectively advise and support the
national policy making council.
To instill broader national perspectives throughout NASA, it is necessary
that the agency improve its interface with external government organizations
and better diffuse national goals down to its program managers. International
cooperation and its inherently inter-related effects can not be effectively dealt
with without top level support from the NASA administrator and other NASA
executives. Specific recommendations for improving NASA's administrative and
policy making structure for Russian cooperation will be discussed in Section 4.2.
The agency must also begin to take longer-term perspectives in joint projects.
This is difficult with the annual budget cycle to which all government agencies
are subjected, but when dealing with international partners, year-to-year
commitments are simply too short-sighted to be effective. Finally, NASA must
recognize its emerging role to help the U.S. space industry remain competitive.
"Industrial policy" was for many years a dirty word in Washington, but
successful application of this concept in Japan and Europe have changed the
minds of many Americans. The new administration recognizes an important role
for government in helping to support industrial competitiveness. The space
industry will certainly be affected by this development. Consequently, as the
lead agency in the space field, NASA must be ready to take on a much greater
role in promoting the commercialization of space and in supporting the future
competitiveness of the domestic industry.
4.1.3 Streamline the Policy Making Process
In addition to the reforms for improving the effectiveness of the policy
making process that were discussed above, there are also steps which can be
taken to improve the efficiency of the process. The complexity of the project
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approval cycle in the U.S. has led to relatively slow progress in initiating new
cooperative programs, thus greatly frustrating the Russians. The result has been
that Russian enterprises are turning more and more to Europe as their partner of
choice in joint space activities. The Russians feel that Americans "are all talk and
no action. Hundreds of Americans have visited Russia and drunk a lot of Vodka
but there have been few agreements"' 65 . America's slow response to Russian
proposals to cooperate is mainly a result of the its convoluted policy making
process that simply cannot react quickly to changing situations. All potential
projects are treated as if they're unique requiring approval by dozens of
government agencies and months to process. Large multi-million dollar projects
that dramatically affect foreign affairs are treated in the same manner as projects
of a few thousand dollars with no political or commercial impacts. It does not
matter if a nearly identical project was approved before, the entire review
process is triggered for each new project regardless of past actions. The
executive oversight and interagency review processes were established when
international ventures (particularly with the Russians) were unusual and they
have changed little over the intervening years. To improve their efficiency in the
new environment of more routine international cooperation, it is recommended
that cooperative projects be broken down into at least two levels for approval
purposes. For example, expensive, unprecedented, or highly political projects
could be reviewed by the coordination council discussed above to determine a
policy on utilizing Russian assets in a particular area. However, for more routine
projects similar to those undertaken in the past that entail smaller dollar values
and fewer political ramifications, the interagency review process could be put to
use to provide a streamlined review. There could even be multiple levels of
interagency review so that the most routine projects are only examined by a few
key agencies allowing them to be rapidly processed. If Russian cooperation in
space is ever to become more than an oddity, it is imperative that procedures be
established for approving new projects in a timely manner without requiring the
concurrence of dozens of bureaucrats on every single venture.
165 M. Sinelshikov, Department Chief, Russian Space Agency, interviewed in his Moscow
office, October 18, 1992.
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4.2 NASA's Implementation Approach
The importance of NASA taking the broad policy perspective outlined in
Section 4.1.2 is driven by the diverse demands now placed on international space
projects. In determining the best approach for implementing its cooperative
space activities, NASA should focus on the same three objectives that drive the
national policy making process. The first objective of improving space program
effectiveness has of course always been pursued by NASA. However the
importance of the latter two objectives, concerning foreign and industrial
relations, has been recognized only recently and therefore their application in
guiding the agency's planning is much less well established. For NASA to create
international space projects that are responsive to broad national needs, this
situation must change. Foreign and industrial concerns should take their place
alongside of the space program's technical needs in deciding how to pursue
international cooperation. NASA must avoid falling into the trap of pursuing
cooperation as an end in itself just because it seems like the right thing to do. The
agency should focus on specific, well defined objectives in structuring all of its
cooperative activities and two of its most important objectives should be to
further foreign policy goals and to support the domestic industry.
This section will discuss how NASA's present strategy for implementing
cooperative activities could be modified to become more responsive to national
objectives. First a point-by-point critique of the space agency's current guidelines
for structuring cooperative projects is presented along with recommendations for
improving these rules of engagement. Included in this critique is a discussion of
the present trends in the world space community and what they may mean for
NASA. The section concludes by recommending a new implementation strategy
that makes greater use of private companies as the interface between
international space programs. By utilizing this new strategy, it is argued that
broader national objectives will be achieved in a more efficient and sustainable
manner. As discussed previously, NASA has not been completely blind to the
changing role of space cooperation in the international environment. Realizing
the increasing importance of cooperation with the Russians and the need to
consider broader national interests, NASA designated a special Associate
Administrator position for Russian Affairs in 1992 and placed Samuel Keller in
this post. The purpose of this reorganization was to elevate coordination for
Russian policy out of the bowels of the External Relations Division and into
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direct contact with the NASA Administrator. Unfortunately, another
reorganization only a few months later removed such high level oversight of
Russian policy relegating it again to its old position three steps removed from top
NASA management. Although at least some in NASA management recognize
the need to change their approach toward international cooperation, sustaining
any long-term improvements has been difficult.
4.2.1 Reevaluating NASA's Guidelines for Cooperation
Several of NASA's guidelines for conducting international space projects
that were presented in Section 3.2 require some degree of modification. The
emerging demands on cooperative space activities have resulted in these old
rules of engagement simply becoming out of date. The following assessment will
address the five guidelines requiring the most alterations, recommending ways
in which they may be improved. The focus of this discussion will be on the
implementation effects of these guidelines as opposed to their project selection
effects that were discussed in the previous chapter. The five principles to be
evaluated are: no exchange of funds, clean interfaces, control of the critical path,
project-oriented agreements, and government led cooperation.
No or Minimal Exchange of Funds
Traditionally, NASA has expected each party to a cooperative agreement to
fully fund its own portion of the project. The rationale for this requirement was
very simple. A major justification for pursuing joint space activities was to
reduce costs, and in the first order analysis one could hardly expect to save
money by sending it overseas. Later as protecting U.S. jobs became more of an
issue to the space program, it was also argued that financial transfers would lead
to domestic jobs being shipped overseas. Because of these two reasons, NASA
has long followed a "no exchange of funds" policy in its international projects. In
conducting its Spacelab work with ESA, its Shuttle manipulator arm project with
Canada and its Space Station Freedom program with several other nations
including Japan, all partners have provided their contributions to the joint
activities free of charge. However, as with any general rule there have been
exceptions. For example, NASA did purchase additional Spacelab modules and
Shuttle manipulator arms from foreign suppliers following the cost free supply
of the first unit of these components. These follow-on purchases were seen as a
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low cost means to obtain additional hardware and were only secondary to the
central cooperative arrangement. Of course the greatest exceptions to the "no
exchange of funds" rule have been made with the Russians. NASA currently has
several contracts providing millions of dollars in funding to some half a dozen
Russian organizations. These projects are intended as a temporary stop-gap to
help maintain the Russian industry during a time of turmoil. Although NASA
has allowed its "no exchange of funds" policy to bend, it has not yet abandoned it
and intends to return to this mode of operation as soon as possible166.
Unfortunately, NASA's desire to return to the good old days when all
international partners made their contributions free of charge is myopic and
neglects the irreversible changes that have occurred in the world space
community. NASA should not be planning to revert back to its former practices
but should be expanding its use of new tools such as financial support of foreign
partners. As previously discussed, any meaningful Russian cooperation is
impossible without the exchange of funds because of the desperate financial
conditions in the former Soviet Union. And why would one want to avoid
providing financial support to the Russians when such assistance is exactly what
is required to attain many important foreign policy goals? The ability to
exchange funds allows NASA much greater flexibility in structuring its
cooperative programs permitting it to make full use of its partner's comparative
advantages. The agency should no longer be constrained, as in a barter
economy, to only cooperative exchanges in which each partner must supply
equal contributions. It should exploit the substantial cost savings that can be
realized by procuring products at their lowest prices worldwide. For Russian
cooperation in particular and for international cooperation in general, NASA
should seize the opportunity to leave behind the unnecessary constraints of its
old "no exchange of funds" rule.
There are two main reasons why NASA is reluctant to cast away its "no
exchange of funds" constraint. The first is that since the agency is funded by U.S.
tax dollars, it feels that it has a responsibility to feed those dollars back into the
American economy. As a government agency, NASA does have important
national responsibilities but they cannot be effectively met using a simplistic rule
of thumb such as "avoid giving money to foreigners". The agency's responsibility
166 D. Jacobs, International Relations Division, NASA Headquarters, interviewed in his
Washington office, January 19, 1993.
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is to promote the three national objectives enumerated above and if supporting
these objectives requires funding overseas partners, it should be done. The other
reason why NASA continues to avoid overseas purchases is because of their
potential negative impact on U.S. industry. When products are bought from an
overseas instead of a domestic supplier, the immediate effect is a loss in U.S. jobs.
Accordingly, some restraint in utilizing foreign sources may be necessary,
especially considering America's present emphasis on improving its economic
performance. But in the long-run, the ability to purchase low cost foreign assets
can help to improve America's international competitiveness and consequently to
create American jobs. As stated by Senator Barbara Mikulski, "the goal of any
joint venture in space exploration or space science with members of the former
Soviet Union should be the generation of additional U.S. jobs"167. NASA must
not unilaterally rule out continued purchases of Russian assets but should direct
its purchases toward those areas where its needs as well as those of the U.S.
industry and worker can simultaneously be met.
Clean Interfaces and Minimal Technology Transfer
Related to the "no exchange of funds" rule is NASA's traditional
requirement for clean technical and managerial interfaces. Each party to a
cooperative agreement is expected to possess or develop all of the technologies
that are necessary to implement its share of the project. As far as possible,
interfaces are to be kept simple and well-defined to minimize managerial
complexity and technological contact between foreign partners. Under this
approach, the joint design or development of space systems is essentially
prohibited. This principle for cooperating was established years ago to limit the
transfer of advanced technologies to Eastern Bloc nations and to protect
America's technological lead. The first of these justifications has vanished along
with the Eastern Bloc and the second has faded with America's decline as the
undisputed leader in space technologies. NASA has begun to recognize the
limitations of its requirement for clean interfaces and has "for the first time ever,
officially entered into technology-related collaboration with Russia"168. But its
167 E. Pianin, "Russians Offer to Sell, Lease Spacecraft", Washington Post,
February 22, 1992, p. A-6.
168 S. Leskov, "America and Russia Have Signed an Agreement, But They Don't Know How
They Will Finance It", Izvestiya, Morning Edition, May 19, 1992, pp. 1 & 8.
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guiding principle of minimizing technology transfer and striving for clean
interfaces wherever possible remains in force. There is a benefit in keeping
international management interfaces as simple as possible but the costs of rigidly
clinging to this principle can often exceed the benefits.
In the ever more integrated global economy, multinational corporations
who regularly do business across national borders are becoming commonplace.
This situation is particularly evident in high technology industries, including the
aerospace industry169. Through internal movements within these global firms,
many of the antiquated barriers to technology transfer from the Cold War era
have been circumvented. A global economy facilitates the international
movement of technology making the requirement to use exclusively domestic
capabilities overly restrictive. Instead of attempting to ban technology transfer,
an impossible task in the world's inter-related economy, NASA should try to
manage technology flows to the benefit of U.S. interests170 . Cooperative projects
should be strategically planned to allow U.S. firms and organizations access to
foreign technologies that can improve their effectiveness and competitiveness in
the international market. If more complex interfaces are required to obtain access
to these technologies of critical competitive importance, then so be it. The
Russians with their highly advanced space technologies are one of the most
promising potential partners in this area. The state of technology continuously
advances with contributions coming from nations all over the globe. The U.S. is
no longer the world's sole source of advanced space technologies. NASA must
cast aside its fears of compromising U.S. technological leadership through
openness to foreign technologies, since the benefits to such openness far exceed
the possible costs. The real threat to U.S. leadership is that our country may
chose to isolate itself from external technological developments preferring
instead to rely exclusively upon our own means. Such a short-sighted and
nationalistic approach would certainly seal our fate as a non-competitor in the
emerging global marketplace for space products and services.
169 J. Logsdon & M. Laub, The Globalization of Technology: Implications for the Future in
Space Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, March 1992.
170 K. Pendersen, "Thoughts on International Space Cooperation and Interests in the Post
Cold War World", Space Policy, August 1992, p. 236.
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U.S. Control of the Critical Path
The need to demonstrate American leadership has always been of utmost
importance in all joint space ventures involving the U.S.. Typically, the U.S. will
plan an international space project, taking the central position for itself and
offering ancillary positions to its international partners. When the U.S.
completely dominated the world space community such an approach may have
been appropriate but its time has passed. In the future, to truly reap the
economic benefits that are possible with international cooperation, NASA will be
forced to cede some control of critical path elements to its foreign partners.
There simply are not that many projects that can be structured with one party
holding a completely dominate position while still providing mutually beneficial
contributions to all those involved. The managerial and economic realities are
catching up with NASA in its cooperative activities and it will soon have to face
the fact that demanding a privileged position in all projects is untenable. A new
definition of leadership is needed based upon the concept of a leader among
equals, not the present paternalistic model. It is pure arrogance to expect other
nations, possessing advanced technologies and a desire to support their own
industrial competitiveness, to always accept inferior roles in joint activities. To
accomplish the ambitious projects planned for the future, NASA will have to
learn to treat its international partners more like peers and less like lackeys.
There are of course some very good reasons why NASA prefers to control
the critical path in its cooperative projects. By producing the critical elements
itself, NASA can assure that a project will continue even if all its international
partners unexpectantly withdraw. The U.S. is not required to put much trust in
its allies since their contributions provide only secondary functions. For example
on the Space Station Freedom program, if either the Japanese or Europeans
decided not to provide their modules it would lessen the capabilities of the
station but the program could still go on. The trust demanded in such a
relationship is therefore quite small. But maintaining control of the critical path
does not come cheaply. NASA is forced to assume responsibility for producing
all infrastructural elements which often includes duplicating capabilities
produced by its partners. The net result is that NASA's risk is reduced but at the
expense of increasing the overall project cost. In the future, as more equal
projects are formed with international partners, the costs of maintaining control
of all critical elements will eventually exceed the benefits from reduced risks.
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Instead of rigidly requiring U.S. control of the critical path at all costs, a better
approach would be to use risk management to reduce uncertainties in the most
cost effective manner. Multiple sourcing of hardware or establishing levels of
success could be used to manage risk instead of trying to remove it. Keeping
NASA's international space activities as low risk as possible is a worthy goal but
there are also other important goals, such as minimizing costs, that should not be
overlooked. With large projects including many international partners, paying
for all critical elements is infeasible. NASA must learn to accept and manage the
additional risk that are unavoidable when one fully exploits the advantages that
space cooperation can afford. To better control risks NASA should strive to
develop long-term relationships with its international partners built upon trust
and mutual respect. Only through managed interdependence will the full
benefits of international cooperation be garnered without unduly aggravating the
risks to any nation.
Short-Term Project-Oriented Agreements
Unlike the three guidelines discussed above that have experienced many
recent exceptions, NASA's mandate that its international cooperative activities
consist of specific, clearly defined projects remains in full force to this day. The
entire agency is managed as a group of projects so it is not surprising that its
international activities are run in a similar fashion. By creating projects that are
supportive of the agency's general mission, NASA is able to distribute its work
among many different project managers for planning and implementation
purposes. NASA sees project-oriented management as the most efficient
approach for partitioning its work and in controlling its diverse space activities.
This type of management approach is widely used in technical organizations
where objectives can be well defined by top management and flowed down to
individual project managers for implementation. It was developed to an art form
during the Apollo moon missions whose success was due in large part to
NASA's creation of the world's most sophisticated management control system.
Although project-oriented management was the perfect approach for getting
men to the moon, it has serious disadvantages for promoting the
internationalization of space activities.
The short-term and narrow perspectives of individual project managers
make them unaware of the many broader possibilities from space cooperation.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, by focusing only on the needs of
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particular projects, higher level national objectives can be sacrificed. For
example, due to a project manager's desire to minimize his own project's cost
and complexity, he may avoid utilizing foreign systems that are only of marginal
benefit to him but in the aggregate could provide great benefits to the nation. To
overcome such limitations, industry has long recognized the need to form
strategic alliances with international partners to make full use of foreign
comparative strengths. Unlike project-oriented agreements, strategic alliances
entail long-term cooperation in broad areas and do not require that all possible
benefits be identified upfront. They allow for one partner to "trade" its
comparative strengths in one area for a partner's assistance in another area.
These "package deals" can help participates to take full advantage of their
partner's capabilities without the undo restriction of balancing each individual
project. ESA's internal relationship provides a good example of how a strategic
alliance in international space activities can be successful1 71 . NASA on the other
hand insists on cooperating only on a project-by-project basis even in such clearly
long-term activities as the joint development of Space Station Freedom. To
obtain more effective cooperation in the future, NASA should follow the lead of
industry and the Europeans in creating long-term strategic alliances. These
arrangements provide the only way to fully realize the pay-off from joint space
activities. The diverse and often national level benefits from international
cooperation are simply beyond the view of individual project managers. NASA
must recognize this and begin to take a longer-term and more flexible outlook in
structuring its international space activities.
Government Led Cooperation
The final NASA guideline for cooperating that needs to be reevaluated is
the agency's traditional insistence on directly working only with government
organizations. As a government agency, NASA is more comfortable dealing
with other governmental bodies because it believes that they operate in a similar
fashion and under similar political constraints. However as previously
mentioned, assuming too many similarities between foreign space agencies and
NASA can be misleading. This is particularly true for the Russian Space Agency
171 J. Logsdon & J. Fabian, International Cooperation in Space: New Opportunities. New
Approaches, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University and the Association
of Space Explorers, April, 1992, p. 10.
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and the centrally controlled space industry that it directs. Nonetheless,
governments are uniquely capable of providing national commitment and they
have the extensive resources necessary to undertake the type of long-term and
expensive projects that have been the mainstay of international cooperation. For
these reasons, NASA has always sought government-to-government agreements
and rarely involved the private sector (except for the scientific community) in its
cooperative activities. Yet the growing worldwide emphasis on economic
competition and the commercialization of space is forcing NASA to reevaluate its
position. Space is no longer the exclusive domain of governments, supporting
commercial space interests and their international competitiveness has now
become very important. Accordingly NASA, as well as other government
agencies, should begin to consider the economic and trade implications of their
proposed joint activities, taking care to consult industrial leaders to assure their
needs are met. They should also consider cooperating with other potential
international partners besides government organizations (i.e. private companies)
since these enterprises possess the value-adding capabilities and their prosperity
is critical to expanding the commercial utilization of space.
The private sector will play an increasingly important role in the space
community in the coming years and NASA should not cut itself off from this
valuable resource by insisting on cooperating only with government agencies.
The growing importance of economic considerations in space activities will mean
that industrial players will play an ever more significant role both at home and
abroad. At home, NASA's programs will be increasingly judged on how well
they protect and promote the competitiveness of the commercial sector. As a
result, consultations with industry to obtain their advice and support will be a
critical factoring in securing Congressional budget approvals. Abroad, the
growing strength of foreign industrial enterprises will allow them to enter into
extensive, long-term agreements without direct government supervision. Such a
development can already be witnessed by observing the independent activities of
the large Russian enterprise Energia, or the large German firm Kayser-Threde.
Putting the domestic and international trends together, one would expect direct
industry-to-industry contacts to play a greater future role in initiating and
structuring international space activities. Many American business leaders
already have a more internationalist outlook than most government officials as
evidenced by the boom in private international joint ventures. The full
ramifications of this development for the space industry will be discussed in the
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next section. However, outside of the fully commercialized telecommunications
sector, government will continue to play the lead role for a long time. NASA
should take advantage of private initiatives as much as possible but it should
also realize that in most cooperative areas it retains leadership responsibility.
The agency's goal should be to create an environment in which private
international space ventures can prosper. It must not limit itself to working only
with other government agencies but should look for ways to work with foreign
companies so that its interests and those of the domestic industry can be
simultaneously met. In the future, NASA should aim to become industry's
partner in managing international cooperation, not cling to its present role as
industry's customer recognizing only other government agencies as its peers.
4.2.2 The Need for a New Strategy
To overcome NASA's shortcomings in cooperating with the Russians, it is
necessary not only to modify some of the existing guidelines for cooperation, but
to develop an integrated strategy for conducting international activities. The
criticisms and recommendations provided in the previous section represent
separate observations that must be brought together into a coherent strategy if
they are to be effectively implemented. It is fine to say that project-oriented
management and government led cooperation should be de-emphasized, but
what is to take their place? This section will analyze the global trends occurring
in the space community and recommend a revised strategy for NASA that is
more compatible with the new international milieu and more responsiveness to
America's national interests.
The most common strategy to date for conducting international cooperation
in space has been to structure joint activities using government-to-government
agreements. Using this approach, commitments are made between government
agencies in participating countries who then provide all interfacing functions
with their national industries to develop the necessary hardware. However, as
shown in Figure 4.1, this is not the only possible way in which to structure
international joint ventures. The traditional approach is shown as Strategy 1 in
the figure below but there are additional possibilities identified as Strategies 2-4
that should also be considered. For example, instead of obtaining access to
foreign space capabilities using another nation's government as an intermediary,
NASA could contract directly with foreign industrial enterprises to purchase
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their products. Alternatively, NASA could use U.S. companies as the interface
with overseas firms either through government or private initiation. These latter
cooperative approaches are becoming increasingly popular with greater
emphasis in the space community on commercial considerations. The
implications of this trend on NASA's strategy for cooperating with the Russians
will be analyzed in the following paragraphs. By assessing the pros and cons of
each of these possible strategies, insights into how NASA may improve its
interchange with the Russians will be derived.
Figure 4.1
Strategies for Accessing Russian Space Assets
United States Russia
: - ...- . . .'. '.
- Government Govermen
The conventional strategy for conducting international space activitiesparticipating country. As is well known, this is not the case between the U.S. andpart of "i ndustry" because they possess many Industryal functions.
The conventional strategy for conducting international space activities
(Strategy 1) has been very effective for scientific and exploration projects but its
potential utility in more demanding areas such as technology sharing is limited.
To truly have the symmetric organizational structure shown in Figure 4.1, it is
necessary that the government-industry relationship be the same in each
participating country. As is well known, this is not the caA).e between the U.S. and
Russia. The government and industry in America are distinctly separate entities
while their functions remain intertwined in Russia. Consequently, it is not
completely accurate to consider enterprises such as NPO Energia exclusively as
part of "industry" because they possess many quasi-governmental functions.
The danger with this strategy is that U.S. government agencies have the tendency
to simply assume that their Russian counterparts occupy similar positions in the
hierarchy to their own. This has been particularly problematic for NASA in its
relationship with the Russian Space Agency (RSA). Unlike in the U.S., all civilian
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space power in Russia is not concentrated in a single agency. The RSA is far less
influential and well established in its space program than is NASA in the U.S.
program. But to utilize conventional government-to-government agreements,
NASA requires a foreign space agency similar to itself so it has either deluded
itself in overestimating the authority of the RSA or used its influence to try to
form the RSA in its own image. Both of these actions are the result of an attempt
to force-fit a strategy where it really does not apply. The fundamental
institutional mismatch between NASA and the RSA cannot be overlooked. The
RSA does not have complete control over all Russian space assets. NASA must
recognize this and broaden its contacts in Russia to assure that it is dealing with
those organizations that truly control the capabilities of interest and not with
those governmental agencies who are only theoretically in charge.
Through years of cooperation with the Europeans, Japanese and others on
such programs as the Shuttle and Space Station Freedom, NASA has developed a
detailed approach for conducting international projects. This long-established
procedure is now being used to implement most cooperative activities with the
Russians172. Government organizations play the central role in this approach by
creating Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) that establish national
commitment and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that specify the
responsibilities of each nation's space agency in joint activities. Not surprisingly,
NASA would like to continue to use its well developed and largely successful
procedures for conducting international projects. However, these procedures
were developed for coordinating scientific and exploratory space projects and
their applicability in broader cooperative areas and in the changing global
environment is highly questionable. Governments are no longer the only players
in the space arena and they are no longer in sole control of their nation's space
capabilities, particularly in the former Soviet states. In the future, NASA must
not lock itself into cooperating only with government partners simply because of
bureaucratic inertia. The agency should consider more direct contacts with
Russian industry as is being done by other agencies and companies both inside
and outside of the space community.
172 Implementing Agreement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency of the Russian Federation
on Human Space Flight Cooperation, signed by D. Goldin & Y. Koptev, October 5,1992.
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The most straight-forward strategy for accessing former Soviet space assets
is to go right to their source in Russian industry (Strategy 2). This avoids the
complexity of dealing with the government as an intermediary as well as the
uncertainty of whether the government is truly in control of a particular area. It
also assures that financial support gets into the hands of the people who need it
most and is not siphoned off as it goes through the bureaucratic channels.
Because of these reasons, the Europeans are directly funding several Russian
institutes and enterprises to conduct work for them without using the RSA as an
intermediary 173. NASA has also begun to provide direct funding to Russian
institutes and enterprises, in particular to NPO Energia and Lavochkin's Babakin
Research Center. There are however several reasons why such a direct approach
is not very desirable. First of all, it requires that NASA establish working
relationships with many organizations in the former Soviet Union instead of just
a single central space agency. This can be very difficult considering the
communication barriers, diverse business practices, and the general ignorance of
each others' organizations that exist between the U.S. and Russia. Consequently,
there is a tendency to latch-on to lower level organizations and use them as
surrogates for a top level coordinating agency. Just such a situation has occurred
between NASA and NPO Energia. To minimize the need for contacts all over
Russia, NASA tries to utilize NPO Energia as an interface to the rest of the
Russian industry. But lacking any responsibility to the industry as a whole,
Energia uses its privileged position to monopolize NASA contracts for its own
people leaving other enterprises with little Western support. This situation is
neither fair to the rest of the industry nor in NASA's best interests.
A second important downside of the direct approach is that top level
governmental commitment is not given to joint ventures. Only the individual
enterprises involved in a particular project are responsible for its completion, not
the entire Russian government, hence there is a much greater risk of default.
There is also the added uncertainty of the legal foundation for agreements
between NASA and non-governmental entities in the former U.S.S.R.. Are
Russian enterprises able to enter into legally binding contracts with foreign
governments and if so, who is responsible for their enforcement? The lack of
dearly defined rules in this area makes NASA understandably apprehensive in
pursuing the direct strategy. Finally, the idea of "giving away tax dollars" to
173 "Russia Gets ESA Contracts", International Space Report, Spaceflight June 1992, p. 182.
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individual Russians strikes many in the U.S. as inappropriate and politically
questionable. NASA would far prefer to fund the Russian government (or
possibly U.S. firms) for particular tasks and have them obtain whatever assets are
necessary from the Russian industry. Such approaches are more consistent with
NASA's normal modes of operation and therefore are subject to less internal
resistance within the agency.
A more politically acceptable strategy in the long-run for obtaining direct
access to Russian space assets is for NASA to use U.S. industry as the
intermediary (Strategy 3). This strategy has several important advantages over
direct government procurement from Russian enterprises. First of all, it allows
NASA to work primarily with its domestic contractors with whom it has a long
and well-developed relationship. This greatly simplifies the government's
interface role placing most of the burden for establishing effective working
relationships with the Russians on private firms. Industry, with its fewer
bureaucratic constraints and more internationalist perspective, is in a much
better position than NASA to make the dramatic organizational changes needed
to accommodate the Russians. Secondly, a major objective of cooperation is to
expose the Russians to Western business practices and this can only be done by
having them work with U.S. firms and not with government agencies. Thirdly,
another important objective is to transfer Russian technologies to U.S. firms to
improve their international competitiveness. Technology transfer to U.S. firms
will be greatest if they have direct contact with Russian enterprises and do not
have to go through a government middleman. For all of theses reasons,
government use of private industry as an interface to the Russian space industry
has become quite common. For example, NASA is using Rockwell International
to procure the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Assembly from NPO Energia
that is needed to make the Space Shuttle compatible with the Mir docking
system174. NASA could have purchased this hardware itself but it believes that
the technical interchange that will result from having Rockwell as the procuring
agent will help to make the project more successful. Similarly, SDIO has used
Rocketdyne (a division of Rockwell International) and Space Power, Inc. as
purchasing agents for the Topaz 2 reactors that it has bought from the
174 A. Lawler, "Rockwell, NPO Energia To Build Docking Device for Shuttle, Mir",
Space News, September 14-21, 1992, p. 12.
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Russians 175. Both these examples demonstrate the growing trend away from
government-to-government interaction toward industry-to-industry interaction.
Of course there are some negative impacts from utilizing private companies as an
interface with the Russians. One of the most important of these is the additional
costs that are added to a project because of the presence of a private middleman.
If the private company adds no value beyond simply acting as a contracting
agent, the additional costs of utilizing it are generally not worthwhile. However,
if the company has particular technical expertise or is in fact the final destination
for the technology being procured, it will often be worth the additional costs to
obtain more efficient technology transfer or a better final product.
The most progressive strategy for accessing Russian space assets is to allow
private companies in the U.S. to establish joint ventures with Russian enterprises
to supply the technologies and products needed by the American space program
(Strategy 4). These joint ventures would be formed as a result of private
initiatives to increase the competitiveness of individual firms. The government
would be responsible only for creating an environment in which firms are willing
to take the risks of utilizing Russian systems to improve their product lines.
Enhanced American space services that make use of Russian technologies,
components or complete systems would then be available for government
purchase similar to any other products made by the domestic industry. This
differs from the previous strategy by relying on commercial instead of
government leadership in forming and implementing cooperative projects. For it
to be effective, government would have to set consistent policies for the use of
Russian systems so that industry could determine which areas of cooperation
offer the best opportunities for profit. Without consistent government policy,
industry would face the unnecessary political risk of losing its investment in a
joint venture due to changes in policy that post facto disallowed use of particular
Russian capabilities. To avoid such misunderstandings, U.S. government and
industry must work together as a team in establishing which areas of cooperation
are most supportive of national objectives and also offer reasonable possibilities
for successful implementation. By taking this approach, NASA will be able to
manage the top level direction of cooperative activities with the Russians while
still exploiting the advantages that company led cooperation offers.
175 B. Henderson, "Russian Partners to Aid U.S. Firms in Developing Space Reactors",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 22,1992, p. 35.
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There are many reasons for preferring commercial leadership in cooperating
with the Russians. These include most of the benefits that Strategy 3 offers, such
as simplifying the demands on the government bureaucracy, providing greater
business exposure to Russian enterprises, and directly supporting U.S.
commercial needs, as well as a few others. International business relationships
are relatively common and their reliance on private capital makes them strive for
the maximum possible efficiency. To the contrary, government-to-government
agreements are fewer in number, operate in a politically charged environment,
and often suffer from bureaucratic inefficiencies and excessive implementation
costs. Using private incentives to improve the efficiency of economic interactions
is the heart of a capitalistic economy. The Russians are well aware of what can
result from too much reliance on government leadership in economically
important spheres. The U.S. space community must be careful not to fall into a
similar trap. The greater efficiency, flexibility and creativity, as well as the
established international channels and contractual procedures that U.S. business
possesses should be exploited to improve cooperation with the Russians. Only in
this way, can crucial government limitations such as an inability to commit
funding beyond a year at a time or to manage strategic alliances instead of short-
term projects be overcome.
The usefulness of direct corporate contact with Russian enterprises has led
to the worldwide formation of many private joint ventures. However, the lack of
a clearly articulated policy on what type of joint U.S.-Russian products the
government will be willing to purchase has stifled some initiatives. Nonetheless,
dozens of U.S. aerospace companies have initiated joint ventures with Russian
enterprises to help them improve their domestic products. International Space
Technology Inc., a joint venture of Loral Space Systems, a major U.S. satellite
manufacturer, and KB Fakel, the leading Russian producer of electric thrusters,
intends to modify Russian thrusters for use on American satellites and is a
typical example 176. Russian enterprises are also initiating contacts with U.S.
firms to make use of their expertise and financial resources for such projects as
the joint development of an advanced telecommunications system in the former
Soviet states177. And beyond U.S. borders, direct corporate contact with Russian
176 "Russian-U.S. Firm to Sell Novel Satellite Thrusters", Space News. December 6, 1992, p. 6.
177 B. Davis, "Soviets Aim to Find Western Investors for World-Wide Satellite TV Venture",
Wall Street Journal, Friday, March 29, 1991, p. A-12.
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space enterprises is booming. The recent announcement by Aerospatiale, the
European builder of the Ariane launch vehicle, that it has signed 10-20 contracts
with Russian enterprises with a combined value of several million French francs
demonstrates the growing importance of this cooperative approach abroad 178.
There is a clear trend away from governmental leadership in all Russian space
cooperation towards a larger role for industry. In the more traditional areas of
space science and manned exploration, direct government control may continue
to be necessary. But in the newly developing technology and commercial
product areas where competitiveness and foreign policy considerations
dominate, private leadership of cooperative efforts are much more suitable.
NASA must recognize the benefits of utilizing industry as an interface to Russian
enterprises and begin to form partnerships with U.S. firms to more effectively
exploit their abilities. Only through a teaming of efforts between U.S.
government and industry can all of the diverse objectives of Russian space
cooperation be realized in an efficient and productive manner.
4.3 Project Level Implementation Issues
The higher level implementation issues addressed in the two proceeding
sections were driven by developments in the international community as well as
internally imposed limits by America's space policy making apparatus.
Although Russian needs and peculiarities played some role in deriving the
previous recommendations for change, they were not the dominant factor. Both
the NASA and interagency system for conducting international space
cooperation should be restructured to more effectively pursue joint activities
with other nations, regardless of whether Russian participation is involved. The
Russian element adds some additional demands to the need for reform but it is
not the fundamental driver. The situation is quite the opposite for project level
implementation issues. When it comes to the actual planning and
implementation of specific projects with Russian partners, understanding their
unique technical and management structures is of critical importance. The
technical capabilities, political environment, and the entire economic and
industrial system in the former Soviet Union are unlike any with which NASA is
used to working. Consequently, new modes of operating are required if projects
178 "Aerospatiale, Russian Outfits Sign Contracts", Space News, February 8-15, 1993, p. 2.
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are to be implemented in an effective manner. This section will first enumerate
the various approaches that could be used to implement joint projects with the
Russians, discussing their potential strengths and weaknesses. Then an
assessment of the impacts of Russian management practices on the expected
usefulness of each of these approaches will be given. Distinctive Russian needs
and characteristics will be shown to be the dominant factor in determining the
most suitable approach for implementing individual projects. The analysis in the
following paragraphs is concerned primarily with NASA's implementation
needs but since NASA's projects may be conducted through a company interface,
issues of interest to private industrial partners are also addressed.
4.3.1 Approaches to Implementing Cooperative Projects
The types of cooperative projects that could be conducted with the Russians
are quite numerous but they can generally be divided into two main categories:
Research & Development (R&D) and Production projects. The options for
implementing projects in these two categories are very different. Table 4.1 lists in
ascending order of complexity the types of projects that could be undertaken in
each cooperative category. In the R&D category, the lowest level cooperative
projects entail funding Russian enterprises to use existing expertise and
personnel to assess U.S. space systems designs and to suggest how they may be
improved by utilizing Russian capabilities. Low level R&D cooperation could
also include testing of U.S. equipment or models at one of the many capable
Russian experimental facilities. Either one of these approaches would utilize
existing Russian assets for limited purposes over a fixes period of time.
Examples of this type of cooperation are quite common and include most of
NASA's contracts with NPO Energia as well as many initiatives that U.S.
companies are pursuing. The Boeing Company is using this approach
extensively to improve the technology in both its aeronautical and space
systems179. The next level of sophistication in R&D cooperation consists of
licensing existing Russian technology for use in the United States. These project
are more long-term than funding studies or experiments since they may lead to
follow-on production activities. However, they still rely exclusively on existing
Russian capabilities and do not require extensive interaction between U.S. and
179 L. Tucci, "Boeing, Russian Firm Team on Life Support", Space News, Feb. 1-7, 1993, p. 6.
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Russian researchers. Examples of this type of cooperation are less numerous
since they demand greater commitment and greater understanding of Russian
capabilities. Pratt & Whitney's joint venture with NPO Energomash for access to
RD-170 rocket engine technology is one of the most prominent instances of such
cooperation to date18°. The most advanced stage of R&D cooperation involves
the joint conduct of research and development work. Such activities require
integrating the vastly different R&D systems of U.S. and Russian partners. These
projects benefit from the longest-term perspective but also suffer from being the
most complicated and highest risk. Because of these drawbacks, there have been
very few projects of this type, particularly under U.S. government sponsorship.
One notable exception is the Boeing company's recent founding of a technical
research center near Moscow that will employ both Russians and Americans to
jointly develop technologies for commercial aircraft applicationss81 .
Table 4.1 - Approaches to Implementing Cooperative Space Projects
Research & Development Projects Production Projects
* Sponsored Design Reviews/Testing * Hardware Purchases or Sales
* Technology Licensing Agreements * Import/Export to New Markets
* Joint Research & Development * Joint Production Activities
In the production category, the lowest level approach to cooperating is
simply to purchase from, or sell to, the Russians existing space hardware. This
could include anything from individual components such as solar arrays or
batteries up to complete space systems such as launch vehicles or satellites.
Direct sales offer a rapid means for obtaining access to foreign assets with
minimal need to develop elaborate interfaces or to risk long-term investments.
Because of its strong benefits and minor risks, the purchase of Russian hardware
has received great interest in Western nations. For example in the U.S., several
entrepreneurial firms, such as Rimsat Incorporated, are considering the purchase
of Russian telecommunications satellites to provide commercial services in
180 J. Lenorovitz, "Pratt Signs Accord With NPO Energomash", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, November 2, 1992, p. 25.
181 "Russian Technology Draws Boeing to Open Research Center Near Moscow",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 17, 1992, p. 31.
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underdeveloped world markets 182 . The next possible level of production
cooperation is for a U.S. organization to act as a marketing agent for Russian
products in the West. The American partner is asked not only to utilize Russian
capabilities itself but to help the Russians expand their sales to third parties. This
approach can leverage American marketing and business knowledge along with
high performing and low cost Russian systems to create highly competitive
products in the international market. A reciprocal arrangement where U.S.
products obtain access to the Russian market through a joint venture is also
possible but of limited value due to the poor financial condition of potential
Russian customers. The use of a Western partner as an import/export agent has
been very popular in the sale of Russian products abroad. For example, the
German firm Kayser-Threde now has a joint venture with NPO Energia to
market Russian remote sensing data in the West to compete with Spot Image and
Landsat images 183 . Without such Western assistance, the Russians lack the
business and marketing expertise necessary to penetrate new markets. The most
advanced stage of production cooperation is the joint manufacturing of space
hardware, be it components or complete space systems. This type of cooperation
requires the greatest degree of interaction, the largest financial commitments and
the highest risks. Substantial differences between Eastern and Western business
practices result in many practical implementation barriers that must be overcome
when using this approach. Because of these difficulties, there has yet to be any
joint production of space hardware by Russian and U.S. partners. However, as
familiarity and confidence grows between the two leading space powers, it is
only natural to expect that one day this will change. But for such a change to be
possible, it is necessary that U.S. organizations learn to understand Russian
practices and capabilities better so that they can become better partners.
4.3.2 Impact of the Russian Business Environment
Possessing a full understanding of the operations and management
practices in the former Soviet Union is critical to implementing efficient and
productive joint space projects. The most important Russian business practices
of concern to potential Western partners were identified in Section 2.4. From the
182 L. Tucci, "Rimsat to Use Gorizont for Pacific Coverage", Space News, Jan. 25, 1993, p. 6.
183 "Selling Mir Images", Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 28, 1992, p. 13.
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discussions in that chapter, several fundamental cultural differences between the
space industry in Russia and those in the rest of the world were highlighted. The
following paragraphs will discuss the impact of these cultural difference on the
implementation approach that should be used for joint projects. Russian
industry's complete dominance by technical specialists and its prior operation in
a centrally planned economy has led to little development of business skills,
particularly marketing skills, by top Russian managers. As a result, Russian
enterprises tend to put all their effort into optimizing a product's technical
characteristics without considering the needs of potential customers or the
economic requirements for making the product salable. Consequently, when
forming joint ventures with Russian industry, U.S. partners must be prepared to
bear most of the burden for assuring that the project is adequately marketed and
financed. This is particularly true for highly integrated projects involving joint
R&D and production where the success of both parties depends on a well
managed overall program. U.S. partners should take responsibility for assessing
a product's potential market, determining the most important product attributes
for the customer, establishing customer relations and arranging for project
financing. In the process of working with Western partners, Russian enterprises
will learn how to more effectively perform these functions but in the early stages
of cooperation, Russian business naivet6 should not be underestimated.
The dominance of engineering professionals in the Russian space industry
has led to conservative product designs that rely on old proven approaches
instead of developing newer and more progressive ones. On the negative side,
this results in Russian systems that are generally bulkier, heavier and make use
of lower technology constituents than their Western counterparts. Consequently,
integrating Russian components into U.S. systems can be difficult because they
are designed using a different philosophy and often do not use the latest
technologies. On the positive side, Russian conservatism has led to their
development of remarkably robust and reliable space systems. U.S. engineers
who have witnessed the Russian's heavy reliance on product testing, in-flight
health monitoring, and their extensive quality assurance efforts have been highly
impressed 84 . The Russians are not confident enough to fly a piece of space
hardware until it has been tested to a far greater extent than is customary in the
184 J. Reardon, President of Energo, Incorporated, U.S. representative of NPO Energomash,
interviewed at his office in Revere, Massachusetts, November 12, 1992.
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West. The emphasis on robust designs has allowed Russian enterprises to mass
produce many of their space products without negative impacts on reliability.
Scale economies from mass production along with the long-standing Russian
priority on producing easily operable space systems (for application in
potentially hostile military environments) has resulted in low production and
operation costs for most Russian space systems. Therefore, whether forming a
joint venture to access technologies or manufactured hardware, one of the
greatest benefits that Russian cooperation can provide is the transfer of low cost
space capabilities to the West. U.S. partners must recognize this great potential
benefit and structure joint projects to make use of the cost savings inherent in
utilizing Russian manufacturing and technology development capabilities.
Another important cultural difference is the highly personal nature of
business relationships in Russia. Unlike in the U.S., personal contacts and
friendships are used to establish business agreements, not "open competitions"
and legally binding contracts. This situation is exemplified by the dominant role
of the Chief Designers within the space industry. Inside of a given enterprise, the
Chief Designer autocratically rules (usually for life) leaving employees few
avenues for advancement beyond his control. Consequently, personal fawning
over one's Chief Designers is not uncommon. An enterprise's external relations
are likewise at the complete discretion of its Chief Designer so that establishing a
personal rapport with this individual is essential for conducting business.
Potential U.S. partners must recognize these Russian practices in attempting to
create joint ventures with space enterprises in the former Soviet states. The
importance of personal contacts, especially with the Chief Designer, to a project's
potential for success cannot be over-emphasized. When simply purchasing
Russian products or funding a short-term study, establishing extensive contacts
may not be necessary but for any longer-term or more integrated effort,
developing a reliable relationship is essential. Russian business is built more
upon personal trust and respect than upon clearly defined legal procedures.
Although the hope is that greater contact with Western companies will introduce
more democratic and impersonal decision making into Russian business, for now
subjective factors such as friendships remain of utmost importance.
Due to their close association with the military, most Russian space
enterprises have a fairly secretive manner that tends to inhibit the full disclosure
of their capabilities and needs. Through continued Western exposure one would
expect the Russian industry to progressively open up as it develops confidence in
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the intent and benefits offered by Western firms. But for now, potential U.S.
partners must recognize the barriers that secrecy creates and structure their
programs to either accommodate or overcome these barriers. For example, many
Russian enterprises continue to produce substantial military hardware along side
of their civilian space products. It is not possible for such enterprises to
cooperate in a completely integrated fashion without exposing sensitive
technologies to U.S. partners. Accordingly, cooperative projects with these
enterprises must either be kept at the simpler stages that do not require extensive
interaction, or their military and civilian work must be separated to allow for
highly integrated joint space activities. A U.S. partner would only have control
over the former decision so that if a Russian enterprise decided not to separate its
military and civilian work, its partners only alternative would be to limit itself to
relatively simple forms of cooperation with the enterprise.
Beyond the cultural characteristics that have developed over many years of
Soviet rule, other more recently promulgated conditions must also be considered
when planning a joint venture with a Russian space enterprise. One of the most
important of these is the desperate financial condition of most space enterprises
in the former Soviet Union. Their shortage of funding for such basic needs as
paying workers, purchasing materials or maintaining facilities makes their direct
investment in international joint ventures out of the question under most
circumstances. Consequently, U.S. partners should expect to provide the lion's
share of the funding that will be required in a cooperative project with a Russian
enterprise. The political and economic uncertainties in the Commonwealth of
Independent States must likewise be considered in structuring joint ventures.
Politically, as the former Soviet states are divided into ever smaller autonomous
units, the union-wide supply network for space system components will
continue to deteriorate. The separation of Ukraine from the Russian Republic
proved a great shock to many Russian space enterprises who were no longer able
to obtain critical parts and materials from their Ukrainian affiliates. Political
instabilities make investment in Russian ventures more risky since no one can be
certain that government support for international joint ventures will be
maintained if the government changes. Economically, the worsening condition
and the potential for drastic changes in the structure of the economy add
additional risks. Space enterprises may irretrievably lose many valuable people,
technologies and facilities due to economic hardships, drastically reducing their
ability to contribute to a joint project. And with the impending privatization of
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industry, it is unclear who has the authority to commit enterprises to long-term
agreements or to sell specific assets. The political and economic environment
requires that great care be taken to effectively management risks in cooperative
projects. The uncertainties make any joint venture relatively high risk requiring
that risk reduction approaches, such as developing relations with multiple
suppliers or obtaining top level government commitments, be used to the
greatest extent possible. In the end, many of the risks involved in working with
the Russians cannot be avoided, but they can and should be managed.
The lack of established legal procedures in the former Soviet Union also
complicates business transactions and adds uncertainty to joint ventures. There
is no contract law or well-developed mechanisms for enforcing domestic, let
alone international, business agreements in Russia. Consequently, U.S. partners
must either be content with the personal commitments often used in internal
Russian transactions or impose contractual agreements on Russian partners that
in reality cannot be enforced. The latter approach is generally taken since it
makes agreements with Russian enterprises similar to agreements with any other
partners. But it must be recognized that these agreements are not backed up by
Russian law and therefore are far riskier than similar agreements with Western
partners. Finally, the general lack of business experience throughout Russian
industry puts some unique demands on potential partners. One of the greatest
demands is to bring Russian managerial practices up to international standards
before fruitful cooperation can be conducted. For example, in implementing its
joint venture with NPO Energomash, Pratt & Whitney found that it first needed
to teach the Russians some basic managerial control and marketing principles
before its joint activities could begin in earnest 185 . In particular, Energomash
possessed no adequate cost accounting system for determining how expensive it
was to perform particular tasks. Upon forming the joint venture, Pratt &
Whitney immediately went to work to install a cost accounting system at
Energomash that would keep track of the reimbursable expenses incurred by the
Russians in support of the joint activities. Without such a system, there is no way
to set a price on a particular service that is commensurate with the costs incurred.
Lack of accurate cost information has often forced the Russians to price their
products in a relatively arbitrary manner that has been greatly criticized by
185 J. Roberto, Director of Business Development & Planning, Pratt & Whitney's Government
Engines and Space Propulsion Division, interviewed by phone, November 6, 1992.
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international competitors 186. U.S. organizations considering joint ventures in
Russia must recognize that they will be required to be teachers as well as
partners to their Russian colleagues if their cooperative projects are to be
successful. Some U.S. organizations, SDIO being the most notable, have taken
advantage of Russian business naivete to procure their technologies and
products at unreasonably low prices. The Russians recognize their vulnerability
to such exploitation 187 and obviously taking advantage of them in their time of
need is not the way to develop a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship.
In conclusion, Russian space enterprises have many technical capabilities
but little financial support to provide to joint space ventures. They are long on
technical expertise but short on business experience. Consequently, American
partners should look to utilize Russian systems and technologies for their
technical as well as cost advantages, but should expect to provide the Russians
financial and business management support in joint space activities. Old rules of
engagement, developed for international partners who operate in a similar
manner to U.S. organizations, should not be force-fit to Russian cooperation.
U.S. organizations should recognize the differences in Russian business practices
and work with their Russian partners to develop internationally compatible
alternatives to their present modes of operation. Particular emphasis should be
placed on teaching Russian enterprises the importance of business control
systems, marketing and financial planning. By taking these steps, some of the
most important economic, political and managerial barriers to cooperating with
Russian enterprises can be overcome so that the substantial technical benefits
that they have to offer can be utilized by American partners.
186 P. de Selding, "Cheap Russian Launch Bid Confirms Competitor's Fears", Space News,
August 10-16, 1992, pp. 1 & 20.
187 I. Spirina & Y. Alekseyev, "Commentary on U.S. Russian Test of Topaz Reactor", on the
Tinko program, Moscow television, 1400 GMT, May 13, 1992.
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Chapter 5
Recommendations & Conclusions
The Russian space program offers numerous technologies, products and
services that could be profitably employed to lower costs and improve the
performance of American space systems. This study identified dozens of these
cooperative opportunities and there are undoubtedly many more that have yet to
be recognized. There is little argument over the applicability of Russia's
impressive space capabilities in the West. The difficulty arises not in trying to
identify worthwhile areas for cooperation, but in attempting to implement
programs to realize the potential benefits. Too often in the past, short-term and
narrow organizational objectives have been pursued at the expense of more
strategic national goals. To overcome this problem, this study has focused on
three national goals as the criteria for judging the value of cooperative space
projects. These national goals are to: improve the space program's efficiency,
support U.S. foreign policy, and enhance international competitiveness of the
domestic industry. Focusing on these national goals provides guidance not only
in what areas are useful for cooperation, but also in how cooperation should be
pursued. The above criteria can be effectively applied only by forming an
executive level coordination council for international space activities that is
capable of taking a national perspective in setting space policy. The specifics of
how such a council would create more consistent long-term strategies for
utilizing Russian space assets are presented in Section 5.1. NASA's strategy for
cooperating with the Russians would also benefit from greater emphasis on
national needs and on longer-term objectives. Specific recommendations for
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restructuring the agency's management of joint Russian activities to improve
their efficiency and their responsiveness to the above goals are enumerated in
Section 5.2. Finally, Section 5.3 provides recommendations for better
implementing individual joint projects with Russian partners. National concerns
play an important role in assessing implementation strategies even at the project
level, but other factors such as the unusual characteristics of Russian enterprises
are also important. Making the changes recommended in the following sections
at the national, agency and project levels will allow NASA, as well as the
domestic industry, to fully utilize Russian space assets in a manner consistent
with the long-term national interests of the United States.
5.1 Form Executive Level Coordination Council
National policy making in the U.S. for international space activities is in
disarray. Decisions on whether to cooperate on particular projects are being
made on a case-by-case basis with little attention to long-term national objectives.
With President Clinton's disbanding of the National Space Council, the U.S.
government has lost what little ability it had to coordinate the international space
projects of its many agencies. The interagency review process, which has proven
in the past to be inefficient and short-sighted, has now by default been given
even greater responsibility. But the inherently parochial interagency process is
incapable of taking a national perspective in its decision making. The relatively
low level officials who conduct the interagency reviews are more suitable for
assuring that established policy is implemented, not for developing new policy.
When they are forced into such a role, they retreat into their institutional biases
and argue for projects considering only their agency's limited needs. The results
are inconsistent and reactive policies that lack a long-term U.S. level perspective.
To break the cycle and produce more proactive policies that exploit the
burgeoning opportunities for international cooperation in space, particularly
with the former Soviet states, international space policy making must be elevated
to a higher level. NASA alone cannot change the top level space policy making
structure in the U.S. but it can promote such changes and make its organization
compatible with them. There is a critical need to improve space policy making at
both the national and agency level. NASA should pursue a strategy that directly
improves its own conduct of international projects as well as stimulates the
restructuring of policy making at the national level.
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Under the Bush administration, there were two separate White House
councils that in theory coordinated all high technology activities of the U.S.
government. These were the Federal Coordinating Council for Science,
Engineering and Technology, chaired by the President's science advisor and the
National Space Council, chaired by the Vice President. The councils themselves
were composed of the top administrators from over a dozen government
agencies, but most of their actual work was performed by executive staffs and
lower level working groups. With the transition to the Clinton administration, a
single Office of Science, Technology and Space, led by the President's science
advisor, John Gibbons, was formed. According to George Stephanopoulos, the
President's communications director, "[the] Science, Technology and Space
[office] is a combination of the science and technology and the space councils"188 .
Richard DalBello, a close associate of John Gibbons, has been put in charge of
space matters in the new office. There is no longer a dedicated White House
organization to provide national coordination for space activities. Although the
Space Council's ineffective track record made its demise under the new
administration inevitable, the need to coordinate space policy, particularly
international policy, is greater than ever. Consequently, it is imperative that a
new executive level council, devoted specifically to managing international space
activities be created. Only through executive level coordination can policies
remain focused on the broad objectives that can be achieved by international
cooperation. It is recommended that an International Space Activities
Coordination Council (ISACC) be established as one of the operating arms of
Office of Science, Technology and Space under the President. This new council
would be responsible for many of the dedicated space activities that were
formerly the purview of the National Space Council. It would establish top level
policy from a national viewpoint leaving the interagency review process
responsible only for assuring that policy was properly implemented. And most
importantly, it would create a national forum for assessing international
opportunities and for responding to them in a proactive manner.
The relationship that the International Space Activities Coordination
Council would have to other government bodies, industrial concerns and foreign
partners is shown in Figure 5.1. The ISACC members would be lower level
188 A. Lawler, "Single Council to Handle U.S. Space, Science and Technology", Space News,
February 15-22, 1993, pp. 4 & 21.
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Function of the International Space Activities Coordination Council
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executives (e.g. the manager of international space affairs) from each space-
related agency and not the chief executives who formed the former Space
Council. The agencies' chief executives could still meet approximately on an
annual basis in the President's Science, Technology and Space Council to debate
the highest level policy issues but they would have the support of the ISACC for
all international matters. The ISACC members would meet more regularly,
possibly on a monthly basis, to coordinate international activities and to perform
many of the tasks formerly done by working groups under the Space Council.
Although not agency administrators, the ISACC members must be of a high
enough level to understand the manifold impacts of international cooperation. It
is also important that they be open to the opinions of their colleagues from other
agencies to avoid the barriers to constructive policy making that plaque the
present interagency process. To obtain the necessary independence of thought, it
is suggested that a team spirit be promoted on the ISACC so that its members
have loyalties not only to their home agency but also to the coordinating council
itself. This can be achieved by establishing relatively long, fixed-term
appointments for council members and by allowing performance reviews from
their ISACC work to be used in promotion decisions. However, the ISACC
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members must also maintain contacts and influence back at their home agencies
to be effective. To assure that they do not become out of touch, council members
should periodically consult with top administrators at their respective agencies
and new members should regularly be rotated into the coordination council. The
council's independence from narrow agency agendas could also be promoted by
appointing its chairman from the staff of the Office of Science, Technology and
Space. Taken together, these measures should instill in the council sufficient
independence yet keep it well grounded in the individual agency needs,
allowing it to make decisions in the overall best interests of the nation.
The ISACC would utilize input from all space-related government agencies
in formulating America's international space policy. Of course the President and
his staff at the Office of Science, Technology and Space would have final
authority in approving U.S. policy, but their support of ISACC decisions would
be presumed except in the most extenuating of circumstances. The ISACC would
have the legal power to authorize or prohibit particular joint projects and the
political clout to enact a long-term cooperative strategy. The council would need
its own administrative budget, approved directly by the President's Science
Advisor, and an operating staff of around a dozen people. To do its job
effectively, it is important that the ISACC maintain close relationships with those
on Capitol Hill who are responsible for funding international space projects.
Once policy is established, the interagency review process would continue to be
used among the organizations shown within the dashed box in Figure 5.1 to
assure effective policy implementation. With the ISACC, policy could be
established proactively before specific projects are suggested unlike the present
reactive process whose agenda is fixed by the proposals in the system.
The ISACC should make much greater use of advice from businessmen in
forming international space policy than has been done in the past. To make
international space activities more supportive of commercial interests it is
essential that the private sector get involved at the policy formulation as well as
at the project implementation stage. Without the assistance of business concerns,
policy will tend to promote purely governmental goals without due regard to the
needs of commercial industry. A special industrial advisory board, composed of
top executives from space-related companies, should be formed to provide a
commercial perspective to the council. The widely recognized need to support
U.S. industrial competitiveness and to transfer business expertise to Russia,
makes the participation of businessmen in the policy making process even more
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important. Establishing formal channels to obtain private sector inputs to the
ISACC is necessary if the present inefficient system of constant congressional
lobbying by individual companies is to be improved upon. Finally, to assure that
all joint space activities meet the needs of foreign partners and are consistent
with established policy, the ISACC should act as the principal liaison to
international organizations. It could provide a single interface to the U.S. space
program for foreign partners allowing long-term relationships to be more easily
established. Such central coordination of U.S. international activities is
particularly useful for interfacing with multinational space coordinating bodies,
such as the Inter-Agency Consultative Group (IACG) 189, who are becoming
increasingly important in the management of international projects. Under the
proposed system, individual agencies could still pursue direct contacts with
foreign enterprises but any agreements that committed the U.S. government or
entailed the transfer of funds would require ISACC approval and oversight.
The major benefit of the ISACC is its elevation of international space policy
making out of the interagency process and into a White House level council.
Such higher level consideration of issues allows longer-term national objectives
to be pursued in a more consistent manner. It also allows the interagency
process to focus on implementation issues, as it was intended, so that it can
improve its own efficiency. But unlike the former Space Council, the ISACC
would be an established institution that demanded a substantial commitment of
time and loyalty from its members. By separating the policy creation from the
implementation process, the ISACC will be able to proactively develop strategies
for meeting the ever more stringent foreign policy and industrial competitiveness
demands placed on international space ventures. With the change in
administration, stimulating a restructuring of White House policy making
bodies, and the opening up of Russian space assets to the West, there now exists
an unprecedented opportunity to remake America's approach to international
cooperation in space. NASA should seize this opportunity and promote the
establishment of an organization such as ISACC to focus international joint
189 The Inter-Agency Consultative Group (IACG) for Space Science was formed in 1981 by
representatives from the U.S., Europe, Japan and the U.S.S.R. to coordinate activities to
explore Comet Halley. Its widely acclaimed success led to its permanent establishment
as a mechanism for managing international space science projects. For a complete
description of the IACG and its role in international cooperation see J. Johnson-Freese,
"From Halley's Comet to Solar Terrestrial Science: The Evolution of the Inter-Agency
Consultative Group", Space Policy, August 1992, pp. 245-255.
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ventures on national needs and thereby improve the image of the space program
in general. To miss this opportunity would be detrimental to our nation as a
whole and truly catastrophic for the long-term health of NASA and the U.S.
space industry.
5.2 Restructure NASA's Cooperative Activities
Without clear direction from the national policy making apparatus, NASA
has been slow to respond to the changes in the international space community.
Yet whether or not real reform is attained at the executive level of government, it
is essential that NASA restructure its own organization to better exploit
cooperation opportunities in the future. The agency cannot blame all of its
problems on a lack of executive level support, there exist many internal
shortcomings in NASA's present approach and management structures for
pursuing joint space activities. Developed during the 1960's and 1970's, NASA's
cooperative strategy is based on assumptions about the international space
community and the role of the space program in American society that no longer
hold. NASA must recognize the advances in other nation's space capabilities
and the broader interests in the U.S. that the space program now serves. Space
cooperation has become an important foreign policy tool for managing the stable
development of a market economy in Russia and for creating stronger
technological and cultural bridges to other nations around the world. Effective
cooperation has also become central to maintaining the competitiveness of U.S.
companies in the ever more global marketplace for space products and services.
These new goals cannot be effectively achieved using NASA's old strategy for
cooperation that was developed in a completely different era to manage projects
with completely different purposes.
NASA now has a broader mission not only to explore outer space and
advance space science as efficiently as possible, but also to utilize space activities,
particularly international activities, to further a broad range of foreign and
industrial policy objectives. Along with continuing to conduct its traditional
scientific and exploratory projects, NASA has begun more routine activities such
as the operation of the Space Shuttle and the Earth Observing System (EOS). As
space utilization continues to expand, operational space activities will become
increasingly vital and NASA may well need to solicit assistance from industrial
partners to effectively operate the burgeoning space-based infrastructure. In
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addition to supporting NASA work, private companies are striking out on their
own to commercialize space in such areas as telecommunications and remote
sensing. It is becoming widely accepted that NASA has a responsibility to help
U.S. firms to be internationally competitiveness in these areas. The agency must
re-evaluate its relationship with the domestic industry, no longer looking at
private companies simply as "contractors" but instead as "partners" in the
exploitation and utilization of outer space. Commercial interests are also an
important ally because of the broad-based political support that they can bring to
space activities during these uncertain budgetary times. Both to perform its
broader mission and to exploit recent developments in the international space
community (particularly in the former Soviet Union), it is essential that NASA
restructure its approach to space cooperation to make greater use of domestic
industrial partners. The following sections lists specific recommendations for
improving NASA's agency level strategy for pursuing international cooperation.
Although Russian cooperation is the focus of this study, several of the
recommended changes would benefit NASA's cooperative projects with other
foreign nations as well making their enactment even more obligatory.
5.2.1 Expand NASA's Cooperation with Russia
Although NASA has been slower than other U.S. agencies, companies and
foreign organizations in making use of Russian space assets, it is now conducting
substantial cooperation in the manned exploration and space science areas.
These activities should continue to be supported and expanded with only limited
modifications. In manned exploration, the present crew exchanges and docking
projects are laudable first steps but provide only limited and near-term political
benefits. These initial projects should lead to more broadly beneficial joint
ventures in the future that fully utilize Russia's vast assets in human spaceflight.
Russian spacecraft and technologies offer many opportunities to enhance U.S.
manned systems and lower their operational costs, yet these assets have been
only minimally exploited to date. Similarly, in space sciences, many data
exchanges and coordinated projects are now being conducted but there are few
truly joint activities that make full use of Russian capabilities. NASA's long-
range goal should be to move beyond these early stages of cooperation to more
advanced, and more broadly beneficial, cooperative approaches in both the
manned exploration and scientific areas.
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Outside of these two areas, NASA is conducting very few cooperative
projects with Russia and this must change. No longer is NASA's mission defined
as the conduct of space science and exploration for their own sake. Space
activities must now support national goals such as advancing U.S. foreign policy
or the competitiveness of the domestic industry if they are to obtain political
backing. Unless the agency steps up to these new roles and modifies its
international cooperative activities accordingly, it is in danger of losing its public
support. As stated recently by U.S. Representative Alan Mollohan, "NASA is not
connecting with the American people, and the agency is losing its relevance in
Congress". NASA must begin to "serve broader national needs" such as
supporting the technological competitiveness of the private sector or else it will
become "a Cold War anachronism" 190. Two commercial areas where NASA has
provided little support to industry in accessing Russian capabilities are in
satellite and launch services. The agency should expand its activities in these
areas considering the use of Russian hardware for its own use (possibly in
cooperation with a domestic partner) as well as assisting U.S. industry to utilize
such hardware. U.S. industry should be broadly defined to include small
entrepreneurial enterprises, who stand to benefit the most by using Russian
systems, along with the large established aerospace firms. Special effort should
be made to develop cooperative projects that introduce new capabilities into the
U.S. that enhance industrial performance while not creating unfair competitive
forces on individual private firms. Striking a reasonable balance is particularly
important in the launch services sector where Russian competition could
threaten domestic firms. NASA should also take a more aggressive role in
transferring competitive space technologies from Russia into the U.S., both to
support industrial competitiveness and to improve its own programs. Russia's
impressive technological achievements in space make joint ventures involving
technology transfer one of the most promising areas for cooperation which also
are relatively low risk to implement. By expanding Russian cooperation in its
traditional fields as well as into these new areas, NASA will be able to meet the
broader objectives now demanded of space projects and thus assure greater
support for its activities from the U.S. public and legislative leaders.
190 A. Lawler, "Image Change Needed for NASA to Gain Support", Space News,
March 15-21, 1993, p. 5.
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5.2.2 Elevate International Relations Function at NASA
Similar to the need to elevate the coordination of international space
activities at the national level is NASA's need to elevate its International
Relations division internally. International activities have become too numerous
and too important to be effectively managed by the lower level officials that have
been assigned this job in the past. Amazingly, NASA's top person responsible
exclusively for Russian space activities is three levels removed from the
Administrator! How can such a highly inter-related issue as Russian space
cooperation, which impacts over a dozen other agencies and foreign partners,
possibly be managed at such a low level? The answer is that it cannot. Since
officially international relations have been relegated to such a low position in
NASA's organizational structure, many informal channels of control for Russian
cooperative policy have developed. Several Associate Administrators and
Directors who formally have nothing to do with international activities often
play a substantial role in setting policy. In addition, many important
international policy making functions have been absorbed into program offices
that are conducting joint activities or diffused to field centers who have close
contacts with Russian organizations. NASA's informal and dispersed control of
Russian space activities makes their coordination with other agencies very
difficult. The lack of central control also tends to result in greater emphasis being
placed on lower level needs instead of broader national objectives. To overcome
these shortcomings and provide a focal point for interfacing with the ISACC, it is
necessary to elevate international relations to its just place near the top of
NASA's management hierarchy.
The recommended changes in NASA's organizational structure to elevate
international affairs is shown in Figure 5.2. At present there is an Associate
Administrator for such comparable functions as Public Affairs and Legislative
Affairs while International Relations is consigned to a division director within
the External Affairs office (Code I). Also included in Code I are Defense Affairs,
a Policy Coordination division and several other miscellaneous management
support functions. It is recommended that International Relations be elevated to
its own office headed by an Associate Administrator with a Director under him
responsible for Russian cooperation. This new Associate Administrator could act
as the representative to the ISACC and would have direct contact with the NASA
Administrator to assure that international affairs receive the necessary top level
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Figure 5.2
Recommended Elevation of International Relations at NASA
Existing Structure
Revised Structure
management oversight. To make room for a new Associate Administrator, the
Public Affairs and possibly the Legislative Affairs offices could be combined
along with the remaining divisions of External Affairs into one office for
Domestic Affairs. It is also recommended that the Commercial Programs office
be expanded and given greater authority (possibly changing its name to the
Industrial Relations office) so that it can better perform NASA's emerging role as
a partner with industry in promoting U.S. commercial competitiveness. The
International Relations office would need to work closely with the Industrial
Relations office to assure that its joint ventures met the needs of U.S. industry.
By making these organizational changes, NASA will be able to bring together in
one office, at a sufficiently high level, control for all of its diverse Russian space
activities. This new office, along with support from specialists in industrial
relations, would then be able to conduct Russian cooperation in a coordinated
manner that is more responsive to the needs of NASA and the U.S. industry.
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5.2.3 Revise Guidelines for Conducting Cooperative Projects
NASA's guidelines for conducting joint space activities were developed
many years ago when the U.S.-Russian relationship was quite different and the
demands on international projects were less complicated. Due to bureaucratic
inertia, the agency has been slow to change its cooperative approach to keep up
with the times. To fully exploit the numerous opportunities to cooperate with
the Russian space program in a manner consistent with U.S. national interests, it
is essential that NASA's reluctance to change be overcome. Its policies for
managing joint activities are presently too short-sighted and too focused on
narrow agency interests to achieve the broad objectives that now drive space
cooperation. To overcome these handicaps, five changes in NASA's guidelines
for conducting cooperative activities are recommended.
Firstly, NASA should no longer insist on "no exchange of funds" in its
international projects. Such a requirement unnecessarily constrains the agency
and limits its ability to support competitiveness and foreign policy goals,
particularly when dealing with the Russians. NASA's objectives to lower its
overall costs and assist domestic industry are not best served by the simplistic
rule to send no money overseas. Often space projects can be conducted for a
lower net cost by purchasing foreign hardware and the introduction of
international technology or components into the U.S. can help to improve the
competitiveness of domestic products. NASA should work with domestic
industry to develop a strategy for bringing into the United States the most widely
applicable foreign space capabilities through purchase or exchange agreements.
In the Russian case, infusing funds into the former Soviet space sector is a key
requirement to meet the important foreign policy goal of stabilizing their
industry. Yet a "no exchange of funds" rule restricts NASA from making any
real contribution in this area. NASA should no longer limit itself to barter
transactions in international activities but should instead take advantage of the
enhanced flexibility and opportunities offered by financial exchanges.
A second related guideline that also should be amended is NASA's
insistence on clean interfaces and limited technology transfer. The globalization
of the space industry is making artificial national barriers to the movement of
technology counterproductive. The U.S. should not attempt to outlaw
technology transfer but should instead manage it to its own competitive
advantage. Although some measures for protecting critical defense technologies
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must continue to be maintained, completely barring Russian technological
interaction with the West is no longer necessary for security reasons. NASA
should use its cooperative projects to access the substantial technological
achievements of the Russian space program, not prohibit such interaction by
rigidly requiring "clean interfaces". The developing global competition in space
products and services will be driven by technological innovation and NASA
must not cut itself off from international advances by insisting on no technology
transfer in its joint projects. Obtaining access to foreign technologies is one of the
best reasons for cooperating in space. For ease of management, simple
international interfaces are beneficial but they should not be blindly pursued
neglecting the technological incentives of more integrated cooperation.
A third NASA guideline requiring modification is the U.S. desire to control
all elements on the critical path. Retaining control of all critical elements in a
joint project is a costly and impractical approach for reducing risk. To fully
realize the financial benefits of space cooperation it is necessary to allow foreign
partners to produce and finance substantial contributions to joint projects.
NASA must recognize that it is no longer able to afford the luxury of controlling
all essential production so that it must find new ways to manage risks and to
establish leadership in space activities. The increasing level of international
cooperation and the growing capabilities of foreign partners makes U.S. critical
path control an unrealistic objective for most space projects. NASA should
instead accept the risks inherent in international cooperation and attempt to
more effectively manage them by developing long-term relationships with its
international partners built upon trust and respect.
The fourth change required is for NASA to take a longer-term perspective in
its international activities. The agency's pursuit of cooperation on a strictly
project-by-project basis neglects the synergy that a long-term relationship can
provide and puts insufficient emphasis on higher level national objectives.
Project managers have too narrow a perspective to see the implications of their
actions on national interests and the pressure to justify their project on its own
merits, isolated from concurrent benefits to related activities, cause non optimal
approaches to be taken. To overcome these shortcomings, industry has long
recognized the important role that strategic alliances can play in improving the
net productivity of international ventures. It is widely believed that the
"strategic alliances now common in the aviation and automobile industries" will
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soon begin to dominate the space industry as well1 91. The agency must
acknowledge this trend and modify its cooperative guidelines to be consistent
with the new business environment. NASA should learn from private industry's
example and begin to utilize long-term strategic alliances instead of strictly short-
term narrowly focused projects in conducting its own cooperative activities.
The fifth and final change that should be made to NASA's cooperative
approach is to de-emphasize government-to-government contacts in cooperative
activities. The expanding number of international projects along with the
increasing power of private companies in the space industry make the demand
for government leadership of all space cooperation unrealistic. Government
interfaces are too bureaucratic and develop too slowly to meet the rapidly
expanding needs of complex joint space ventures, particularly those involving
Russian partners. "Many feel that industry will, and should, lead the way in
bringing Russian technology into the U.S. space program" 192 . NASA must
recognize the increasing importance of commercial players in the space
community and its own limited ability to manage the more elaborate
international relationships that are emerging. The agency should no longer insist
on dealing exclusively with foreign governments but should instead form a
partnership with U.S. industry to access foreign space capabilities together. The
details of this recommendation will be discussed more fully in the next section.
By making use of the efficiency and experience of private companies in
implementing projects, NASA will be able to focus its efforts on assuring that its
overall cooperative program is supportive of broadly defined national goals.
5.2.4 Create NASA-Industry Partnership to Exploit Opportunities
The most important step that NASA could take to enhance its cooperative
activities with Russia, making them more efficient and more responsive to
national needs, would be to enlist the participation of U.S. industry in
implementing joint projects. The agency's reliance solely on its own internal
capabilities for managing the rapidly growing field of international space
191 J. Manbers, Vice President of NPO Energia USA, "Secret to 2 1st Century Success",
editorial, Space News, March 15-22, 1993, p. 15.
192 M. Smith, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service,
"Buying Russian Technology - Pros and Cons for the U.S. Program", Space Policy,
November, 1992, p. 365.
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cooperation, particularly Russian cooperation, limits its potential for success.
Utilizing industry as the principal interface to the Russian space community
would provide several important advantages. Firstly, NASA would be able to
continue to interact primarily with domestic firms with whom it has cultivated
long-standing and productive relationships. This would allow the space agency
to avoid developing many of the complex and costly interfaces that are necessary
to do business directly with the Russians. The burden of developing contacts at
the various relevant Russian organizations would rest with industry who, due to
its experience in forming strategic alliances and its less bureaucratic structure, is
more suited to such a task. Secondly, important foreign policy goals would be
advanced by using companies as an interface. Direct contact between U.S.
companies and Russian enterprises would provide the best means for teaching
Russian managers Western business practices and how to compete in a free
market. And through business-to-business contacts, the financial support that is
necessary to stabilize the Russian industry could be more easily provided since
companies, unlike NASA, are not politically adverse to funding foreign partners.
Thirdly, important industrial competitiveness goals would be supported by
utilizing private commercial contacts. Since the final destination of most
technology transferred to the U.S. is within industry, greater efficiency can be
achieved by having companies directly access Russian technology instead of
using NASA as a middleman. And stimulating companies to form Russian
contacts to meet NASA's needs can foster relationships that can be beneficially
exploited to improve the companies' competitiveness in other areas. Finally, and
maybe most importantly, making use of U.S. companies to interface with Russian
partners would increase the overall efficiency of joint activities. Commercial
management techniques are simply more innovative, flexible and cost-effective
than the more rigid approaches used in the government. Private companies are
driven by the profit motive to adopt the lowest cost approach whenever possible.
Unfortunately, in government agencies no comparable incentive exists. Joseph
Pelton, the former Director of Strategic Planning at INTELSAT, has argued that
privatized space activities are inherently more productive and easier to control
than government run programs. In his view, this has resulted in a "historical
evolution" whereby there is "a progressive shift in the organization of major
space activities away from the original space agency model towards more
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commercial management principles"'193. NASA should accept this trend and
utilize the greater efficiency that private initiative offers to improve the
implementation of its joint space activities with Russia.
To create an environment more conducive to an active role for private
companies in conducting Russian cooperation, NASA must undertake three main
tasks. Firstly, the agency must establish a clear and consistent policy on the types
of Russian assets that it will consider using in its programs. Obviously this
policy will have to be coordinated with the ISACC to assure that NASA's
international activities supports national objectives. Without such unambiguous
direction, private companies will be hesitant to initiate joint ventures with
Russian partners because of the fear that all their efforts may be for naught if the
space agency latter decides not to utilize Russian technology or products in a
particular area. Secondly, NASA should use its central position in the space
program and its experience in dealing with the Russians to assist industry in
making contacts in the former Soviet Union. This catalyst role is particularly
important to small U.S. firms who may lack the resources needed to overcome
the initial barriers involved in forming a joint venture in Russia. Thirdly, the
agency must work with the "trail blazing" firms who take the initiative and
pursue Russian cooperation in completely new areas. This support may include
purchase guarantees of initial production runs, indirect financial support or
simply providing access to the government experience base. Whatever the
teaming arrangement, NASA must demand that its industrial partner provide
real added value to the joint project and not just add an unnecessary (and costly)
layer of management. By taking these steps, NASA will help to create an
environment in which U.S. companies, both small and large, are motivated to
commercially exploit Russian space assets to benefit themselves, the space
program and broader U.S. national interests.
193 J. Pelton, "Organizing Large Space Activities, Why the Private Sector Model Usually
Wins", Space Policy, August 1992, pp. 233-244.
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5.3 Improve Effectiveness of Cooperative Projects
Due to a dearth of experience, the approaches presently being used to
conduct joint projects with Russian enterprises tend to have many shortcomings.
Simply shifting the burden for managing project level implementation away
from the government to the private sector will help but will not solve all of these
problems. The approaches used by both industry and government in structuring
joint activities need to be fundamentally changed. The short-term and narrow
objectives that are now being pursued must be replaced by more strategic
approaches to Russian cooperation. Ignorance of Russian business practices and
needs must be overcome if the benefits of joint U.S.-Russian ventures are ever to
be fully realized. In the following paragraphs, several specific recommendations
are presented for improving the effectiveness of cooperative projects with Russia.
The recommendations were derived not only by considering U.S. requirements,
but also by paying particular regard to Russian needs and capabilities. Too often
the unusual predicament of Russian space enterprises is given little weight in
structuring joint activities, resulting in projects that are only marginally beneficial
to the Russians and consequently of limited long-term value.
First of all, the utilization of Russian technical resources to lower costs and
improve the performance of U.S. domestic systems should be the top priority of
any joint venture. The extensive investment made by the former Soviet Union to
develop leading-edge space technologies and products should be exploited by
U.S. partners for immediate application in their own systems. Joint ventures
with other motivations such as obtaining access to the large Russian market for
space-related goods and services may be pursued, but should not be emphasized.
The unstable economic conditions and the limited financial resources of Russian
organizations give such ventures limited appeal, especially in the short-term.
Russian technological achievements offer opportunities for cooperation in a wide
range of areas. The simplest and most easily implemented projects make use of
Russia's vast Research & Development and testing facilities. Potential projects
include U.S. sponsored studies at Russian institutes to analyze or redesign
American space systems or to test American hardware. Low Russian labor rates,
their extensive experience in the design of space systems and their possession of
unique testing facilities make such joint projects highly desirable. U.S. partners
could also make use of Russia's in-space assets to lower the cost of performing
some of their space testing. For example, the Mir space station or one of the
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many Russian expendable microgravity capsules could be hired to perform U.S.
experiments in space biology or materials processing. Purchasing these services
from the Russians would be far less expensive than developing similar domestic
capabilities. Another slightly more complicated type of cooperative project
involves the direct transfer of Russian space technologies to the U.S.. This can be
achieved by exchanging technicians to learn new techniques, by transferring
written technical specifications or by importing pieces of Russian hardware that
contain the technologies of interest. Russian technological leadership in liquid
rocket engines, life support systems and space nuclear reactors, make these some
of the more promising areas for pursuing technology cooperation.
Instead of transferring Russian technologies to U.S. products for domestic
manufacturing, American partners could directly purchase advanced
components in Russia. This would take advantage not only of superior Russian
technologies but also the lower production costs that most Russian enterprises
enjoy. Components of particular appeal for purchase by U.S. partners are electric
thrusters, rendezvous and docking mechanisms and space batteries. The most
extensive use of Russian technical assets is obtained by purchasing complete
Russian systems. The former U.S.S.R.'s major investment in space infrastructure
allows it to manufacture and operate launch systems and satellites much more
cheaply than in the U.S.. Particularly in launch services, where the Russians
possess unique capabilities, there are significant opportunities for U.S. partners
to benefit by utilizing Russian systems. And Russia's extensive experience in
building and operating space stations could certainly be put to immediate
productive use in the United States. The recent initiation of yet another redesign
effort on space station Freedom makes Russian space station capabilities
especially interesting to NASA at this time. By utilizing Russian knowledge and
hardware developed for the Mir, NASA could substantially reduce costs and
improve the political support for the Freedom program. It is even possible that
the Mir and Freedom programs, the centerpieces of the Russian and American
space programs, could be combined creating the world's first truly international
space station. This would definitely provide a jump-start to U.S.-Russian space
cooperation. Scientists and engineers have no problem identifying literally
hundreds of areas where Russian assets could be used to improve U.S. systems.
American partners should pursue these technological opportunities and
structure their joint projects to exploit them for their cost saving and performance
enhancing benefits.
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Secondly, U.S. partners must recognize that the most desirable resource that
they have to offer Russian enterprises is hard currency. The desperate financial
conditions in the former Soviet Union along with the incredible ruble-dollar
exchange rate makes direct funding of Russian partners a necessary and
relatively low cost approach. Other potential U.S. contributions to a joint project
such as technology, business expertise and access to the U.S. market can be
important, but the critical allure from the Russian perspective is foreign funding.
The immediate need to pay personnel and buy materials to keep their enterprises
solvent outweigh any longer-term benefits that U.S. technological or business
contributions could make. In the near-term, U.S. partners should accept their
role as principal financier for joint activities conducted both in the U.S. and in
Russia. As the economic situation becomes more stable in the former Soviet
Union, the requirement that most financing comes from the U.S. may be
progressively relaxed. But for now, U.S. organizations should use their relative
financial strength as the best means of exchange for obtaining access to the
impressive technological capabilities of the former Soviet Union.
Thirdly, to fully realize the benefits that Russian technical assets offer, U.S.
partners must bridge the gap between American and Russian business practices.
Although the promise of financial support may be alluring to former Soviet
enterprises, productive projects will not be possible until some of the more
significant managerial barriers are overcome. These barriers exist both on the
U.S. and Russian sides. On the Russian side, the failings in their approach to
Western space cooperation are well documented. Jeffrey Manbers, the U.S.
Representative for NPO Energia, has identified four factors that are responsible
for this situation: "the greed factor -- an attempt by every side to make a lot of
profit for nothing; the Hollywood factor - the false idea that all Westerners are
incredibly wealthy; the conspiracy theory factor -- a belief that all negotiators
have more authority than they really have; and the status quo factor -- the
conservative mindset that makes commercial space projects difficult to
implement with the Soviets" 194. To this list the eminent Russian scientist Mikhail
Marov adds "the illiteracy factor - the rather primitive ideas of people in the East
on how to conduct business with the West" 195. To overcome these weaknesses
and misunderstandings in the Russian space industry, U.S. partners must act as a
194 J. Manbers, "Negotiating With the New Russia", Space News, January 13-26, 1992, p. 1.
195 M. Marov, "The New Challenge for Space in Russia", Space Policy, August 1992, p. 276.
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kind of "business teacher" to their new Russian partners. Contrary to what was
taught for decades in the former Soviet Union, capitalism is not built upon pure,
unadulterated greed. Western companies do pursue their own interests, but not
without due regard for the long-term implications of their actions.
Unfortunately, many Russian managers believe that the more greedy and short-
term they act, the more they are true capitalist. It is essential that during the
initial phases of a joint venture, U.S. partners instruct their Russian counterparts
on Western business practices and their potential application in former Soviet
industry. Russian enterprises need particular assistance in understanding the
role of marketing, strategic planning and the use of management control systems.
U.S. aid may need to go beyond simple instructional efforts to include assisting
the Russians in actually performing some of their marketing functions or in
installing more effective management control systems. Although performing
these functions places additional demands on U.S. partners, their acceptance of
this more complex role will greatly increase the overall potential for success.
On the U.S. side, companies must learn to understand the idiosyncrasies of
the Russian space industry so that they can interact with its enterprises more
effectively. In particular, the complete dominance of the Russian industry by
technocrats, with their disinterest in purely business functions such as marketing
and finance, must be recognized. The Russians will put all their effort into
designing a technically elegant solution that may completely disregard the needs
of many potential users. In a joint venture, the U.S. partner should demand
control of the business functions that have historically been neglected by the
Russians (e.g., strategic planning and customer relations) to assure that needs in
these areas are adequately addressed. U.S. companies must also learn to adapt to
the more personal nature of business relationships in the former Soviet Union. It
is often obligatory to first develop a personal rapport with the managers of an
enterprise before any substantial joint activities can commence. It is particularly
important to obtain the trust and respect of an organization's Chief Designer due
to this individual's direct personal authority over all business and technical
matters. U.S. managers should be careful not to insult their Russian colleagues
by insisting on too much strict formality in business dealings. The Russians are
far more comfortable with a relationship built upon trust and mutual respect
than one built upon binding contracts and legal commitments. Russian business
practices may seem very naive to U.S. managers but they should not be
summarily written off. Although inappropriate practices such as neglecting the
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marketing and cost accounting functions must be made to conform more with
Western norms, their more culturally based differences, such as their personal
approach to business, need not necessarily be changed. U.S. companies should
learn to accept these differences and work with the Russians to make the
diversity between our two nations a strength and not a weakness. Finally, U.S.
partners must realize that most Russian space enterprises still receive a
significant portion of their income from military production. Consequently,
complete openness to U.S. partners is impossible and some degree of secrecy
should be expected. As better relations develop the need for secrecy will
decrease, but for now the lack of complete disclosure should be accepted as
simply part of doing business with the Russian space industry.
The fourth and final recommendation for improving project level
effectiveness is for U.S. organizations to utilize risk management techniques
when conducting joint ventures in Russia. There is no denying it, the risks
involved in pursuing joint activities with a Russian partner are formidable. The
political and economic situation in all former Soviet states is highly uncertain.
There is no established legal framework by which to structure or enforce
contractual agreements with U.S. partners. And evaporation of public support,
and consequently funding, for many Russian space projects has led to critical
financial situations in some space enterprises and the overall deterioration of the
space industry. The difficulties created by all of these uncertainties are
compounded by poor communications and the general lack of cultural
understanding between the U.S. and Russia. However, having just enumerated
all the potential pitfalls, it must also be stated that none of the above difficulties
are as bad as some would have us believe. Although it is true that Russia is
going through a traumatic economic upheaval that has wrecked havoc
throughout the space industry, through all of this turmoil the Mir station has
been continuously manned and the cosmodromes have continued to launch over
50 space missions a year. For all our political stability, the U.S. cannot match
these achievements. Russian society is run by an enormous bureaucracy and
although cosmetic changes may occur rapidly, there is great inertia to maintain
ongoing projects at their present levels. Unlike the U.S. who is constantly
threatening to pull the plug on its international partners in the Space Station
Freedom program, Russia puts top priority on its international projects.
International space activities would be the last in line to be effected by any
domestic difficulties. This is particularly true for international projects that bring
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in foreign currency since due to the weak ruble, even small foreign payments can
maintain large segments of the Russian program for years. Consequently,
although the former Soviet Union is a very uncertain place, the top priority that
the Russians place on international space projects, the importance of attracting
hard currency and the slowness of change in such a large bureaucracy drastically
reduce the potential for Russian default in a major joint space project. Although
the risks are not as high as some may suggest, they remain substantial and thus a
risk management strategy is important for any joint venture. Therefore, U.S.
partners should make full use of contingency planning, multiple sourcing, fall-
back positions and other risk mitigation approaches in forming Russian joint
ventures. By recognizing the risks and managing them in a proactive manner,
U.S. firms can effectively control them and reap the benefits of Russian
cooperation with minimal uncertainty.
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